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Enhancing Democratic Communication? 




Against the political backdrop of the Palestinian conflict and Israeli occupation, 
this thesis focuses on the most important media in the Palestinian context, 
television, which has the widest reach and influence among Palestinians. The 
main aim of the thesis is to investigate the question of how far, in the perceptions 
of Palestinians, the two television channels – Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV – are 
contributing to the development of a new democratic political state through 
participative communication processes. Both quantitative and qualitative data 
were collected in the Gaza Strip between December 2009 and July 2010 through 
a survey questionnaire of 500 Gazans, semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews and focus groups with a range of participants, from university students 
and human rights activists, to journalists and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) employees.  
 
The thesis investigates the perceptions of different sectors of Palestinian society 
and media workers about their access to the television channels, their views on 
media reliability, freedom of expression, the watchdog role of television, their 
opinions on the status of democracy and human rights, and other issues related to 
media functions and democracy in Palestine. Three functions of the media - as a 
forum for discussion and debate; as provider of information and as a watchdog, 
critiquing the powers that be – are explored. The thesis examines how the media 
perform in providing the functions of democratic communication through 
exploring the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas 
governments and the two television channels Palestine Television and Al-Aqsa.  
 
The key findings of the research were, in the view of many respondents, that the 
two television channels, Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV, were controlled by the 
two political parties - Fatah and Hamas respectively and that this has 
compromised the media’s function to promote democratic communication and 
the democratic process. The thesis argues that the two political factions are trying 
to manipulate the public and conceal information that affects their power. As a 
result, the political parties have polarized the emerging public sphere. The lack of 
freedom of expression and access to information has prevented the establishment 
of a democratic space essential to create a coherent political system and on which 
to base a democratic society that respects human rights. 
 
The thesis concludes by suggesting, however, in the transition to democracy, the 
existence of partisan media may be able to fulfil a role in contributing to the 
democratization of Palestine. The two television channels do provide limited 
functions of democratic communication to their own factions, so between them 
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‘...Palestinians acknowledge the pluralism, values and freedom of opinion that the 
Palestinian media has greatly enjoyed up to this day. ... And, therefore, we will use our 
full power to stop any attempt to restrict the Palestinian media. Liberty was always one 
of the main goals of the Palestinian struggle’ (Yasser Arafat, 1994).  
 
‘...dominant elites today, especially the previous revolutionaries and freedom fighters 
(in other words, Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization), adopt a 
pragmatic policy whether with conviction or without, and use it as an excuse to 
suppress any opposition’ (Edward Said, 1996). 
 
 
1.1 Forging democracy in a conflict zone 
 
The problem of Palestine remains one of the most vexed, unresolved issues in the 
contemporary world. It is a key concern at local, regional and global levels, because of 
its position in the geo-politically and economically important Middle East. Palestine is a 
conflict zone because of its position geographically and historically as a holy place for 
the world’s three major religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The roots of the 
Palestinian problem go back to the first Zionist Congress organized by Theodor Herzl in 
1897 in Basel, Switzerland. As the Jewish populations across Europe were facing racial 
discrimination and violence, Zionist ideologists wanted to create a Jewish homeland 
which would attract Jews from around the world and thus end the prejudice and hatred 
they experienced for centuries in Christian Europe (Za’aiter, 1986; Herzl, 1946; Vital, 
1980). The Basel Congress approved that Palestine should become the homeland for 
Jewish, paving paved the way for the colonisation of Palestine by Zionist settlers (Ilan, 
2006).  
 
By 1914, Jewish population in Palestine had reached 85,000, and as the strategic 
position of Palestine became more pronounced during the First World War, many 
Jewish groups argued that they could protect and promote the regional interests of the 
European powers (Al Hammad, 1997). It was ignored that over half million Palestinians 
were living in Palestine, their traditional home. Instead, the argument was made that 
Palestine was uninhabited and its population was nomadic, travelling in and out of the 
territory without a fixed home (Za’aiter, 1955). The slogan which was making round 




The Sykes-Pico Agreement which was signed by Britain and France in 1916 divided the 
Arab region into zones: Lebanon and Syria were handed over to France, Jordan and Iraq 
to Britain, and Palestine was to be internationalized (Abu A’arafa, 1981). In November 
1917, the British government issued the Belfour Declaration, named after the Foreign 
Secretary Arthur J. Balfour, promising the Jews the establishment of a national home in 
Palestine. It stated that:  
 
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country (cited in Smith, 2004, p.72). 
    
The Balfour Declaration was a crucial endorsement for the creation of a Jewish state. 
Concerned about being evicted from their homes, the Palestinians resisted the new and 
enhanced Jewish migration to the region. By the end of Second World War, the conflict 
between Palestinians and Jewish groups had been militarized (Khouri, 1976; Neville, 
1976). The newly formed United Nations intervened to resolve the crisis: in November 
1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 which divided Palestine into 
two states (Ferguson, 1973).  
 
The Palestinian rejected the plan on the grounds of sheer injustice: Palestinians 
constituted 70 per cent of the population and owned 92 of the land, but were allocated 
only 47 per cent of their country, while the Jewish total was only 30 per cent of the 
population and they owned just 8 per cent of the land, but were awarded 53 per cent of 
Palestine (Abu Sitta, 1998). Even though the Jewish leaders had not accepted the 
partition plan, they agreed to establish their state on the granted land. The Arabs 
rejected the partition of Palestine, arguing that this will legitimize the existence of a 
Jewish state in Palestinian land. The holocaust and its aftermath had created a wave of 
global sympathy for the Jewish people, reflected in the United Nations decision to 




The creation of Israel shattered the Palestinian community, hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians became refugees (Gerner, 1991). In December 1948, the United Nation 
General Assembly passed Resolution 194 which called for the United Nation 
Conciliation Commission to facilitate the return of Palestinians refugee to their homes 
(UN, 1948a). The resolution known as the Palestinian Right of Return which insisted 
that the Palestinians have a right to return to the homes and villages they were forced to 
leave. Although the Western powers called Israel to permit the Palestinians to return to 
their home, Israel refused to accept the resolution, linking its acceptance to have a peace 
agreement with neighbouring Arab governments. Israel found itself surrounded by 
hostile countries. From the Israeli prospective, Palestine is their historical and holy land 
and Palestinians belong to Arab countries, and therefore Arab countries should absorb 
the Palestinians into their societies (Said, 1992). Since then the Palestine-Israel conflict 
has escalated into regional wars – including the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars - as well as 
subsequent Israeli incursions in southern Lebanon and Gaza. (Cattan, 1988; Masalha, 
1992; Masalha, 2000; Sela and Ma'oz, 1997; Ilan, 2006).  Of these, the most significant 
was the 1973 war which changed the geo-political reality of the region. The United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling all parties to ceasefire and to 
implement the Security Council Resolution 242, which was passed after the 1967 war, 
and called for ‘withdrawal of Israeli forces’ from Palestinian territories of West Bank 
and Gaza Strip which it occupied during that war. (Aronson, 1990; Abu Khalaf, 2009). 
Despite repeated pressure from various Arab countries these two crucial UN resolutions 
remain unimplemented (Masalha, 2000; Ilan, 2006).    
  
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains at the heart of Middle East politics. It has 
defined the geo-political landscape of the region for more than six decades. It is not 
surprising then that the case of Palestine has attracted many scholars who have 
researched and written about political, social, religious and cultural aspects of the life 
there. Recent Palestinian history is the story of a people who have high ambitions to end 
the occupation of their ancient land and to build a new democratic state (Bennis, 1990). 
The Israeli occupation has made them refugees in their own land, a population without a 
political identity, living as stateless citizens, either under military occupation or as 
minorities in the Israeli state. The outside world, especially the West, has been 
intimately involved in the process, trying to mediate between the two sides to resolve 
the crisis (Sela and Ma’oz, 1997; Ilan, 2006). During the Cold War years, it became a 
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key site for superpower rivalry, with the Soviet Union supporting the Palestinian cause 
while the West, led by the United States, standing by their strongest regional ally, Israel 
(Aruri, 1984). 
 
However, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
1991, followed by the US attack on Iraq earlier that year, the US and its European allies 
promised statehood to the Palestinians. After the Oslo Agreement of 1993, the first ever 
multi-party elections took place in the Occupied Territories. These generated much 
enthusiasm among Palestinians, who at last expected to practise real democracy in all its 
aspects, such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, participation in decision-
making, the rule of law, implementation of human rights, as well as civil and political 
rights protected by the constitution. It was also expected that independent and 
professional media institutions would be established in order to play their role as a 
fourth estate and cooperate with civil society organizations to prepare for building a 
new state. This altered political situation has encouraged interested researchers to study 
the nascent democracy in Palestine.  
 
Despite continuing political instability in the Palestinian territories, democracy there is 
taking small but steady first steps. However, to study democracy in such a complex 
situation, many issues have to be taken into consideration, such as the difficult 
circumstances that the Palestinians live under, which is represented in the complicated 
socio-political situation, the troubled and still unfolding peace process and the reality of 
the Israeli occupation. There is no doubt that the Palestinian Authority (PA) does not 
exercise full sovereignty to implement democracy in a meaningful manner. This is, in 
part, due to the external pressure that is constantly imposed on the Palestinian Authority 
by Israel and the international community. Operating under such pressures has made the 
PA little more than a docile and dependent entity, unable to implement its commitments 
towards democracy and human rights. Soon after acquiring power, it started to impose 
censorship and restrictions over freedom of expression, and commit violations against 
human rights. This has led to the vanishing of the opposition groups and eroding the 
power of the adversarial media - both considered vital for a healthy democracy. 
Inevitably, such a situation has had a negative impact on Palestinians and Palestinian 




The peace process and agreements signed between the two sides, Palestinians and 
Israelis, started in 1991, after the end of the first Gulf War, when President George 
Bush called for an international conference on Middle East peace, to be organized in 
Madrid. Despite the Israeli objection to Palestinian attendance, the delegates 
participated in the conference in conjunction with the Jordanian delegation. After this 
high-profile and much publicised conference in the Spanish capital, secret negotiations 
continued between the Palestinian groups, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and Israeli government in Oslo, leading to the so-called Oslo Accords 
(Baumgarten, 2005). On 13 September 1993, Washington invited the two parties to sign 
the Declaration of Principles (DOP) at a ceremony, where the PLO chairman shook 
hands with the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Rabie, 1995). In May 1994, 
Yasser Arafat returned from his enforced exile in Tunis to take control and head the 
newly formed Palestinian Authority. According to agreements between the PLO and 
Israel, additional areas were handed over to the Palestinian Authority. The PA and Israel 
continued to negotiate in several rounds of talks and signed many other agreements. The 
announcement of the DOP gave great hope to the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories, as they believed that this would end the Israeli occupation and liberate some 
of the territories. Indeed, such announcement marked an historical development in the 
peace-making process. 
 
In January 1996, Palestinian elections took place, in which 88 members of the 
legislative council and the president of the Palestinian Authority were elected. Among 
Arafat’s many opponents were the Islamist groups, particularly strong in the Gaza Strip, 
inspired by and under the influence of Egypt’s powerful Muslim Brotherhood (Hilal, 
2006). The Islamic parties, led by Hamas, opposed Arafat and the Oslo Agreement he 
signed, thus delaying the elections. However, the elections were conducted 18 months 
later than planned to consolidate Arafat’s hold of the Palestinian population and silence 
the opposition. Arafat controlled the election in a sense to prevent anyone to contest 
against him without his approval. As a result, Arafat became the first President of the 
Palestinian Authority (Muhsen, 2003).   
 
The concessions that the PA was almost forced to give to Israel under the agreements, 
embarrassed Arafat and eroded his credibility within sections of the Palestinian society. 
According to the agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, the PA had 
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to control Palestinian military factions. The two religious groups, Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, opposed such control, and decided not to respect the agreements between the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel. Since the first Intifada in 1987, Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad had a strong base in the Occupied Territories. They had earned much social 
solidarity through focusing on social welfare, education, healthcare, and establishment 
of charitable organizations. Indeed, they acquired their support and political growth 
from such social services (Abdullah, 2005).  
 
The next major step in the peace process was the Camp David summit convened in July 
2000 by the US President Bill Clinton, who invited the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak, and the PA Chairman Arafat. After Arafat refused what Barak offered him in 
Camp David, Israel declared he had not worked as a peace partner, while the US blamed 
Arafat for not taking the advantage of this opportunity. The US argued that Arafat was 
not only responsible for the failure of Camp David summit, but also for the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada (Rubenberg, 2003; Baroud, 2006).  
 
In September 2000, hard-line Ariel Sharon supported by dozens of Israeli forces, visited 
the Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Temple Mount) in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit, part of 
his campaign for Prime Ministership, had outraged most Palestinians, as they 
considered it as an assault on one of the holiest shrines for Muslims. Consequently, 
violent demonstrations took place against the Israeli forces. Gradually, the 
confrontations exploded into the Second Intifada and spread all over the Occupied 
Territories. As a result, Israeli forces reoccupied the territories granted to the Palestinian 
Authority (Laetitia, 2004). The incident raised Sharon’s popularity within Israel and 
helped him to become Prime Minister. 
 
One outcome of this action was that the Palestinians were living under stricter security 
control. The agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel had stipulated that 
the PA was responsible for internal security in the Occupied Territories and to prevent 
any violent actions against Israeli targets. The fledgling and resource-starved Palestinian 
police forces were made responsible for security and controlling the territories. There 
was a growing sense among the Palestinians that rather than confronting the Israelis, the 
Palestinian Authority was suppressing its own people. This was at a time when there 
was the continuing expansion of the Jewish settlements on Palestinian territories. Even 
though negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel were going on, Israeli 
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government did not stop the expansion of settlements (Baroud, 2006). This situation had 
weakened the position of the Palestinian Authority among the Palestinians. In contrast, 
Hamas, by opposing to hold negotiations with Israel, gained public support. Moreover, 
the two religious groups - Hamas and Islamic Jihad - were challenging the Palestinian 
Authority. Influenced by militant Islamic ideology, these groups argued for a ‘holy war’ 
against the Jewish state. From their perspective, negotiations with Israel would not 
result in returning Palestinian land to its legitimate inhabitants. The only solution, so the 
argument went, was to fight and forcibly expel the Jewish settlers from Palestine 
(Beinin and Stein, 2006).  
 
For the Israelis and the US Administration, Arafat’s long political career was coming to 
an end as he was increasingly becoming irrelevant within Palestinian politics. The 9/11 
attack in New York and Washington also contributed to the changing US geo-political 
priorities in the Middle East, with ‘Islamic’ terrorism becoming a primary concern. A 
major blow to Arafat’s reputation was inflicted in January 2002 when Israeli forces 
captured Karine A, a ship carrying weapons. Israel declared it had been sent from Iran 
to Palestine and succeeded in convincing the US administration of Arafat’s 
responsibility and even complicity in the Karine A incident. The US Administration 
accepted the Israeli version and considered Arafat had violated the peace accords and 
thus deceived the international community. Israeli forces surrounded the Palestinian 
President Arafat in his compound in Ramallah in the West Bank and destroyed it except 
the floor where he was trapped. They restricted his movement and declared the area a 
closed military zone (Beinin and Stein, 2006). 
 
In June 2002, President George W. Bush called for Arafat’s removal because he had not 
done enough to stop ‘terrorist’ attacks against Israeli targets. He declared that the 
Palestinians could build their viable state only by fighting terror, reforming their 
political process, and change their leader. The change of Palestinian leadership and the 
beginning of new political development resulted in the emergence of the ‘Road Map’, 
which was composed by the ‘Quartet’: the United States, Russia, the United Nations, 
and the European Union. In March 2003, after the pressure from the Quartet, Arafat 





This was a major shift in Palestinian politics as Arafat was for decades seen all over the 
world as ‘Mr. Palestine,’ having relentlessly pursued the cause for the liberation of his 
motherland (Cobban, 1984). Arafat died in Paris on 11 November 2004, his death 
marking an end of an era of Palestinian history. Within weeks of the death of the most 
popular Palestinian leader, presidential elections took place in the Palestinian territories 
- on January 9, 2005. Mahmoud Abbas won the elections and became the Palestinian 
Authority President. Despite the public support they had got, Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
boycotted the elections. For them entering the elections meant a change in their 
ideology and an end to the resistance to Israeli occupation (Usher, 2006). 
 
However, a year later, in January 2006, when the elections for the Palestinian 
parliament were held, Hamas changed its strategy and announced its participation. They 
won many seats and thus gained the majority within the Palestinian parliament (Hilal, 
2006). The victory of a party hostile to the Jewish state alarmed the Israeli government 
and their US allies. Consequently, Israeli government declared that if Hamas 
participated in any government activities, Israel and the international community will 
not recognize the Palestinian National Authority (Brom, 2006). This stern warning 
forced Hamas to moderate its policies towards Israel and change its strategy to be 
recognized as mainstream political movement. The party stopped attacking Israeli 
targets, and declared a cease-fire against Israel (Beinin and Stein, 2006). 
 
Yet, the United States and Israel continued to consider Hamas as a terrorist group, and 
therefore they would not allow it to represent the Palestinians. The Israeli government 
and the US pressurized the Palestinian President Abbas to prevent Hamas from being 
part of the government. This assertion was not without its contradictions: before the 
Palestinian elections in 2006, the US had called for democracy in the Middle East, 
arguing that all political parties had the right to participate in the elections. When the 
elections approached, both Israel and the US were aware that Hamas was contesting the 
elections. However, they did not expect Hamas to win so many seats. The US avoided 
any overt communication with Hamas and maintained a very sceptical attitude 
regarding its participation in the new Palestinian government (Seo, 2009). 
 
Within the faction-ridden Palestinian politics too, the rise of Hamas and its huge public 
support was viewed with alarm. After Hamas swept the elections, the Fatah party (the 
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party established by Arafat) refused to participate in any government led by Hamas. In 
addition, after they came to power, Hamas started to take over leadership positions 
within the Palestinian Authority. This situation irritated Fatah leaders. Tensions 
between Fatah and Hamas militants gradually increased in the Gaza Strip – the Hamas 
stronghold, culminating into street fighting. In May 2007, the conflict between Fatah 
and Hamas had escalated to such an extent that the supporters of the two parties 
exchanged fire. Consequently, in June, Hamas succeeded in gaining control of the Gaza 
Strip and expelled Fatah to the West Bank. Many reconciliation attempts led by Arab 
leaders, Palestinian independent groups within Palestine as well as other Palestinian 
political faction leaders took place, but without any success.  
 
Implementing electoral democracy against the backdrop of such a politically-fraught 
environment is extremely difficult. The hostility between the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
and Hamas led to the latter’s focus on social life to win public support. It invested in 
building a network of Islamic social institutions such as schools, sport clubs and clinics. 
Such socio-economic support systems coupled with its continued resistance to Israeli 
occupation, provided Hamas with a large popular base among the residents of Gaza. 
While in the West Bank, the PA led by Fatah, monopolized the political arena since its 
establishment, and prevented others participating in political decision-making. Unlike, 
Hamas, the PA came to terms with the Israeli state, in the process losing some 
credibility and support among the Palestinian public. When it participated in the 
parliamentary elections in January 2006, Hamas raised the slogan of ‘Reform and 
change’. Its victory in those elections, judged by international observers as transparent 
and fair, was not respected by Israel and its allies. 
 
Political analysts argue that in order to have a democratic political system in Palestine, 
it is important to integrate the Islamic movements such as Hamas into the political 
process. Ideological differences are healthy in a democracy and contribute towards 
building a liberalized and pluralist political system. However, electoral politics has 
instead exacerbated tensions and the two parties - Fatah and Hamas - have monopolized 
the political decision-making in their spheres of influence (West Bank and Gaza, 
respectively) and prevented other factions participating in democratic processes. Each 
party has suppressed the others’ voices, thus undermining key aspects of democracy. 
Freedom of expression among political opponents has been severely restricted, while no 
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criticism of authorities is tolerated. For journalists and media professionals, new and 
strict restrictions have been imposed to curb their already limited freedom to acquire 
information and express their views. In such circumstances, public participation in 
democratic processes has been confined to party members only, excluding a majority of 
the other voices. Increasingly, the media are unable to criticize political elites and their 
role as a fourth estate has been undermined. The rule of law becomes difficult to 
implement in the absence of a fair judicial system, and human rights violations have 
become almost routine.  
 
In addition, the continued Israeli occupation remains another key factor obstructing the 
implementation of democracy in the Palestinian territories. Despite the Israeli 
government claims that it prefers to negotiate with democratic Palestinian government, 
it has become clear that it only wanted to enter in talks with a pliable Palestinian group 
such as Fatah, rejecting any Hamas participation in the governance of Palestine.  
 
As the 2006 elections demonstrated, Hamas has a popular base within Palestinian 
society and it is capable of wresting power from the PA even in the West Bank. Such a 
scenario does not suit Israel as it cannot control and pressurise Hamas in the way it has 
managed with Fatah. During its direct occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
Israel did not encourage freedom of expression and freedom of information, as that 
contradicted with occupation laws. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has been pressurising 
the Palestinian Authority to suppress the Palestinian opposition parties. It has 
announced its opposition to Hamas holding power and forming the Palestinian 
government, and if that happens, it has threatened to abandon any negotiations with the 
Palestinians. It placed political and security pressure on the Palestinian Authority to 
impose restrictions on the freedom of expression of Palestinians. Such pressures have 
affected the whole status of democracy in the Palestinian territories. 
 
1.2 The nature of Palestinian society 
It is important to note the distinctive nature of Palestinian society in Gaza, a society 
which has lived under occupation and constant economic blockade. Such economic and 
political realities inevitably have an impact on social norms and structures – the class 
division in Gaza is less clearly visible than in many other Arab countries. According to 
Professor Rafiq El-Masri, a well-known socialist in Gaza, the structure of Palestinian 
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society has been profoundly shaped by the special circumstances prevalent, notably the 
Israeli occupation, an occupation different from others such as the French colonization 
of Algeria. He added, ‘The Israeli occupation is ideologically based on transfer policy in 
which they transfer the original people from their lands to outside. But in Algeria, the 
French colonialism was known for occupying territories and establishing settlements, 
but they did not expel the original people’. Israeli occupation expelled the Palestinians 
and thus created the refugee problem. This has created a situation in which Palestinians 
could not form a complete society. Thus it is not possible to refer to the situation in 
Palestine as a complete society; instead it is necessary to talk about Palestinian 
communities. These communities are located in different areas such as the Gaza Strip, 
the West Bank and Palestinians refugees dispersed all over the world.  
 
The Gaza Strip is geographically a very small area, densely populated, with very few 
natural resources. The Strip was administered by Egypt until 1976, the year it was 
occupied by Israel then in 1994 the Palestinian Authority took control. Even after the 
Strip became nominally independent under the control of the Palestinian Authority, 
recourses remained limited. Consequently a robust business class has not yet emerged, 
because more than 75% of Gaza’s population are refugees. These people have no land, 
no regular job and therefore no proper income. After the Palestinian Authority came to 
power in Gaza, a new class developed. This class, according to El-Masri, can be called 
the ‘aristocratic class’ which lives off the Palestinian Authority resources – themselves 
dependent on donor aid. Most ordinary people remained as they were: jobless, poor and 
deprived. The unemployment statistics in Gaza Strip for the last year were very high 
(PCBS, 2010).  
 
1.3 Media and democracy in Palestine   
 
Given this complex political legacy, as outlined above, it is important that any analysis 
of the Palestinian media has to take into consideration the historical circumstances 
which have shaped and continue to influence the Palestinian political landscape. Over 
several past decades, the Palestinian media have suffered from various forms of 
occupation and mandates in which suppression and repression were the main 
characteristics. Since the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, Israeli 
authorities have been imposing restrictions on journalists, censoring those who report 
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anti-Israeli stories and arresting the ones who violate the occupation laws. Operating 
under such difficult regime, a vast majority of Palestinian journalists were limiting their 
work to the coverage of mostly local news.  
 
After control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip passed to the Palestinian Authority 
and Hamas respectively, the security forces for both organizations became responsible 
for dealing with journalists. Following on the tradition of Israeli authorities, 
these security forces too were ruthless in curtailing media freedoms and the right 
of journalists to access information. It is not surprising then that even the ordinary 
people of Palestine have been affected by this culture of censorship and coercion. This 
has prevented them from participating in political processes, and the discourse of 
democracy and human rights has therefore been undermined by both authoritarian and 
sectarian tendencies. 
 
Although the Palestinian media had played an important role in raising the Palestinian 
issue among other Arab nations, and indeed internationally, in its domestic context, it 
tended to fuel the internal conflict and contributed to the drift into a spiral of political 
struggle. In this ideological battle for power and privilege, the official and opposition 
media in Palestine were expressing their respective party’s position and broadcasting 
partisan, and sometime inflammatory, material rather than disseminating information 
and opinion which would create a culture of tolerance and promote democratic 
pluralism. Such a partisan media reflected negatively on freedom of opinion and 
expression and acted as a setback for the establishment of democracy in a fragile and 
fragmented polity, whereas democratic media provide the opportunity for citizens to 
participate in dialogue that contributes to reducing tension and encourages attitudes that 
serve the public interest.  
 
The political system prevalent in the Palestinian territories, represented by the 
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, 
has played an influential role in creating an atmosphere of control and censorship, and 
has prevented freedom of expression, especially among workers in the media sector. As 
some semblance of power shifted to the local elites after the elections, they succeeded in 
building cordial relationships with journalists and media institutions, thereby ensuring 
that favourable reporting became the norm. For many Palestinians, this close proximity 
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of a partisan media to those in power made the media information suspect, thus 
undermining the role of media in the public sphere. As for the journalistic community 
within Palestine, such a media culture divided journalists and media organizations 
between those who promoted the elites and those who chose to practise self-censorship.  
 
In addition, the absence of laws or negligible implementation of those laws on the 
statute books, have resulted in a situation where there are little or no legal procedures to 
protect freedom of expression and violations against press freedom. In fact these 
violations have progressively become more strident, extending to kidnapping and 
physical attacks against journalists.  
 
However, in the light of political changes in the Palestinian arena, freedom’s margins 
are always changing. On occasion media coverage has provided meaningful criticism of 
contemporary issues and gone beyond partisan politics and the narrow ideological 
framework which has defined Palestinian life in the post-9/11 era. 
 
Against this political backdrop of a partisan media system, this thesis focuses on the 
most important media in the Palestinian context: e.g. television, which has the widest 
reach and influence among Palestinians. Specifically, it examines the contribution of 
two major television networks in Gaza - Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV - to the political 
process and democratization of discourse in one of the world’s most difficult political 
spheres. The channels are chosen as case studies as they represent the two major 
political groups in the Palestinian society: while Palestine TV represents the interests of 
the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, Al-Aqsa TV promotes the Islamist Hamas. 
 
This is undertaken through a detailed and wide-ranging study of the reception of 
television among Gazan citizens. The discussion is organized within the broader context 
of the relationship between a largely partisan media and a nascent democracy. Five 
major themes are addressed: the first theme, Palestinian television and public 
participation, examines the role of Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV in providing a 
platform for open discussion of divergent opinions and a consideration of whether the 
two channels create an arena for different groups to communicate freely with each 
other. The second theme, Political dimensions of television in Palestine, demonstrates 
how the two channels relate to both political parties – Fatah and Hamas – and function 
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as a mouthpiece for the factions. It also explores to what extent these channels help in 
bridging or expanding the political divide in Palestine. The third theme, Television 
performance and promotion of democracy, examines the role of the two television 
channels in fostering democracy, in relation to the three functions of media in a 
democracy: information, forum and critique. The fourth theme, Television’s role in 
monitoring government actions, is concerned with the role of the two channels in 
monitoring government activities. It explores to what extent these two television 
channels function as a fourth estate, able to take a stand against government corruption 
and to criticise those in power.  The fifth theme, Television and the project of state-
building, aims to illustrate how the control of the two channels affects the state-building 
process, and the importance of an independent media at a difficult stage of its evolution. 
It also aims to illustrate practical evidence of how the measures against the media and 
restrictions on journalists affect the process of state-building.       
 
It is important to emphasise that for the purposes of this dissertation the definition of 
democracy is not limited to elections. In this context, democracy is about freedom of 
information, freedom of expression, independent and pluralistic media, public 
participation and state-building. Our understanding of the media too needs to be in its 
broader context. It is suggested that independent media are vital for a society and help in 
shaping the public sphere and reinforcing the process of democracy. It is considered as 
the backbone for democracy, providing credible information and enabling citizens to 
participate in political decision-making. It can play a watchdog role to reveal misuse of 
power by those in authority. It is argued that a free flow of information strengthens 
democracy and empowers citizens.  
 
In Palestine, as elsewhere in the world, politicians and other influential groups attempt 
to control the media in order to communicate with people, influence public opinion and 
shape the public sphere. Unlike in mature democracies where this process has acquired 
political sophistication, as the management of media for political purposes is done with 
professionalism, in much of the Arab world control is maintained by coercion. Given 
the history of occupation and exploitation, the Palestinian case provides a very good 





1.4 Research questions and thesis structure 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the central question: How far, from the point of 
view of Palestinians, the two television channels - Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV - have 
contributed to the democratic process, by enabling political participation through 
democratic communication? 
 
Arising from this are the following sub-questions: 
 
• To what extent do the two networks supply the necessary political information 
to Palestinians in Gaza? 
• Do the two networks provide a platform for political participation to Gaza 
residents? 
• How far have the two networks functioned as a fourth estate in a fledgling 
democracy? 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters, structured as follows. The introductory chapter 
provides a background to the thesis, discusses the rationale for the project and its main 
research questions. The second chapter reviews the theoretical framework around ideas 
of media and democracy. It examines different aspects of democracy in relation to the 
media and discusses how the media can contribute to promoting democracy. Three 
functions of the media - as a forum for discussion and debate; as provider of 
information and as a watchdog, critiquing the powers that be – are explored. It is argued 
that for fostering democracy and ensuring a proper functioning of a democratic polity, 
citizens need credible and complete information to make informed choices and 
decisions affecting their lives. The forum function refers to one of the basic principles 
of democracy that individuals have the right to participate in political life and it is the 
role of media to provide the platform for their discussion in order to reach rational 
decisions for public good.  
 
The information function refers to human rights affirmation of the right of individuals to 
access information, and therefore it is the role of media to inform people to help 
structure their opinions. In order to foster democracy, the media have to provide the 
necessary information and allow individuals to have free access of information. The 
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watchdog function refers to the essential part of democracy where the media have a role 
of watchdog to examine those in power in order to ensure that the public interest is 
safeguarded.  
 
The third chapter, ‘Palestinian media and democracy in a historical context,’ explores 
the prospects of democracy in Palestine through examination of the relationship 
between the media and the different rulers in Palestine, in a historical context. It 
provides an overview of the development of the media, censorship and media control 
during different stages of Palestinian history. It is argued that a fuller understanding of 
the importance of media institutions in the contemporary Palestinian context can be 
acquired by tracing the Palestinian media history and examining the circumstances and 
the factors that affected its evolution. The chapter demonstrates how the press - serving 
as an instrument for political communication and a tool for political mobilization - 
reflected the struggle for Palestinian identity. It shows how Palestinians have lived 
under the control of different powers and, that, as a result of this foreign domination, the 
Palestinian media have tended to be more political than commercial. This political 
dimension was also visible, the chapter suggests, in the way the Palestinian press gave 
equal if not more significance to covering pan-Arab issues rather than focusing solely 
on Palestinian nationalism. The history of Palestinian media can be seen as a struggle 
against various censorships under Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Israeli, and then 
Palestinian rule: the media in Palestine have been a target of all the powers which have 
ruled over it during the last century. Independent media have so far remained elusive 
and varying forms of censorship and self-censorship have continued to shape 
journalism. These different forms of censorship prevent journalists from taking part in 
promoting debate and democracy in Palestinian society. The press in the Palestinian 
overseas diaspora has played an important role in uniting the Palestinian people against 
the Israeli occupation. The diaspora – with its access to media outlets in different 
countries - also contributed to bringing the world’s attention to the cause of Palestinian 
freedom. 
 
Political instability and continued Israeli occupation has also severely damaged the 
evolution of democracy in Palestine. Palestine is at an early stage of state-building, and 
media independence and the protection of human rights are essential tools for the 
execution of democracy. Unfortunately, the situation of the media under the Palestinian 
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Authority has not significantly improved. The institutional structure of the Palestinian 
Authority is highly bureaucratic and, in addition, the dominant role of the Palestinian 
elite has a major impact on the media system. 
 
The fourth chapter sets out the methodology used to investigate the research questions 
and includes an overview of the methodological approaches. The chapter critiques the 
advantages and disadvantages of various research methods and how these were adapted 
to be appropriate to the Palestinian context. It describes the methods which were 
deployed during the field research and the collection of data in order to answer the key 
research questions in this thesis. These questions aim to explore the extent to which the 
two leading Palestinian television channels, Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV, enhance 
democratic communication. They also aim to explore the perceptions of the Palestinian 
people of the two television networks and their role in state-building. The two channels, 
which are allied to the main political parties, Fatah and Hamas, seek to influence the 
public sphere and both channels have played an important role in the socio-political 
development of Palestinian society: consequently their contribution to state-building 
deserves special attention.  
 
It is also important to look into the ideologies and policies of both channels to see to 
what extent these influence coverage of particular events. This provides an 
understanding of the nature of the media organizations operating within Palestinian 
society - a society making conscious moves towards the establishment of a democratic 
political system. It is essential to triangulate a number of methodological strategies and 
so both qualitative and quantitative methods were deployed. Social survey, semi-
structured interviews and focus groups were combined in order to examine the 
questions raised in the thesis. Indeed, combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be very useful and result in enriched data. The strength of data collected 
through each method combined to provide an opportunity to triangulate the results. 
Combining these methods was also a useful tool for investigating the relationship 
between media and democracy in the context of state-building.   
 
Different approaches were employed to develop a scientific set of data that reflects the 
stratified structure of Palestinian society. The chapter discusses the variety of research 
approaches, divided into three sections, each dealing with one of the methods used in 
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this thesis. The first part concentrates on focus groups, the second discusses semi-
structured interviews, and the third focuses on survey methods. The qualitative and 
quantitative methods which have been used in this study were designed to investigate 
Palestinians' perspectives about media, democracy and state-building. In the interviews, 
focus groups and the questionnaires, the researcher deliberately targeted people from 
different socio-political and socio-cultural backgrounds to reflect their perceptions of 
media, democracy and the Palestinian situation.  
 
The fifth chapter, ‘The Social Survey: Findings and analysis’, provides findings from a 
survey of 500 Palestinians in Gaza, representing different ages, areas, and political 
affiliations. The questionnaire aimed to look at the Palestinians perceptions of Palestine 
TV and Al-Aqsa TV regarding their contribution to enhance democratic communication 
in Palestine and the state-building process. The survey covered, among others, 
respondents’ media consumption, television’s reliability and independence and freedom 
of expression. The respondents were also asked about their views on television as a 
fourth estate and its role in promoting democracy and human rights in Palestine. The 
survey had a very good respondent success-rate: 486 out of 500 questionnaires were 
returned. It does not however in any way claim to be representative of the whole of 
Gaza. Different places, such as sports’ clubs, universities and Internet cafés were 
targeted in a range of areas throughout Gaza.  
 
The sixth chapter, ‘Focus groups: Data analysis,’ analyses the data from focus groups 
which were conducted with Gazans  about Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV and their 
perceived contribution to enhance democratic communication in Palestine and towards 
the process of state-building. Respondents believed that each of the two channels were 
used as proxy by its controlling party – Fatah and Hamas – in the battle between the 
rival political groups. They introduce divisiveness rather than harmony, hatred instead 
of rational debate, and suspicion rather than social trust among Gazans.  
 
This leads to the undermining of media credibility, public mistrust and debasing of 
democratic structures. Yet the two channels cannot avoid their responsibility for 
shaping public opinion, building peace and social consensus. At this stage of state-
building, the two television channels can function as a fourth estate, promote democracy 
by encouraging tolerance among various factions, and protect human rights. But their 
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actions so far, as noted by Gazans, are insufficiently democratic as they are not even 
able to promote tolerance between the two factions.  
 
The chapter provides an overview of comments and views expressed by the participants 
during the focus group sessions about the role of the two TV channels. The participants 
were taken from different groups – university students, human rights activists, 
journalists and non-governmental organization (NGO) employees - the intention being  
to target both the politically affiliated and independents in order to examine their 
perceptions of the two television channels and their perceived contribution to the 
democratization of Palestine. The discussion was organised within five themes, 
exploring the role of television in public participation, political dimensions, promotion 
of democracy, as a watchdog and contributor to state-building. 
 
The chapter examines from the participants’ point of view the different functions of 
media in a democracy such as information, critique, and forum. These three functions 
were examined from the five different themes. By deriving empirical evidence from 
fieldwork, the chapter demonstrates how the two factions control the two television 
channels and how participants see the channels’ contribution to the state of democratic 
communication in Palestine. By doing this, the chapter provides information about the 
Palestinian socio-political situation and the role that these two factions played to 
manipulate the media in order to dominate the public sphere. The differences in 
participants’ points of views showed how they see the two factions’ perception of the 
future of democracy in the Palestinian state.  
 
The seventh chapter, ‘Discussion: Media and democracy in a conflict zone,’ synthesizes 
data from interviews, focus groups and surveys to paint a picture of the complex 
relationship between television and democracy in one of the world’s most polarized 
societies. It discusses the difficulties of peaceful co-existence between two 
ideologically-driven political groupings, vulnerable to regional and international 
economic and political pressure. The role of mass media, especially television, is 
highlighted to provide a communicative space to create a democratic polity in Palestine 




The chapter discusses the structure and nature of the Palestinian media and the problems 
that hinder its contribution to the enhancement of democratic communication. It 
demonstrates the different aspects of democracy that are taking place during the 
transition period, using examples from fieldwork to explore democracy as an ideal that 
Palestinians seek and as an obstacle that hinders its progress.  
 
These issues affect the Palestinian media in its everyday practices. Despite several 
media institutions having been severely affected by the two governments and by Israeli 
occupation policies, they are still able to carry out some of their daily activities. The 
lack of freedom of expression, the obstruction of information, and the existence of daily 
harassments by the two governments' security forces have become major barriers in any 
move towards democracy. Although Palestinian press law affirms freedom of 
expression, it contains vague terms which are subject to different interpretations. 
Ambiguous terms and sentences contained in the press law were intended to enable 
censorship of media and journalists. The prominent role of the executive forces of the 
two governments and the vagueness of the Palestinian press law has had a significant 
impact on the right of freedom of expression. Violations against freedom of expression, 
self-censorship, restrictions on Palestinian press freedom and the detention of journalists 
have all been part of a decline in Palestinian media performance.  
 
The data from fieldwork shows that the two television channels are providing a platform 
for their own members and supporters of their policies. Interviews with political 
analysts reveal that such participation that does not include the range of civil groups in a 
society contributes to a deepening of political differences which then leads to state 
destruction rather than state building. Moreover, the two governments' control over 
media channels has resulted in public mistrust in the information that is broadcasted. 
However, the presence of the two opposing television channels has in some ways acted 
for the public interest, as each channel functioned as a fourth estate for its opponent. 
But, at the same time it has become clear that the two television channels play the dual 
role of being government channels, which defend their owners' strategies, and political 




The concluding chapter summarizes the key findings and reflects on the importance of a 









There is little doubt that a free and pluralistic media system is one of most important 
conditions for a democracy to survive and prosper. Indeed, having independent and 
pluralistic media is necessary for public participation as the basis of a democracy, as 
well as contributing to social stability and state-building. Such a media can function as a 
Fourth Estate and thus work to protect and promote the interests of citizens. O’Neil 
notes that ‘the media . . . is vital to the creation and vitality of civil society; without it, 
freedom of communication, and thus the foundation of democratic rule, is undermined’ 
(O’Neil, 1998, p. 2). Democracy implies not only free and fair elections, but freedom of 
information and expression, respect for minorities and human rights for all citizens. 
This chapter explores the relationship between media and democracy. After providing 
an overview of definitions of democracy, I examine the different aspects of democracy 
in relation to media and discuss how the media can contribute to promoting democracy.  
 
2.1 The media effects research  
The question of how media influence its audiences has a long and complex history. In 
this section, I want to explore some of the main strands of academic work undertaken in 
this area.  My empirical research for this project has been informed by the extensive 
theoretical work done in the US and in Europe. Although these theoretical frameworks 
have evolved within a Western context, some of the arguments they articulate and the 
thinking they contribute about the audiences are also relevant for the Palestinian 
situation. 
 
The origins of media effects research go back to the1920s in the US with research into 
the impact of the new mass medium of film. Researchers tried to answer the central 
question ‘What effect do the media have on the individual?’ The growth of radio and 
the success of Nazi propaganda urged scholars to put more effort into studying media 
effects, which applied even more strongly to television, as a powerful visual medium in 
people’s homes. The media enabled by new cable, satellite and video technologies have 
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added a further dimension. The concern is still the same fear that the effects of the 
media might be harmful, especially to vulnerable minds.  
 
Media researchers have designed many ways of investigating and interpreting the 
impact on audiences, attempting to make sense of what media consumers come across 
in their everyday lives. However, it should be noted that the views about the nature of 
these effects is changing all the time. Yet, the idea of individual affected by the 
powerful message of mass media has varied, from being passive recipient to active and 
selective user of media content (Klapper, 1960). Indeed, media content can affect 
individual’s behaviour, thoughts, or opinion in a way that could be immediate or late, 
direct and indirect. However, studying users of media shows that there is need for doing 
more than surveys in order to find strong, direct and immediate effects.   
 
McQuail (1994) divided the history of research on media effects into four stages. The 
first stage from 20th century to the late 1930s was led by the notion of using the media 
as a propaganda tool. The second stage was from 1930s to the late 1960s. This stage had 
reviewed the pattern of strong media effects and considered personal influence as the 
main paradigm. The third stage which began in the late 1970s was dominated by the 
search for new strong media effects. The fourth stage which started in the early 1980s 
till now is dominated by what he called ‘social constructivism’ in which the explanation 
of media and individuals incorporates elements of both strong and limited effects. 
 
As he noted, media effects theory goes back to the era of the First World War when the 
media used as a propaganda tool. During the Russian revolution, communists realized 
the importance of broadcasting. In fact, in 1925, the Soviet Union was the first country 
used short-wave radio in Moscow where they started to broadcast communist 
propaganda (Thussu, 2006). In the1930s, the Nazis used the media to disseminate ‘racist 
and anti-Semitic ideology of the Third Reich’ (Thussu, 2006, p.15). Another example of 
using media as a tool for manipulating people’s minds was when National Fascist Party 
led by Mussolini (1883-1945) used the media ‘to promote Fascist ideals’ (Thussu, 2006, 
p.15). 
 
Harold Lasswell notes in his book Propaganda Techniques in the World War (1927) 
during the war time, it is not sufficient to mobilize men and means; mobilisation of 
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opinion must occur. Such political propaganda and media manipulation by elites has led 
to what so called hypodermic needle or ‘hypodermic effect theory’, which visualized the 
media message as a strong drug that would have influential effects on individuals 
(Lasswell, 1927). It is based on the assumption that media are a powerful means of 
public communication and capable of injecting the views of ruling elites into a passive 
individual’s mind. Gunter notes that the period of 1920s and 1930s ‘witnessed the 
emergence of mass audiences on an unprecedented scale as a function of the growth and 
establishment of the press, films and radio’ and at that time ‘the media exercised a 
powerful and persuasive influence’ (2000, p.10). The theory is also linked with Shannon 
and Weaver’s model of direct effect (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). 
 
Despite its flexibility and regular revision, the hypodermic needle model has been 
subject to many criticisms as inadequate (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955/2006; Ang, 1996; 
Gunter 2000; Gauntlett, 2005; Morley, 2006). In addition, it cannot account for the 
complexity of the relationship between the media and the individual. Gauntlett (2005) 
has argued that ‘the effects paradigm should be laid to rest, of interest only as part of the 
natural history of mass communications research’ (p.5). 
 
Political elites and governments have turned their attention to the mass media as a tool 
of manipulation. James Curran (2002) notes: ‘The conviction … that the media are 
important agencies of influence is broadly correct. However, the ways in which the 
media exert influence are complex and contingent’ (p. 158).The Second World War had 
witnessed prompt growth of using mass media as mobilization tool. Examples of these 
were when Britain used the BBC (Curran and Seaton, 1997) and the United States used 
Voice of America (Thussu, 2006). 
 
Marxist scholars such as Adorno and Horkheimer (1979/1944) and Marcuse (1964) 
noted the use of media as propaganda tool by Nazi in Germany and in the United States. 
Indeed, Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1979) recognise what they call ‘the culture 
industry’, in which ‘the flood of detailed information and candy-floss entertainment 
simultaneously instructs and stultifies mankind’ (p. xv). Adorno (1978) argued that the 
cinema had negative effects on an individual’s perception. He noted that ‘Every visit to 




Views of the media as a propaganda tool reinforced theories of cultural hegemony. 
Cultivation theory has received attention from communication scholars. It is developed 
by George Gerbner and Larry Gross (1976). The theory was based on many studies 
conducted in the late 1960s in the United States about violence. The studies made by the 
US National Commission after the assassination of Martin Luther King and Robert 
Kennedy. It meant to identify the causes of violence in the country and the ways to 
prevent it. It focused specifically on the effect of television in spreading violence. 
Gerbner and Gross (1976) considered television ‘a medium of the socialization of most 
people into standardized roles and behaviours’ (p. 175). Morgan and Signorielli (1990) 
introduced theoretical and methodological techniques to assess the television’s 
influence of people’s social life. They added that ‘Cultivation analysis is concerned with 
the more general and pervasive consequences of cumulative exposure to cultural media’ 
(Morgan and Signorielli,1990, p.16). However, one of the drawbacks of media effects 
theory is that it did not take into account the different responses that individuals might 
have to the same media content. 
 
2.2 Active audience research 
In the early 1940s Paul Lazarsfield and Herta Herzog carried out a mass communication 
research programme to find out the ‘uses and gratifications’ that radio listeners gained 
from daytime serials, quiz programmes, etc. (Herzog, 1941). Lazarsfield and Herzog 
rejected the hypothesis that the media have great power. Their empirical research 
concluded that media effects were limited. This then challenged researchers to establish 
how to measure media effects. They began to look at the media and its relationship with 
opinion, attitudes and knowledge. They concluded that media effects could be important 
in some cases such as children who may be more influenced by media than others 
(McLuhan, 1964). In Uses and Gratifications research, the central question was ‘What 
does the individual do with the media?’. Such research considers recipients as active 
users who can consume media contents and decode it. Gratifications could differ for 
different individuals and can include information, entertainment, social interaction, etc. 
(McQuail, 2005).  
 
The concept of the active audience has shifted the emphasis away from the power of the 
media to the power of the audience. Scannell (1996) notes that ‘power in this 
relationship (in the first and last instance) rests more with those on the receiving end 
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rather than with those who produce what is on offer. And this is because no one can 
make anyone listen to or watch anything on radio and television. If listeners and viewers 
don’t like what they find they can simply switch over or switch off’ (p.12). However, 
active audience theory has been criticised by other media theorists (Morley, 1980, 2006; 
Fiske, 1987, Ang, 1996). Ang (1996) argues that ‘audiences may be active in myriad 
ways in using and interpreting media, but it would be utterly out of perspective to 
cheerfully equate ‘active’ with ‘powerful’, in the sense of ‘taking control’ at an 
enduring structural or institutional level’ (p. 139). 
 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (2006/1955) and Joseph Klapper (1960) refuted the claim of media 
effects and showed that media power was overestimated.  Klapper (1960) established 
that mass media were more likely to strengthen existing attitudes than change or create 
new attitudes. In his study, The Effects of Mass Communication, Klapper (1960) found 
that there was a small segment of voters changed their vote plans during the election 
campaign, as their prior beliefs influenced the message interpretation. In addition, the 
messages were discussed among opinion leaders and friends leading to the two-step 
flow model. In this regard, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955/2006) argue that 
‘communications studies have greatly underestimated the extent to which an 
individual’s social attachments to other people, and the character of the opinions and 
activities which he shares with them, will influence his response to the mass media’ (p. 
25). They affirm the role of personal influence in the media-audience relationship. They 
emphasise, ‘personal influence seems to be singularly effective’ as it achieves what they 
call the ‘reinforcement function’. ‘When a mass media influence-attempt coincides with 
an interpersonal communication, it appears to have much greater chances of success’ 
(pp. 82-83). 
 
Another study which refuted media effects theory was conducted by Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson and Gaudet, published in their book, The People’s Choice (1948). The study 
was about voting behaviours in the 1940 US presidential election. They found that the 
effect of media content was less direct than had been expected. They asserted that 
personal effect has more influence on individual’s attitudes than media content. They 
note that ‘In the last analysis, more than anything else people can move other people’ 
(Lazarfeld et al., 1948, p. 158). It should be noted that the two-step flow model has been 
criticised by scholars (McQuail and Windall, 1993). Robinson argued in 1976 that the 
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two-step flow model was no more efficient. He asserts ‘when interpersonal sources and 
mass media sources are compared or are in conflict, interpersonal sources wield greater 
influence. However, that condition of ‘when’ needs to be stressed’ (p. 315). 
 
In fact, the emergence of new media has contradicted the two-step flow model and 
paved the way for individuals to seek for more information, which shows that there is a 
multi-step flow in a reverse form: from the new media to individuals who seek more 
from traditional media and others for reinforcement. Donald and his colleagues (2004) 
conducted a study about the influence of internet on individuals seeking information on 
genetic testing. They found that ‘The diffusion of the Internet has radically expanded 
the readily available sources for information of all types. Information that was once 
obtained second-hand from friends and acquaintances—the traditional ‘two-step 
flow’—is now found easily through the Internet’ (Donald et al., 2004, p. 660).  
 
In both effects research and Uses and Gratifications research, different methods have 
been used, including survey, interviews, participant observations etc. But the main 
difference between the two approaches is that the Uses and Gratifications research tends 
to use less structured techniques such as participant observation and in-depth 
interviews, while the effects research use highly structured techniques (Jensen and 
Rosengren,1990). 
 
In the mid-1980s, a new audience research approach in mass communication emerged. 
Such research is referred as ethnographic research, which involves a researcher living in 
a native or foreign community to learn about their life, applying different scientific 
methods and concepts (Moores, 1993). The important point here is that the ethnographic 
approach is considered a more open and representative technique than questionnaires, as 
the latter do not allow the participants the opportunity to use their own words. It also 
allows for interaction between the researcher and the people who are coming from 
different cultures and backgrounds. At the same time, the researcher in this approach 
holds the power to choose the focus of the research, the observations that should be 
involved and the findings distribution style (Hermes, 2010). Moores (1993) notes that 
Morley’s study of the television magazine programme ‘Nationwide’ was the leading 
empirical ethnographic study that dealt with audiences. The study was based on a large 
number of group interviews. The groups comprised of part-time and full-time students, 
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schoolchildren, managers from banking institutions and trade union officials. The 
Nationwide programme was recorded for approximately 30 minutes and then showed to 
the groups for discussion. Morley (1980) in his study had applied the encoding and 
decoding model while interpreting his Nationwide interviews. He rejected the idea of 
textual determinism in which the text has dominant power over audiences and is the 
source of meaning. At the same level, he takes into account the audience interests, 
arguing that interaction between texts and audiences are occurring. Morley suggests that 
individual’s readings are considered the product of their social experience and the 
cultural knowledge they have access to (Morley, 1992).  
 
In 1970s, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham 
initiated research related to humanities and social research.  Stuart Hall’s ‘Encoding and 
Decoding’ model was an important example of the CCCS work (Hall, 1980). The 
principle of this model is that producers encode meanings into the media text and 
audiences decode the meanings from that text. The meaning that made by producers is 
encoded by conventions to hide the text’s ideological construction. On the other side, 
audiences watch, listen or read the media text and interpret the text according to a 
number of frameworks such as education, gender, age, ethnicity and class. In addition, 
past experience and previous knowledge also affect individual’s interpretations.  It 
should be noted that researchers of audience studies prefer qualitative over quantitative 
methods because it allows them to take into consideration the social context.  
 
The encoding and decoding model theorizes three positions that audiences could adopt; 
(1) the dominant attitude, where recipients agree and recognise the full meaning of the 
text ‘preferred meaning’; (2) the negotiated position, which is established when 
individual adopt or oppose the text; (3) the oppositional attitude, where individual 
oppose and reject the text (Hall, 1980). Morley (1992) had criticised this model, arguing 
that the process of analysing audiences viewing is more complex than what was 
suggested by encoding and decoding model. In his study of Nationwide, Morley (1992) 
found that groups that had the same class gave different interpretations. Despite the 
criticism of encoding and decoding model, it still offers a solid theoretical base for 




Katz and Liebes (1990) had conducted research about the globally popular American 
television series Dallas in order to determine whether such programme have a cultural 
imperialist effect. The research was conducted with fifty groups of befriended couples 
from different ethnic communities. The groups were asked to watch the programmes 
and then discuss a list of open questions. Katz and Liebes were able to classify 
substantial differences in the ways that the different groups interpreted the programme. 
They studied how far Dallas was relevant to those groups by attending critical 
statements made by respondents about the value of the programmes and referential 
statements as if they were real. They showed that cultural origin was important in the 
way the groups interpreted the programmes. The study by Katz and Liebes provided 
very useful framework for audience studies and opened up new avenues for research in 
media reception (Katz and Liebes, 1990).  
 
2.3 Exploring the relationship between media and democracy 
Although there are many different definitions and forms of democracy, there is no 
single working model of democracy (Raboy and Bruck, 1989; Antic, 2004). According 
to Kivikuru (2006), the concept of democracy in relation to media is based on four 
assumptions: (1) that citizens are well informed, (2) citizens are concerned about 
politics, (3) The right to speak and participate in decision making is equal for all 
citizens, and (4) decisions are submitted to public discussion.  
 
Diamond notes that democracy is not just about transparent, competitive, and periodical 
elections. Liberal democracy consists of an autonomous judicial system, the rule of law, 
an executive legislature, a guarantee of human rights, the freedom of the press and of 
expression and institutions, and independent law enforcement agencies, as well as civil 
and political rights protected by the constitution (Diamond, 1999). Others have defined 
democracy thus: 
 
 We define a democracy as a regime (1) that sponsors free and fair competitive 
elections for the legislature and executive; (2) that allows for inclusive adult 
citizenship; (3) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (4) in which 
the elected governments really govern and military is under civilian control 




Fukuyama (1992) defines liberal democracy as a representative form of government in 
which constitutional and pluralist politics co-exists. He argues that liberal democracy is 
a set of rules in which society participate to choose their representatives through free, 
transparent and periodic elections. However, the notion of democracy needs to be 
defined in a social context. Raboy and Bruck (1989) provide a broader notion of 
democracy, affirming that certain principles need to be maintained, such as sovereignty 
and independence of individuals and communities in making decisions related to their 
lives, equal opportunity for individuals within a society and the right to oppose all forms 
of suppression which limits individual autonomy. For Habermas (1989), democracy 
means a guarantee for equal rights for all citizens, ensuring a successful participation in 
political processes. 
 
The relationship between media and democracy is of particular interest to social and 
cultural theorists (see for example, Keane, 1991; Dahlgren, 2000; Pratt, 2007, among 
others) and it relates closely to Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (see below). 
Hatem (1996) argues that although there is a logical link between democratic media and 
democratic society, it is the democratic media which accomplishes democratic society 
not the other way around. 
 
The role of the media in promoting democracy has been extensively covered in 
academic literature (for example, Randall, 1999; Jamal, 2003; Kumar, 2006; UNESCO, 
2008, among others). Media can work as an important tool for educating voters about 
elections, raising consciousness of political rights, and mobilizing them to actively 
participate in political life. The media have an important role in upholding democratic 
norms during the election process: the media can be seen as a facilitator and one of the 
guarantors of fair elections (UNESCO, 2008). In this context Curran (2000) states that: 
  
The media brief the electorate and assist voters to make an informed choice at 
election time. The media also provide a channel of communication between 
government and governed, which helps society to clarify its objectives, 
formulate policy, co-ordinate activity, and manage itself (p.127).  
 
McNair (2003) adds that the media provide voters with the information they need to 
make political choices among competing political parties. This implies a greater degree 
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of political participation, which contributes to an enhanced and pluralistic citizenry that 
can influence the process of decision-making and government policy. In this sense, a 
pluralistic media can contribute to the promotion of human rights and treatment of all 
individuals as human beings, as well as represent their views. The basic principle of 
democracy is that individuals have the right to information that affects their lives and 
are guaranteed participation in political decision-making (Hatem, 1996).   
 
2.4 Media and the freedom of information 
Berger (2002) notes that in a successful democracy such principles as freedom of 
information and expression, equal rights for individuals, respect for human rights and 
protection of minorities as well as right of access to public information are equally 
important. Indeed, laws ensuring the freedom of information have been adopted by 
many countries and grant access to information to media outlets, organizations and 
individuals. However, the degree of accessing such information varies considerably in 
different countries and the implementation of freedom of information laws can be seen 
as a measure of the transparency of a particular political system. The right to 
communication guarantees the individual’s right to send and receive information, and 
not to be treated as a passive recipient. The new information and communication 
technologies have greatly facilitated this function by allowing more interactive dialogue 
between individual receivers and senders (broadcasters) of information.  
 
Fostering pluralistic media and ensuring that the media work for the public interest and 
provide them with political choices, is the basis for a healthy democratic state (Berger, 
2002). It is essential, therefore, for mass media to uphold the right to freedom of 
expression and provide citizens with a platform through which this right can effectively 
be applied. In this sense, the media can be seen as protecting and promoting 
fundamental human rights (UNESCO, 2008). Democratic and pluralistic media 
discourse can be enriched through discussion, in which minority views compete with 
majority opinion. Freedom of expression is one of democracy’s most valuable 
principles, protected through resistance to political and economic powers. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights puts special emphasis on freedom of expression: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
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information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (United 
Nations, 1948; UNESCO, 1980).  
 
However, despite the massive growth of media globally, many countries are in fact 
experiencing a shrinking of media pluralism. Advocates of social justice argue that 
media institutions controlled by governments are unable and unwilling to provide 
opportunities for freedom of expression. Even though governments commit to 
implement civil rights in their constitutions to protect freedom of expression, they tend 
to apply many direct or indirect forms of control over the media to suppress this 
freedom. Many governments have succeeded in manipulating the law to justify their 
actions against the media. State control over the media can be used as a tool to 
manipulate public opinion. 
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that state-owned media are not representative of all 
citizens and not concerned about consumer demands. In many instances governments 
effectively own the media, thus eliminating any competition from private or community 
media. The constitutions in many countries delineates the rights of freedom of 
expression, but governments limit such rights in the name of national security, respect 
of religion and morals, and protecting individual rights. The concept of national security 
can sometimes be misused by states to suppress opposition. 
 
One reaction to such use of power against opponents in the name of protecting national 
security has led to civil society actors to protect citizen’s rights. New digital 
technologies – especially those on-line - have given audiences a chance to interact with 
each other at an unprecedented level. In the new digital age, political activists can use 
mass communication as a weapon for social power against governments that control 
them (Jenkins and Thorburn, 2003; Castells, 2009). The globalization of media and 
communication and the technology revolution that it has triggered makes it possible for 
countries to penetrate others’ boundaries. Transnational media can inform, promote, and 
encourage populations to press over their governments for change, making many 
governments anxious and even fearful about the collapse of their arbitrary rule 




In addition, Srestha (2003) states that the role of independent media in a democracy is 
crucial to ensure diversity of public opinion and to work as a watchdog against 
corruption and inefficiency of governments and ruling elites. It is essential, he argues, 
that communication channels are not in the control of any political party or government. 
According to Srestha (2003): 
It is common knowledge that for ideal conditions of democracy to subsist, the 
existence of a free and pluralistic media system is one of the foremost 
conditions. In other words, the existence of democracy in the true sense is not 
possible without an independent media (p.1).  
 
There is widespread recognition that if individuals are accessing information through 
media channels, they can make informed choices and enhance their contribution to 
decision-making on issues that affect their lives. In order to meet its essential role in 
fostering and promoting democracy, the media are required to be accountable, reliable 
and responsible. The media have the ability to address diverse sections of a society, in 
the form of ethnicity, race, religion and social class. To strengthen democracy, mass 
communication channels need to be beyond the control of established interests, while 
citizens should have free access to independent information (UNESCO, 2008).  
 
Overall, the state should be responsible for regulating laws concerning freedom of 
communication, media ownership, pluralism of media channels, and the guaranteeing of 
two-way communication, ensuring a diversity of views can be expressed. Freedom of 
communication can achieve development and prosperity, but for this to materialize, the 
individual’s access to information to participate in decision making is essential. The UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has made freedom of communication essential 
for development and democracy in the world. It has become an important measure by 
which the democratic nature of a government can be defined and assessed.  
 
2.5 Media as the ‘watchdog’ of democracy 
In this context, it is argued that the watchdog role of media is one of the basic elements 
of a liberal democracy; its main function is to act as a check on the state to protect the 
public interest. It needs to relate to a pluralistic political system in which people are 
represented through parties and groups. The role of a democratic media is to monitor the 
actions of the state, and report violations by those in power against individuals. In 
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addition, the media provide an arena for debate, to provide communication channels and 
thus link people with the government by presenting their views (Curran, 2000).  
 
Thus, for democracy to prosper, it is essential to have an independent and pluralistic 
media system that monitors government policy and performs a watchdog function. As 
Nordenstreng (2001) notes, media monitoring in democracy is based on four premises: 
(1) the media are a powerful institution in society; (2) media are free and this freedom is 
framed in the constitution; (3) the media are responsible and accountable established in 
law; and (4) the media which are powerful and free themselves are subject to criticism 
and monitoring. For independent media to function effectively, political and economic 
institutions have to be powerful, balanced by an independent judiciary and there has to 
be a communications infrastructure in place. According to Kumar (2006), in transitional 
and post-conflict countries, political parties and elites control many aspects of civil 
society, with various forms of censorship and self-censorship, making independent 
media weak. Despite these restrictions independent media can contribute to a multi-
party political culture, protect human rights, strengthen stability and achieve 
development (Srestha, 2003).  
 
Nordenstreng (2001) also offers three key functions of the media in a democracy: (1) 
Information - the media inform societies to form opinion; (2) Critique - the media watch 
and examine those in power; (3) Forum – the media provide a space for diverse 
opinions. In addition, for the media to perform its democratic role effectively, it has to 
reflect the diversity of society (UNESCO, 2008).  
 
As Fox (1998) states, independent media play an important role in exposing government 
corruption and confronting politicians. They keep checks on the state, reveal violations 
against human rights, encourage freedom of expression, and report daily events to draw 
the attention of local authorities. Furthermore, they can cover election processes, to 
guarantee transparency and give candidates equal access and equivalent time. Such 
functions make media act as a fourth estate. However, for the media to function 
effectively as a fourth estate, it has to be financially stable and editorially autonomous. 
This is then dependent on the existence of institutions to ensure the proper functioning 
of the media. According to Kumar (2006), developing ‘media entities’ to support its role 
in society involves: enhancing journalists’ skills; promoting independent media; 
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encouraging free flow of information; building capacities to support media entities, 
helping civil society actors that call for media freedom, and developing laws and 
regulations related to media.  
 
Kumar argues for media assistance to developing countries, because he believes this 
helps strengthen rational debate, raises sensitive issues for discussion and makes 
representatives accountable. Such assistance can also contribute to giving a voice to the 
voiceless, and in the long-run, help resolve conflict and contribute to undermining 
authoritarian rule. It is argued that an independent media are necessary for human 
development, as it carries information to and empowers those who live in the margins of 
society (World Bank, 2002).    
 
2.6 Media and democracy: the political and social context 
Politicians need the media and therefore they cultivate media owners and journalists, 
while media also need politicians to survive. Politicians exert power to control the 
media, because they see its role in communicating with the people and forming public 
opinion and debate. It is argued that even when the media are not state-owned, they 
nevertheless seek to be near those in power. According to this view, media are 
dominated by the government and work as a tool for information transmission and even 
manipulation (Herman and Chomsky, 1994).  
 
Authoritarian governments attempt to exert control over the media through rules and 
regulations, particularly about determining and identifying content that can be deemed 
safe for publication or for broadcast. They harass journalists who are investigating 
‘critical stories’. This can affect journalists’ work and even the reliability of 
information. UNESCO (2008) affirmed that journalists should be protected to enable 
them to investigate human rights violations. Their security, safety and the freedom of 
movement should not be violated, so that journalists are able to provide to the citizens 
reliable and unbiased information without fear or favour. Under international law, 
countries are obliged to protect journalists even during conflict and war. Journalist’s 
rights can be guaranteed by independent judicial system able to protect them from 
arbitrary actions by the state. By doing so, journalists can work safely and media can 




Media in many developing countries do not adequately meet the needs of citizens or 
reflect their interests and aspirations. The prevalence of corruption in the political 
systems of many of these countries affects the media system too, resulting in a vicious 
cycle of accusations between the politicians and the media. In the Palestinian context, 
the nascent democratic discourse is deeply constrained by the reality of Israeli 
occupation and continued blockade (Al-Mezan, 2009). Jamal (2003) has argued that 
through its military procedures, Israel has affected every domain of Palestinian public 
and private life. These procedures, which violate the basic human rights of the 
Palestinian people, have had a profound impact on their lives.  
 
Media have an important social dimension too as a channel to encourage 
communication within various segments of a given society – non-governmental 
organizations, syndicates, civil society groups, religious, and ethnic communities. This 
mediated interaction enhances the participation of various groups through exchange of 
information and deliberation thus contributing to social, political and cultural 
development. This should promote societal peace, a necessary condition for fostering 
democracy.  
 
Theorists of media and modernization argue that mass media are an instrument for 
economic and social development which can spread the message of modernity (Sparks, 
2007). Sreberny (2001) argues that democracy is a key part of the development process. 
Therefore, the media are vital for the creation of civil society and there is much need for 
greater participation and development of human resources. Participation enhances 
democratization, by which people’s voices are heard, they have ownership over the 
channel, and develop programmes related to and relevant to their lives. McQuail (1994) 
suggests a development model in which the media are expected to contribute to 
promoting and enhancing social harmony. The objectives of democratic media are to 
ensure the active participation of individuals, diversity of opinions, and to expand 
people’s participation including at the grassroots level (Hatem, 1996).  
 
Mass communication, such as television, has the potential to empower citizens by 
providing a space to discuss issues relating to their lives but also to challenge those in 
power. As Curran (2000) states, a democratic media system enables subordinate groups 
to provoke debate about issues they are facing. Baker (1998) notes that the democratic 
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idea of media is to enable citizens to discuss issues related to their interests. However, 
such accessible media systems require media specialists to facilitate debate and 
audience participation and then broadcast it in order to influence the government. 
Sreberny (2001) asserts that it is the role of the media to foster public debate and 
promote cultural pluralism by providing channels of communication to increase 
people’s participation. Albatreeqe (1993) notes that media and communication 
technologies can work effectively only if there is sufficient participation in decision-
making: ‘Unless this function is fulfilled, mass communication will be counter-
productive and contrary to the fundamentals of democracy’ (p.70). Pratt (2007) argues 
also that civil society actors should be considered an important part of the 
democratization process. 
 
At an international level, democratization and peace-building in communities through 
media institutions - which receive financial and technical assistance - is considered an 
important goal (Kumar, 2006). Technology has removed geographical distances 
between countries by providing communication channels, so that globally citizens can 
share their views, for example, about issues relating to human rights, freedom, and 
democracy. According to Drale (2003), participating in democratic deliberation shows 
us how to undertake ‘rational argumentation’ and become active participants in 
decision-making.  
 
Some media scholars have argued that in many developing countries aspects of society 
such as religion, social and cultural background can act as barriers to the development 
of democracy. Ayish (2001) notes that the development process is vulnerable, especially 
in the Arab world, because of media channels being controlled by governments. He uses 
the term ‘participatory development’, referring to media channels as an essential tool for 
people’s participation in political and social development. The ultimate goal for 
democratic participation is to ensure the equal involvement of all sectors of society in 
the process (McNair, 2003). In order to maintain this, there have to be procedural rules 
governing the elections and the performance of the elected. Additionally, the media 
have a role to promote grassroots social responsibility and thus empower individuals. 
 
As Wasko and Splichal (1993) argue, the media do not exist discretely in society; it is 
associated with the social and political structure. Socialization of communication 
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promotes social unity and enables citizens to interact, thus allowing active participation 
in public life and decision-making.  If the communication process is to encourage social 
relations, it should be based on free discussion and free flow of information. One of the 
important obstacles which obstruct democratic media is the vertical flow of information 
– from the elite to the masses. If the communication process is to be democratic, the 
flow of information has to be horizontal not vertical and in many directions. The only 
way to achieve this is to have a democratic media system.   
 
2.7 Television and the Public Sphere  
The concept of the public sphere is associated with a democratic political discourse with 
its roots in the European political tradition (Habermas, 1989). The word ‘public’ refers 
to a collection of common interests, while ‘sphere’ refers to the space within which 
public discussion takes place and public opinion is formed. Habermas (1989) argues 
that for a public sphere to function properly, legitimate state and political culture has to 
be guaranteed. Thus, for the media to play a democratic role, there is a need for a 
democratic constitution, implying that a public sphere without civil society contribution 
is fragile. In this context, Berger (2002) notes that despite the criticism by numerous 
scholars of Habermas’s public sphere theory, the concept has been widely and fruitfully 
used to analyze the role of media in a democracy.  
 
Consequently, groups within civil society have increasingly turned their attention to the 
role of media in the public sphere and television in particular as the greatest mass 
communication medium to date. Given that visuals have greater influence than words, 
especially in the context of developing countries where millions cannot read, television 
has a special position as a mass medium and therefore its relationship with democracy is 
important to explore (Chalaby, 2005; Thussu, 2007).   
 
For some, the public service broadcasters such as the BBC have an important public 
sphere role (McQuail 1994; Curran, 2002). Diversity of media is considered an 
important element to strengthen the public sphere. McQuail (1994) has emphasized the 
importance of media as a catalyst for progressive change in society, such as the 
evolution of the ruling elites, diversity of power distribution, and exchanging of power 
interests. He believes that media thus are integral to a pluralistic democracy. If the 
media system functions properly, this would reflect also on the effectiveness of the 
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political system, with the ultimate goal of both media and political systems serving the 
public interest (Hatem, 1996). 
 
It has been suggested that for a public sphere to be effective as a public good, policies 
need to be aimed to take full advantage of television. There should be strategies to 
enhance participation of citizens, structures to support public access to television, as 
well as diversity of media ownership (Habermas, 1989; Drale, 2003). As Keane (1991) 
stated mass communication can empower all citizens in a democracy and enable them to 
communicate and convey the message communally. Drale (2003) suggests that a 
successful democracy implies an aggregation of individual interests to majority 
interests, therefore achieving contentment for the public. In essence, a democratic state 
has to ensure that the media maintain to serve the public interest and foster pluralism 
and impartiality. Preventing people from participation in decision-making is an 
indicator of a fragile democratic media system (Hatem, 1996).  
 
As Keane (1991) has pointed out, democracy needs informed citizens and when citizens 
enjoy access to various channels of communication, deliberation could be fostered by 
democratic means to reach social and political agreement. It is important that grassroots 
have access to media channels by which they engage in deliberations and ensure that 
their voices are heard.  
 
As argued above, media organizations need to have specialist crew who are able to 
provide citizens with channels to express themselves, as well as to share their ideas. For 
this to materialize, media institutions need to be democratized internally; in the sense 
that the power should be with the people working for such institutions, thus creating a 
system of democratic societal control (Nieminen, 1997). According to Dahlgren (2000) 
democracy in the real world is difficult to implement, because there are many forces 
that need to be taken into account, such as political economy, social structure and media 
institutions. Therefore, media cannot be separated from its cultural, social, and political 
environment. Hatem (1996) argued that obstacles that confront the implementation of 
democratic media systems are those means which restrain freedom of expression. These 
obstacles have a negative impact on the democratization of media systems. However, 
the main obstacle is the infrastructure of these systems which make the flow of 
information vertical. This means only elites can participate in deliberation and the 
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majority of citizens are mere consumers of media messages. Efforts are being employed 
to overcome these obstacles, such as expanding people’s participation, fostering media 
pluralism, decentralization of channels and encouraging greater degree of freedom of 
expression.   
 
Furthermore, the introduction of new technologies has broadened the media space 
across nations, by which citizens have the possibility to intervene in talk-shows and 
news programmes in their own country as well as trans-nationally. Hatem (1996) has 
argued that technology has entered intensively into our daily life and become an 
important aspect of connecting people globally. It plays significant role in the flow of 
information, images and ideas which can inspire people to learn and benefit and to build 
mutual understanding between nations.  
 
2.8 Television and state-building  
The role of television is crucial in the process of state-building, as it helps to shape the 
public sphere and strengthen progress towards democracy. Visual communication is 
vital for a society; it is the cement that associates citizens together. It links individuals, 
governments, groups, and institutions. With reference to the process of democratization 
and the role of television, Wedell and Tudesq (1997) noted that:  
 
The contribution which television can make to the process of democratization 
depends upon progress made in the professionalization of journalists and 
politicians. Managing all the new technologies requires knowledge of the 
pertinent legislation, functioning rules, and above all, ethics. Journalists must 
ensure that the burgeoning of the media does not become an obstacle to 
democratization, creating false images of democracy and alienating the 
population (p. 22). 
 
Pye (1963) noted that it was the function of the media to contribute to developing 
national unity, especially in the former colonial countries. Modernity and development 
can work in parallel in order to achieve state-building, and for this to happen, 
independent mass media are much needed as they provide, according to Randall (1999), 
the channels of communication between different groups of actors within a given 
society. The media thus play an important role in the process of state-building (Jamal, 
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2003). For democracy to function properly, a free flow of information must occur, 
which will enable citizens to participate in state-building, and bridge the gap between 
the government and the governed. One reflection of this is the content of the 
programmes disseminated through broadcast systems. A free flow of information 
between the government and the citizens, and among citizens themselves, it has been 
argued, reinforce democracy and empower citizens against their political representatives 
(Keane, 1991).  
 
Pratt (2007) suggests that for the state-building process to succeed, it requires active 
political participation from ordinary citizens, as the foundation for social relations and a 
keystone of the state. Journalists have different roles to play: as a link between 
government, policy-makers, and people. It is the duty of journalists to assist citizens to 
raise their concerns with authorities. It is important for journalists to be independent, as 
their political affiliations could affect the quality of media content. To enhance the 
accountability and credibility of a media system, journalists have to be free to report and 
provide information to public, working within and protected by clearly-defined laws 
and regulations. Such professional and institutional infrastructure is important for 
journalists, because ambiguity can be used by authorities to silence and threaten 
journalists which will affect their work, especially reporting on sensitive issue or 
undertaking investigative stories (World Bank, 2002). However, the growing 
commercialization of media can lead to a fall in journalistic standards as they operate in 
a crowded and competitive market for tele-visual images (Berger, 2002).  
 
Speaking specifically about the Arab world, radio and television were viewed in many 
Arab nations as a constructive tool for state-building (Ayish, 2001). Even though the 
interdependence between media and government was seen as part of state-building 
process, governments still controlled the media under such excuses as safeguarding 
national security (Ayish, 2001). Others have argued that many Arab countries justified 
media control as part of their social responsibility, given the political and sectarian 
differences in their societies which could be exploited by vested interests represented by 
an unregulated private media system (Hafez, 2001). In some Arab countries the 
subordination of media institutions to government was legitimized by nationalist 
leaderships, arguing that the media was to be used as a tool for state-building (Ayubi, 
1995). According to Jamal (2003), the sovereignty of the media is fundamental for 
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state-building as it is essential for the success of the national project. However, it has 
been argued that the politicians control the airwaves for their own interests (El-Nawawy 
and Iskandar, 2002). Authoritarianism is not only shaped by the actions of the elites, it 
is also affected by politicians’ self-interest in staying in power (Pratt, 2007). In the 
development process and state-building, media policy is intended to contribute to 
stability and provide equal and just representation to all sections of society, including 
minorities (Jamal, 2001). 
 
2.9 Media control and censorship: the Arab context 
Nossek and Rinnawi (2003) discuss three models to explain the relationship between 
the media and the state. The first model is the totalitarian model, where governments 
control the media and use it as a manipulation tool for political mobilization. The 
second model is the American democratic model where the media are subject to market 
competition but has a social responsibility. Journalists have the responsibility to inform 
and educate people and to direct the media in a way to ensure that published or 
broadcast content does not violate the law or hurt the rights of others. The third model is 
the continental European democratic model where individual and collective rights are 
balanced.  
 
Although proponents of public ownership of the media affirm that information is a 
public good, many governments in the developing countries still control media and the 
state-run media remains the dominant paradigm, despite massive growth in private 
media – both nationally and trans-nationally (Chalaby,2005; Castells, 2009).  
 
In contrast, the public-service media in a pluralist democratic system have a crucial role 
in enabling communication within civil society, thus building networks among 
individuals and various groups. These networks are important because they can act as 
bulwarks against any potential or existing political suppression and how to deal with it. 
Such networks also encourage individuals to ‘cultivate the virtues of democratic 
citizenship: prudence, judgment, eloquence, resourcefulness, courage, self reliance, 
sensitivity to power, common sense’ (Keane, 1991, p. 146). In addition, they can 
contribute to a dialogue between citizens and policy-makers to assess, estimate and 
understand the possibilities and consequences of dangers, thus the media can work as an 
early warning system and suggest ways to avoid any social conflict (Keane, 1991). In an 
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idealized democratic system, the role of the media is to help a society to develop and 
practice such values – public service broadcasters have an important function in this 
endeavour (Drale, 2003).   
 
However, in many Arab countries the governments continue to control the mass media 
– especially radio and television – and use these as a propaganda tool (El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006, Mellor, 2007). Some Arab governments have justified 
their control of the media as a mechanism to protect the Arab culture against Western 
influence, mediated through television (Hafez, 2001). A UNESCO report of the 
International Programme for the Development of Communication, affirms that in most 
Middle Eastern countries broadcasting media systems are seen as part of governmental 
institutions (UNESCO, 2008). Almost all broadcasting systems in the Arab world are 
funded by the governments and therefore also controlled by them (Amin, 2001). Amin 
divides Arab media control into two main categories: the first, according to him, are the 
governments which tend to control the broadcasting system and deploy the ‘ideology of 
national mobilization’ to introduce restrictions on the media. Such governments use 
radio and television as a tool of political communication and to persuade citizens of the 
validity of government actions and thus gain support for national unity. Amin’s second 
category includes the governments which run the broadcasting system in a bureaucratic 
manner – retaining executive control but leave the day-to-day running of television and 
radio to professional journalists and thus acquire legitimacy and gain national support 
for the government.  
 
In societies with high rate of illiteracy, broadcast systems become the main source for 
circulating information and entertainment (Amin, 2001). These systems transmit audio-
visual content which can affect individuals and groups – in political terms, thus 
governments can mobilize people to achieve political ends. The rationale behind 
centralizing broadcasting systems is to support national unity, claimed to be threatened 
by hostile powers in the region as well within the countries. Many commentators have 
argued that Arab governments control broadcasting systems because they are afraid that 
their power will be lost to internal enemies, especially during the time of a sectarian or 




Despite the existence of laws in Arab countries guaranteeing freedom of expression, 
governments can and do persecute journalists or ordinary citizens on such charges as 
threatening national security. Ayish (2001) notes that though individual rights exist in 
Arab communication laws, these could be overruled if a journalist or media institution 
is found guilty of what the  governments may consider an offence against the respective 
state. Governments apply strict censorship laws and journalists can be prosecuted if they 
are perceived to be indulging in activities against the national unity and security, or 
even harmful for any individual’s rights. Such regulations severely restrict the freedom 
of expression and shrink journalist’s professional space (Ayish, 2001; Jamal, 2003). 
Another way of governmental control is indirect: through funding television and radio, 
ensuring that media institutions remain obliged to government officials and political 
leaders.  
 
The Palestinian media scene is a good example of such tensions. In relation to the media 
models discussed by Nossek and Rinnawi (2003), in the Palestinian context the situation 
of mass media is a mixture of both democratic and totalitarian model. State control over 
the media is commonplace and Palestinian politicians tend to use it as a mouthpiece. In 
addition, many media entities have been created since the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority – many of these media are subjected to the market competition 
(Batrawi, 2001). However, even though many of these media entities are autonomous, 
they work in close collaboration with the government.  
 
The political system is considered an important indicator of media development, as it 
shows the degree of freedom enjoyed by the media. Palestine is experiencing deep 
political divisions, also reflected in the mass media environment. The policy and 
ideological disagreements between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the other 
political parties are also to be seen in the mass media. All major political parties have 
aimed to and made efforts to control the media, making the media an arena for struggle, 
and a manipulation tool that each party desires to mobilize the masses to achieve or 
retain power. Moreover, political actors and civil society activists have also turned their 
attention to the media to promote their political agenda and shape the public opinion 




The authoritarian tendencies manifest within the Palestinian Authority have also been 
noticed in the manner in which the Palestinian media system has been controlled and 
curtailed. The Palestinian President has control of public institutions at all levels, 
including the mass media, and especially television. The control is manifested through 
appointing a loyal person as the head of Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), 
and even locating the PBC building within the compound of the President’s office 
(Jamal, 2001). According to Jamal (2003), there is a clear relationship between the 
Palestinian elite and the media, where the national elite not only controls the process of 
state formation but also succeeded in controlling the media and uses it to promote their 
interests and to achieve their goals. Referring to media regime, Jamal (2001), affirmed 
that even the Palestinian President played a major role in constructing a bureaucratic 
regime, and he managed to intervene in all levels and aspects of the Palestinian 
institutions. In some respects, this situation is not that dissimilar to the dynamics 
between media and the state in other Arab countries, many of which have authoritarian 
regimes (Lynch, 2006). 
 
Within such a controlled system, compounded by political and economic instability, 
civil society and human rights organizations cannot be effective. If the media 
institutions are controlled by the state, they are constrained to function as a medium for 
democratic dialogue. However, it is impossible for the state media to continue to control 
information in a digital globalized media age. As new communication and information 
technologies are spreading, media channels have penetrated the national boundaries 
(Jenkins, and Thorburn, 2003). To seek information that is denied to them, citizens are 
diverting to transnational mass communication channels, looking for content they seek. 
As Callard (1997) noted: ‘over the last seven years the Middle East has moved from a 
situation of very limited access to television which was virtually all government 
controlled, to a market where there is a vast number of channels to choose between’ ( 
Cited in Sreberny, 2001, p.18). Such a media environment, triggered by the digital 
revolution, can foster a greater degree of freedom over time, even in non-democratic 







2.10 Contribution of independent media to democracy 
In the late 1980s, the international community started to pay attention to expanding 
democracy to the developing world, triggered by the end of the Cold War and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Their ostensible aim was to promote decentralization 
of power, development of civil society, rule of law, and free and fair elections (Price, 
1999). Donors call for supporting democratic media institutions is influenced by the 
perceived need to maintain stability. The goal of supporting media is to have a 
democratic independent media, one not controlled by the government or businesses, and 
able to present their views and serve their interests (Centre for Democracy and 
Governance, 1999). International community sometimes supports both independent and 
state-owned media. Such support is important because state-owned media enjoy 
privileges such as links with local officials and access to government information. 
Donors recognized the role of independent media in building a democratic society. To 
develop the quality of media institutions and enhance citizen participation, donors 
provide grants for local media channels. These grants improve technical equipments and 
provide training courses for media practitioners. The World Bank defines independent 
media as, ‘Independence refers to the media industry’s ability to report information it 
receives without undue fear of being penalize. It also refers to a media industry that is 
not controlled by any interest group, but still has access to necessary data. No media 
outlet can be completely independent: even when the government does not directly 
penalize unfavorable news, it can refuse to provide information about good stories’ 
(2002, p.4). 
 
According to a World Bank report, media independence is determined by several 
factors. First, media ownership where control over the dissemination of information is 
implemented. Second, policies in place to encourage independent media industry. Third, 
the financing of media industries and the question of how the media entities are funded. 
Fourth, laws and regulations to implement media industry (World Bank, 2002). The 
regulations guarantee that the media outlets work for the public interest and not for the 
government, as well as to be objective and neutral. This will allow the public access to 
information, provide impartial coverage and reflect a variety of topics.  
 
In situations such as one prevalent in Palestine characterized by a centralization of 
media in government hands and the lack of public participation, international 
47 
 
organizations have played an important role in promoting independent media. 
International NGOs and public culture institutions are running training programmes and 
providing technical support to enhance journalist’s skills and to contribute to the 
independent media sector. It is important to emphasise that international organizations 
have a huge contribution in media sector in Palestine to strengthen Palestinian 
journalist’s capacities. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) is a 
striking example of such capacity-building endeavor. SIDA has established a project 
with BirZeit University in the West Bank to train Palestinian journalists. Jallov (2005) 
notes that SIDA’s policy is ‘to support the development of journalism and to make it 
possible for free media to contribute to ensuring that the general public has access to 
information and the social debate’ (p. 5). This project, according to SIDA, has been 
found to be relevant and effective and has widened media freedom in Palestine.  
 
Such international NGOs have focused in funding projects that create a space for 
journalists to express their opinions. They have provided technological equipment for 
alternative media spheres such as on-line portals where journalists can publish their 
stories to potentially huge audience. This is particularly relevant and much-needed 
alternative as mainstream media faces regular and rigorous censorship and other 
limitations imposed over media channels in Palestine. Not surprisingly, these internet 
sites have become very popular in Palestine. Bishara (2010) notes that ‘some of these 
Internet sites have become respected sources of independent news for Palestinians and 
they have provided a vital means through which journalists can avoid the restrictions of 
the print media’ (p. 75). The strategy behind empowering journalists and media 
institutions is to make them able to provide sufficient coverage about government 
violation of human rights, thus creating informed citizens who are able to question those 
in power.  
 
UNESCO is another key international organization which supports the capacities of 
Palestinian media institutions and improves the training of media professionals. It runs 
projects to strengthen Palestinian participatory democracy and public dialogue. The 
objective of the projects, according to UNESCO, are to increase public participation, to 
strengthen democratic processes through independent media, to enhance democratic 
dialogue between citizens and officials, and foster public debates and widen and deepen 
people’s participation in decision-making processes. There is little doubt that the aim of 
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such projects is to provide the Palestinian journalists the ability to support media 
channels as a force to promote dialogue and democracy. The importance of these 
projects and their role in supporting such media channels render unique importance in 
the Palestinian territories that lack the basic tools to sustain a robust public sphere. 
 
Because of the turbulent political and dire security situation in the Palestinian territories, 
Palestinian journalists’ often focus their attention on covering political issues and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The training programmes by NGOs are meant to orient news 
personnel and journalism more generally towards a socially responsible role. Their 
primary objective is to build media institutions and journalistic capacities to adequately 
cover wider social issues – development, gender inequality, intercultural understanding 
- within the civil society, considered vital for sustaining a democratic society and polity. 
It is argued that when journalists have awareness of social issues and democratic 
processes, they would be able to provide a platform for people’s participation to create 
democratic public sphere. There narrow margin of freedom of expression and the 
regime that control mass media has made the Internet a good space for individuals and 
groups to discuss sensitive political issues (Rinnawi, 2002).   
 
For such a media to prosper, political and economic stability are considered as key 
factors. But many transitional and post-conflict countries lack such stability, making the 
media a tool for the elites which manage and manipulate it. The violations of 
information and human rights usually takes place, especially when judicial systems are 
weak and do not enjoy autonomy, thus failing to implement the rule of law or guarantee 
individual rights (Kumar, 2006).  
 
Independent media are often associated with privatized media. However, it is important 
to consider the relationship between the state and the private media. Though the state 
grants licenses to commercial media entities, owners may share business interests or 
have close political links with those in power. Even in countries where private media 
ownership exists, these institutions tend to be controlled by people or businesses with 
links to politicians (Wedell and Tudesq, 1997). According to the World Bank, apart 
from business and private interests, other factors such as high rate of illiteracy, the use 
and access of technology, and purchasing power of consumers, can also act as 




The media legislations in many countries have also acted as a hindrance to independent 
media. Despite impressive growth in the media sector in many developing countries, 
competition is still weak. Price (1999) stated that: ‘A system of domestic media law that 
prohibits competition internally, that constrains the capacity of programme distributors 
to meet the interests of consumers, will be a fragile one. It is not only constitutional 
reasons but pragmatic ones, in this view, that justify a far more open system of 
competition and freedom for broadcasters’ (p. 17). 
 
The independent media have benefited by the developments in broadcasting systems, 
warranted by globalization of television, offering the audience a variety of channels. 
These developments can affect authoritarian regimes and force these to pursue a more 
liberal broadcasting policy. In addition, globalization of communication has made it 
very difficult for authoritarian regimes to keep control over the media. Unlike on 
domestic media, sanctions, censorship and restrictions cannot easily be imposed on 
transnational media (O’Neil, 1998).  
 
However, independent media needs state intervention to protect and enhance freedom of 
expression and at the same time to encourage media diversity and political pluralism. 
Governments in the Arab world are restricting this right in a form of censorship, and 
even self-censorship sometimes practiced by journalists. For democracy to succeed in 
such an environment, independent media have a crucial role, performing the function of 
checks and balances to ensure free and fair elections. Though regular elections are now 
held in many Arab countries, real multi-party democracy has so far failed to take root in 
most cases. In a democratic society, citizens need full and varied information to make 
an informed electoral decision. By providing such information and allowing individuals 
to participate in public deliberation, real democracy can be fostered. Kumar (2006) 
suggests that in the countries with low literacy rates, high cost of printing newspapers, 
and logistic difficulties in distributing media content, the independent media needs 
support from the state to reach the population. The state is often the provider of the 
communications infrastructure, necessary for independent media. This infrastructure 
consists of technology equipment, workers, trained, and skilled journalists. An 
independent and pluralistic media can thus broadcast programmes to encourage citizens 
to exchange ideas and interact with local government officials for monitoring 
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developmental activities. Such programmes can invite local government officials and 
enable citizens to question them regarding issues affecting their daily life. Such 
interactions also help raise government awareness about policy and may contribute to 
reforming or rejecting a particular policy in view of the public opinion (Kumar, 2006). 
 
O’Neil (1998) has also argued that for democracy to function properly an independent 
media, which provides unbiased information and thus enables the citizens to make 
political choices, is essential. In such a formulation, independent media are considered 
as a corner stone for democracy and a key element in the establishment of a thriving 
civil society. Independent media make it possible for outlets to reflect what is relevant 
to the society and correspond to audience demands and interests. In this context, Kem 
(2007) noted that: ‘Participatory theories commonly believe that the media should 
report public opinion to government officials, thereby prompting governmental 
responses. The media should also provide the public itself with knowledge about itself - 
so that those who disagree with the dominant opinion can contest it and so that people 
can have a criterion against which to measure government responsiveness’ (p. 24). 
 
Historically, independent media are capable of undermining authoritarian rule as 
illustrated by the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe. It was an example of how 
democracy depends on the direct participation of individuals and involves freedom of 
speech, guaranteed by human rights and other conventions (Bennett, 1998).  
 
A civil society-led independent media can act as a bulwark against information 
manipulation by the governments. Kumar (2006) argued that independent media assists 
civil society organizations by revealing misuse of power by the governments thus 
provoking public outrage and condemnation. This can lead to public support for 
independent media and assistance to such organizations as more and more citizens 
engage as volunteers with independent media sector. Civil society actors can exert 
pressure over the state to allow individual’s participation, and assist them to have access 
to media (Diamond, 1999). Information empowers people and helps them to make 
informed choices among alternatives and to take rational decisions that affect their lives. 
Independent media can play the watchdog role to expose government actions, yet 
protect individuals from state aggression. Pratt (2007) argued that civil society actors 
have important role in fostering democracy, but conclude that: ‘…democratization is not 
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the outcome of a growth in the number of civil-society actors or the existence of civil 
society independent of the regime. Rather, democratization depends upon the 
ideological debates between civil-society actors and, in particular, the ability or desire 
of civil-society to put forward a vision that challenges authoritarianism, thereby paving 
the way for democracy’ (p.127). 
 
Civil society actors are important for media as they can perform many tasks in relation 
to media support and scrutiny. These tasks can be monitoring media content and 
ownership, support of implementing media laws and regulations, promoting people’s 
participation and to guarantee implementation of freedom of expression and access to 
information (UNESCO, 2008).  
 
As Sklair (1996) stated ‘Democracy is a means to effectuate improvement in the overall 
quality of human life’ (p. 40). Independent and free media are important for democracy 
to take root. It requires strong judicial and executive system to protect and guarantee 
freedom of expression. The purpose of a credible democratic media system is to form an 
arena for different groups to communicate with each other in order to reach rational 
decisions - unaffected by governmental control or business and commercial interests. 
UNESCO (2008) affirmed that independent media and greater access to information 




The media can play an important role in fostering democracy. However, for democracy 
to function, citizens need credible and complete information to make informed choices 
and decisions affecting their lives. In this chapter I have discussed different prospects of 
democracy and how media can promote democratic functions. I explored the three 
functions of media in order to promote democracy. These functions are media as a 
forum for discussion and debate; as provider of information and as a watchdog, 
critiquing the powers that be.  The forum function refers to one of the basic principles of 
democracy that individuals have the right to participate in political life and it is the role 
of media to provide the platform for their discussion in order to reach rational decisions 
for public good. The information function refers to Human rights affirmation of the 
right of individuals to access information, and therefore it is the role of media to inform 
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people to help structure their opinions. In addition, in order to foster democracy, the 
media have to provide the necessary information and allow individuals to have free 
access of information. The third function refers to the essential part of democracy where 
the media have a role of watchdog to examine those in power in order to ensure that the 
public interest is safeguarded.  
 
It is important to note that the definition of democracy should not be reduced to 
elections, as this would devalue its worth. Therefore, democracy is not just related to 
political systems; it is about freedom of information, freedom of expression, 
independent and pluralistic media, public participation and state-building. Independent 
media are vital for a society and helps in shaping the public sphere and reinforcing the 
process of democracy. It is considered as the backbone for democracy providing 
credible information and enabling citizens to participate in the political decision-
making. It can play the watchdog role to reveal misuse of power by governments or 
those in authority. In addition, free flow of information strengthens democracy and 
empowers citizens. We have to understand the media in its broader context, especially 
taking into account such concepts as the public sphere, freedom of information and 
human rights. 
 
From our discussion above, it can be shown that politicians intend to control the media 
in order to communicate with people and shape the public opinion. Different political 
groups pay attention towards media in order to influence the public sphere. In mature 
democracies this process has acquired political sophistication, as the management of 
media for political purposes is done with much greater degree of professionalism. 
However, among authoritarian governments – still in power in many developing 
countries - attempts to control the media in order to stay in power and guarantee that 
their interest would not be affected continues to be the reality. Governments in many 
Arab countries aimed to control the media under excuses such as safeguarding national 
security or as part of their social responsibility. They apply censorship laws against 
journalists and media institutions justifying these by protecting national unity and 
security. The Palestinian case is a very good example of such practices prevalent in the 
Arab world. In the next chapter I will discuss historically the prospects of democracy in 
Palestine through examination of the relationship between the media and different rulers 
in Palestine.  
53 
 
Chapter 3  
From Ottoman to Palestinian Authority: media and democracy in Palestine in a 
historical context 
 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter explores the prospects of democracy in Palestine through the examination 
of the relationship between the media and the different rulers in Palestine in a historical 
context. It will provide an overview of the media development, censorship and media 
control during different stages of Palestinian history. Examining the history of the 
Palestinian press, the chapter will demonstrate how the press reflected the struggle over 
the Palestinian identity. The press served as an instrument for political communication 
and thus a tool for political mobilization. Palestinians have lived under the control of 
different powers and as a result of this foreign domination the Palestinian media have 
tended to be more political than commercial. This political dimension was also visible 
in the way the Palestinian press gave equal if not more significance to covering pan-
Arab issues rather than focusing solely on Palestinian nationalism. The history of 
Palestinian media can be seen as a struggle against various censorships such as 
Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian. By tracing Palestinian media 
history and digging through its past, examining the circumstances and the factors that 
affected its development, we can have a better understanding of the importance of 
media institutions in the contemporary Palestinian context.  
 
3.1 Ottoman hegemony and the Palestinian media 1876-1917 
Despite being a sacred location for the three monotheistic faiths, the first printing press 
was established in Jerusalem by Nesim Beyk, a man of Jewish faith publishing religious 
material in 1830 during the Ottoman period. Furthermore, Jewish printers remained in 
control of the printing presses in Palestine until 1846, the year when the first Arabic 
printing press was established in Palestine. The printing was mostly religious in nature 
(Suleiman, 2009a). Turkish censorship did not encourage Arabic publications to be 
established as the official printing press in Palestine (Sabaat, 1966). Instead the 
Ottoman government published Al-Quds Al-Sharif (Nobel Jerusalem) in 1876 in both 
Arabic and Turkish. Al-Gazal was another newspaper published in the same year. 
Indeed, the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Sharif heralded the establishment of Palestinian 
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press. It should be noted that the printing press in Palestine also contributed 
substantially to the enrichment of the cultural and social life of Palestinians (Abu 
Shanab, 2001). 
 
Annafire Al-Othmani (The Ottoman Clarion) newspaper was established in Alexandria 
in 1904 by Ibrahim Zaka, and then moved to the Palestinian city of Jaffa to continue its 
publication for one year. After the proclamation of Ottoman constitution in 1908, the 
newspaper moved to Jerusalem and Elia Zaka, the brother of Ibrahim Zaka, became the 
owner and changed its name to Annafire. During the Ottoman era, Palestinian editors 
had to supplement their incomes by undertaking other non-journalistic work, since 
journalism did not pay enough. For instance, Yousef El-Isa, the editor of Falastine 
(Palestine) newspaper, was a government employee, and Elia Zaka, the owner of 
Annafire, was teaching Arabic language to Jewish students (Yehoshua, 1974). Elia was 
close to the Jewish cause, publishing articles in favour of Jewish settlements. Such 
closeness made commercial sense, as both the main advertisers and subscribers of 
Annafair were mostly Jewish. Al-Akhbar newspaper, which was owned by Bandali 
Gharabli, also defended Jewish settlements in Palestine. 
 
The Ottoman government proclaimed the constitution in 1908 which was, in essence, a 
reinstatement of the principles of the 1876 constitution. This constitution was based on 
the principles of liberty, equality and justice. The Palestinians took advantage of such 
liberties approved during that period and started to publish newspapers. Prior to 1908, 
Ottoman bureaucracy restricted the Palestinian press, as it was very difficult to obtain a 
license to publish a newspaper. But after the proclamation of the 1908 constitution, a 
more liberal system allowed ordinary citizens to publish newspapers. Moreover, the 
constitution guaranteed freedom of speech and criticism which led to the development 
of the Palestinian press. One indication of this change was the growth in the number of 
newspapers during this period (Abu Shanab, 2001).  
 
The large number of newspapers which appeared in this period contributed to the 
emergence of a new commercial printing press in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. Georgi 
Hananiyya established his printing press in 1894. He started printing even before 
gaining an official license, which he did not acquire until 1906. He was the first 
journalist to establish a private printing press in 1908 and was the owner of the Al-Quds 
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newspaper. It took him nearly ten years to obtain a license to start his newspaper. In 
1911, Isa El-Isa and his brother Yousef El-Isa established their private printing press in 
Jaffa and their newspaper Falastine (Palestine) (Mara’ashli et al, 1984). According to 
Yehoshua (1974), the newspaper supported the Jordanian King Abdulla and endorsed 
his view that Palestinians should be part of an expanded Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom. 
The newspaper encouraged the Palestinians to accept Jordanian citizenship and to 
realize that there was little opportunity for the Palestinian refugees to return to their 
homes.   
  
The liberalization which was provided by the constitution had created a space for the 
emergence of a political press. Many Palestinian intellectuals realized the importance of 
the press in mobilizing the masses. Therefore they made serious efforts to establish an 
independent Palestinian press. However, both Jewish-Palestinian and Arab-Palestinians 
were struggling to establish a political press. According to Suleiman (2009a), 
‘Historians attribute the reason for the increase in the number of printing presses owned 
by Jews was due to the migration of Jews from Europe to Palestine, and the desire of 
the Zionist movement to revive Hebrew as a language for the Jews through printing in 
Hebrew’ (p. 85).  
 
Arabic press succeeded in bringing the Ottoman government attention to the Zionist 
movement and its intention of occupying Palestine and establishing agricultural 
settlements. This concerned some Jewish writers and intellectuals who started to think 
in terms of establishing an Arabic-Jewish newspaper to promote their cause (Yehoshua, 
1974). Accordingly, Shamoun Moyal published the Arabic-Jewish newspapers Saout 
Al-Othmaneya (Ottoman Voice) in 1914 to defend the Jewish settlement in Palestine 
and to confront the propaganda of the Arabic press. It suffices to note that, after the 
Ottoman constitution and the freedom of expression, Arab journalists started to 
establish newspapers to respond to Jewish newspapers and to condemn Zionist 
movement. Furthermore, Arabic newspapers owned by Arabs attacked the two Arabic 
newspapers Annafair and Al-Akhbar which supported the Jewish settlements. 
Palestinians sought to establish anti-Zionist newspapers: Najib Nassar established Al-
Karmil newspaper in 1908 (Mara’ashli et al, 1984). Nasser was one of the most active 
and courageous journalists who wrote regularly and critically in his newspaper about 
the growing Zionist threat to Palestine and was responsible for launching campaigns 
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against Zionists (Neville, 1976). Al-Karmil and Falastine were among the leading 
Palestinian newspapers which played an important role in reviving Arab nationalism 
and opposing Jewish immigration (Ayalon, 1995).  
 
Given the low literacy rate in Palestine at that time, the number of printed newspapers 
was very limited. Ordinary people looked to newspapers to find out about their rights. 
While few copies of newspapers were distributed in villages, newspapers were read 
loudly in coffee houses (Yehoshua, 1974). The editor of the newspaper Falastine wrote 
in an editorial on 29 May 1913: ‘…We consider the chiefs (Mukhtars) of all villages’ 
natural subscribers to this newspaper, and we have been sending free copies for a while 
now to every village in the district with a population of more than one hundred. The 
purpose of that is to allow the farmer to learn what is happening in the kingdom 
(Mamlaka) on the one hand, and to learn about his rights on the other’ (ibid, p. 19).  
 
Thanks partly to the newspapers, the Palestinians began to realize the dangers posed by 
the extensive Jewish immigration to Palestine, threatening their territories (Ferguson, 
1973). Palestinian newspapers started to write against Zionist movement and raise 
awareness among Palestinians about the intentions of the new migrants from Europe. 
The advocacy of pan-Arab and Arab/Palestinian nationalism among many Palestinian 
journalists also contributed to the opposition to the Jewish colonization of Palestine. 
Consequently, Palestinian Jews began to realize the influence of the Arab Palestinian 
press on the Arab public opinion. Therefore, they requested the Ottoman government to 
suppress the expression ‘Palestinian nationalism’ used by the Palestinian press. Their 
protest against the articles in some Palestinian newspapers resulted in the temporary 
suspension of a few titles (Asa’ad, 1972). Such actions and the fear among journalists 
that this created clearly showed that there were definite limits upon freedom of 
expression.  
 
The censorship of Arabic press made it very restrictive, prohibiting any word against 
the government. Some journalists were harassed or even arrested for anti-government 
writings, forcing many to migrate to Egypt where there was a greater degree of freedom 
of expression. In such an environment, newspapers were constantly threatened with 
closure and cancellation of their licenses, making many newspapers avoid writing 
politically charged stories – or in some cases, stop writing about politics altogether 
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(Yehoshua, 1974). Despite such strict restrictions on editorial content and instability 
emanating from political and economic turmoil, the number of printing presses 
increased. During the First World War, printing presses had stopped and most 
newspapers were closed. They were resumed after the war and the defeat of Ottoman 
power, but were not able to develop given the instability in the Middle East triggered by 
the political circumstances that followed these (A’akad, 1966).  
 
3.2 Democracy versus censorship: British Mandate 1917-1948 
The Palestinian press had ceased to exist during the First World War, which indicates 
the difficulties it had gone through during that period. After Palestine became a British 
Mandate, the British tried to allow some freedom of expression which resulted in the 
rise of new spheres in education and culture. This national movement contributed to a 
civil struggle between the Palestinians and Jews (Abu Shanab, 2001). The newspapers 
which had stopped publications during the First World War resumed, and at the same 
time many new newspapers emerged in the marketplace. The number of daily and 
weekly newspapers increased as did their variety: literary, economic and religious 
newspapers appeared and in many languages - Arabic, English, Hebrew, Greek, French, 
and German. Many Jewish journalists and printers started to publish newspapers in 
Arabic language. During this period the total number of newspapers in Palestine was an 
impressive 241 (A’akad, 1966).  
 
This increased journalistic activity provided a new lease of life to journalists and helped 
revive national awareness. Furthermore, these developments also contributed to the 
creation of Palestinian media institutions. As the press and its institutions became more 
vocal, journalists and political activists started to criticize the British Mandate calling 
for independence and resisting Jewish migration. Palestinian intellectuals started to 
form national resistance, as well as consolidating Palestinian groups that shared 
common aims against the British Mandate and the Zionist movement. Such 
mobilization worried the British Mandate authorities, who were informed about the 
trends in Palestinian nationalism often by Jewish settlers who would be able to read 
articles they considered provocative. Consequently, restrictions, censorship, and 
suspensions against the press were implemented. Indeed, initially the British depended 
on Ottoman laws to control the press (Yehoshua, 1974). The mandate authorities also 
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banned Arabic press from entering Palestine; historians point out that as many as 46 
Arabic newspapers were banned during the years 1934-1939 (Suleiman, 2009b).  
 
On the one hand, the British government severely curbed the Palestinian press, which 
criticised the government, and on the other it sought to influence the Palestinian public 
opinion through favourable media (Barakat, 2009). British military leadership published 
a trilingual newspaper in Cairo, offered to Palestine in English, Arabic and Hebrew. The 
English newspaper was called The Palestine News, the Arabic newspaper was titled 
Palestine Newspaper, and the Hebrew one was named Hadashot MeyHaaretz 
(Yehoshua, 1974). In June 1921, the British government established another Arabic 
daily newspaper called Lisan Al-Arab (The Arab Tongue) which was edited by Ibrahim 
Al-Najjar, a Lebanese journalist.  
 
For the first ten years of the British Mandate, Palestinian press performance was not like 
any other press in the Arab world. The press played an important role in forming public 
opinion and exposing the Zionist project of occupying Palestine. In addition, it 
contributed to promoting political and cultural life (Khouri, 1976). Jewish organizations 
realized the power of the press and sought to confront the Palestinian propaganda and 
advocate the Jewish policy via the medium of such Arab-run newspapers as Annafair 
and Al-Akhbar as well as establishing Jewish-owned and managed Arabic magazines 
and newspapers (Yehoshua, 1974). The period during the British Mandate witnessed 
rapid development in journalism, partly because the British authorities had worked on 
reviving the Palestinian education in order to improve their image among the 
Palestinian people (Sawafiri, 1975; Nakhla, 1983). The period also witnessed the rise of 
private political newspapers, owned by various Palestinian factions.  
 
During the Ottoman period, there were no newspapers in Gaza, as it did not have the 
requisite capital or adequate literacy which the press required. Another important reason 
which obstructed the establishment of the press in Gaza was the high competition 
between newspapers in Jerusalem and other cities in Palestine. Furthermore, 
newspapers were distributed only in the big cities due to logistic difficulties (Abu 
Shanab, 2001). Jerusalem was the centre of Palestinian press during the Ottoman period 
and at the beginning of British Mandate. It hosted the central government offices, the 
centres for the Arab national movement, offices for the Zionist movement and Christian 
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missionaries. Many newspapers such as Al-Quds Al-Sharif, Al-Aqsa, Lisan Al-Arab, and 
many other Arabic, English, French, Greek and German newspapers were printed in the 
city. During the years of 1939-1948, Jerusalem tried to retrieve its pioneering position 
as a centre of journalism in the region. During the British period Palestine witnessed 
economic, social and cultural development and newspapers started to appear in such 
places as Gaza and A’aka cities. As these new centres emerged, Jerusalem started to 
lose its leading position (Terban, 2009). Because of their location on the sea, cities like 
Gaza and Jaffa witnessed rapid development during the British Mandate. Harbours and 
industrial areas were established facilitating transportation networks. This situation was 
conducive to printing presses as distribution became more organized, making Jaffa the 
centre of the Palestinian press. Gaza too witnessed the emergence of the Palestinian 
press. Historians point out that the first Gazan to establish a newspaper was the lawyer 
Fahmi Al-Husaini who in 1923 published Majalat Al-Hokok (Law Magazine) which 
was printed and distributed in Jaffa for five years and subsequently moved to Gaza. 
During the British Mandate only five newspapers were established in Gaza. These 
newspapers were Al-Sharq (The East), Sout Al-Haq (Voice of Right), Sout Al-Shabab 
(Youth Voice), Al-Shorouq (The Rise), and Sout Al-Oroba (The Voice of Arabism) 
(Abu Shanab, 2001). 
 
In the early 1930s different Palestinian political parties had disagreements regarding 
what actions should to be taken to curb the Zionist intention of evacuating the original 
residents of Palestine. Most Palestinian parties had their own newspapers, while many 
journalists belonged to political parties. Political and ideological disputes were 
developed in newspaper columns and editorials, with some newspapers calling for 
reliance on political leaders to solve the problem and others demanding popular revolt 
(Porath, 1977). Disputes among newspapers led to internal divisions within Palestinian 
political groups, while some Palestinian journalists emphasised the need for reviving 
national unity and national reconciliation. 
 
Different Palestinian groups used the press to provoke the populace against the Jewish 
intention of occupying Palestine. What made the situation worse was the growing illegal 
Jewish immigration to Palestine. Accordingly, in 1929, the Buraq riots occurred, 
inflaming the public consciousness which escalated to clashes between the Palestinians 
and Jewish groups and culminated in the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939 (Terban, 2009). 
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The clashes and the resultant instable security situation forced the British government to 
devise new and more stringent press laws. The Shaw Commission, set up by the 
colonial office in September 1929, blamed the press for aggravating public sentiment. 
The commission recommended the implementation of legislation which became the 
press ordinance of 1933. The new law gave the high commissioner the power to 
suspend any newspaper which was deemed to have published an ‘offensive’ article 
(Ayalon, 1995). Therefore, restrictions, prohibitions and other intolerances were 
imposed on journalists and newspapers and many journalists were jailed because of 
their writings and opinions relating to their political beliefs.  
 
During 1933, the year in which the British passed the press ordinance, the Palestinians 
established 26 new newspapers. In addition, the statistics show that about 147 
newspapers and magazines had been published during the period between 1933-1948 
(Suleiman, 2009b). This large number of publications indicates the importance of 
journalism at that time. Indeed, several Arabic newspapers, notably Al-Difa’a (The 
Defence), established in Jaffa in 1934 by Ibrahim Shanti,  supported the Palestinian 
struggle against Zionist plans, and adopted a militant position which contributed to the 
growth of the Arab nationalist movement (Khouri, 1976). Such militancy also had a role 
in riots during the period between1936-1939, when some newspapers functioned as a 
tool in spreading anti-Zionist messages and raise public awareness of the threat to 
Palestinian territories. As the criticism of them increased in the press, the British 
authorities imposed further restrictions upon it. Accordingly, on August 7, 1936, a royal 
commission was appointed to investigate the reasons behind the 1936 riots (Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1991). The tightening of the press censorship followed with the 
banning of 34 newspapers, while 11 others received warnings of closure (Terban, 2009).  
 
Such an environment also contributed to factionalism within newspapers. As the 
Palestinian journalists and intellectuals were associating with different political parties, 
disputes between them occupied most of the newspapers’ pages. However, there were 
also efforts made to forge a unified position against British authorities as well as Zionist 
groups. This had reflected in their writings during the rebellions of 1929, 1933 and 
1936. Bill’s commission report mentioned that Palestinian journalists and newspapers 
had agreed on conducting a general press meeting on 27 May 1936. The meeting 
proclaimed a strike for three days after discussing the British government policy 
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towards Jewish immigration and the new press law and its impact on the future of the 
press in Palestine (Suleiman, 2009b). 
 
Harsh wartime censorship was introduced by the British authorities after the outbreak of 
the Second World War. This included censorship of all information going in or out of 
Palestine as well as all severely censoring all newspapers, especially those in Arabic. 
This was part of the Emergency Regulations, announced in 1945 and in which 
censorship was embodied (Najjar, 1975). Only two moderate and pro-British Arab 
newspapers Falastin and Al-Difa’a were able to continue being published during this 
period (Musallam, 2008). After the end of the Second World War and the British 
Mandate, a new war started between Palestinians and Jews and the press entered a new 
age of conflict.  After the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, for reasons 
related to the war, Britain found itself obliged to establish a government-run radio 
station in 1940. The government named the radio as Al-Sharq Al-Adna (Near East 
Radio) and appointed a British officer as its director (Abu Shanab, 2001). The station 
started broadcasting in 1941 from Jenin (a city in the West Bank) and subsequently 
moved to Jaffa. Among its tasks was to re-establish the Palestinian-British relationship 
which had been spoilt because of the government repression of the Palestinians as a 
reaction to disturbances in 1939. The radio also worked on enhancing the Palestinian 
confidence in the government and its commitment for the development of Palestinian 
society. The government had adopted Arabic as an official language for broadcasting, 
and appointed Palestinian journalists in various posts. Cultural programmes were given 
prominence in the station, giving opportunities for several poets, writers and artists to 
introduce their work to the Palestinian people (Suleiman, 2009b). However, with the 
outbreak of the1948 war between Jewish and Arab Palestinians, the station had to stop 
broadcasting. 
 
According to Abu Shanab (2001), the establishment of radio in Gaza was influential 
political propaganda against the newly formed state of Israel. Broadcasting equipment 
was brought from Egypt and installed in Gaza, but by the 1967 war against Israel, these 
attempts had been unsuccessful. By that time, Gazan villagers were gathering in coffee 
shops or homes to listen to international radio broadcasts. In the 1950s, attempts were 
made to establish Eza’at Falastin (Palestinian Broadcast) and to be related to Voice of 
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Arab radio station in Egypt, later replaced by the Palestine Radio Broadcast Programme 
through Voice of Arab station, broadcast daily from Cairo. 
 
Radio was a particularly effective tool for communication with the Palestinian 
population – most of whom were illiterate. The medium also contributed to the 
consolidation of the Palestinian national heritage. In 1936, the radio Jerusalem Calling 
started broadcasting from Jerusalem. The famous Palestinian poet Ibrahim Toqan was 
the manager of the station and later replaced by the Palestinian politician Ajaj Nwaihed 
who was instrumental in providing a powerful platform for many Arab writers and 
artists. The station broadcast a news bulletin in Arabic, English and Hebrew, in addition 
to other programmes. During the 1948 war between Israel and Arab Palestinians when 
Israel occupied West Jerusalem, the station was attacked several times, forcing it to 
move its office from Jerusalem to Ramalla (in the West Bank). It continued to broadcast 
there until Jordan annexed the West Bank and the station moved to Jordan (Abu 
Shanab, 2001).  
 
3.3 Media under Egyptian rule of Gaza 1948-1967 
After the 1948 war and the defeat of Arab armies in Palestine, Palestinians did not 
accept the results of the war and the establishment of the Israeli state. Later in 1949, 
governments of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon signed a truce agreement with Israel. 
Accordingly, Gaza came under Egyptian administration and it was announced that the 
legislative and administrative procedures which were in place before 1948 would 
continue. Accordingly, press and censorship laws, enacted during the British Mandate, 
were reactivated.  
 
During the British Mandate, the civil population in Gaza was high, but after the 1948 
war, residents of villages and cities fled and became refugees. The changing population 
structure affected social and economic life, leading to poverty and unemployment. Yet, 
despite refugee status, people were connected to their families and had other affiliations. 
This led to the appearance of new political entities such as the Palestinian Communist 
Party and the Muslim Brotherhood movement – both also active in the field of 
journalism. The Palestinian communists were the first political group to emphasise the 
need for a socially relevant press to fill the media vacuum in light of the conditions 
which existed in the Gaza Strip after 1948. Accordingly, communist activists started to 
63 
 
contact investors in Gaza in order to persuade them to start a local newspaper, which 
would not only play an important political role at a national level, but also be a 
profitable investment commercially. However, they abandoned the idea when told by 
powerful Egyptian officials that they would not be allowed to publish the newspaper 
unless it was overtly pro-Egyptian.  
 
Politically too, the Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip disapproved of the 
presence of the Palestinian Communist Party and it was banned. After this was 
announced in 1953, the Palestinian Communist Party established its secret newspaper 
which was called Al-Sharara (The Spark), and subsequently, in 1955, its name was 
changed to Al-Jamaheer (the Public) (Suleiman, 2009c). During the Egyptian 
Administration in Gaza, 12 newspapers had been established, with four new newspapers 
launched just in one year -1954   (Abu Shanab, 2001).  The war against Egypt in 1956, 
and the occupation of Gaza Strip, affected Palestinian newspapers in such a way that 
they stopped publication and resumed only after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces in 
1957. After that, the press gradually recovered and the Palestinian political and cultural 
life had witnessed a remarkable development. Accordingly, the Palestinian communist 
party started to work publicly and established their newspaper Al-Tahrir (The 
liberation). In addition, the printing press gradually expanded and began to flourish. 
This reflected the awareness of a need to pay attention to the development of mass 
communication. Furthermore, the emergence of new political parties assisted the 
development of the press and the establishment of new magazines and newspapers. This 
margin of freedom helped to create a public sphere and shaped Palestinian society. 
These newspapers and magazines were important in creating the first move towards a 
democratic society. During the Egyptian Administration in the Gaza Strip, a large 
number of magazines and newspapers were established; some existed for many years 
and had an important impact on various aspects of Palestinian life while others were 
forced to stop publication for political, economic or other reasons. 
 
3.4 Palestinian media and Jordanian rule 1948-1967 
On 14 May 1948, Israel declared the establishment of the State of Israel based on the 
UN Partition Plan. By the end of 1948 the war between Arabs and Jews ended and 
Jordanian forces took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. On April 3, 1949, 
Israel and Jordan signed an Armistice Agreement which allowed Jordanian forces to 
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keep control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Qahwaji, 1972).  Jordan thus 
annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem and granted all Palestinian residents 
Jordanian citizenship. Palestinians were struggling over what constituted their identity, 
a theme dominant in the Palestinian press.  
 
Despite political and social confusion, the Palestinian press, especially in the West 
Bank, thrived under the Hashemite rule. Jordanian Government considered the West 
Bank as part of Jordanian territories, thus benefiting Palestinian life there. Historians 
agree that under the Jordanian regime the period between 1951 and 1957 was of relative 
prosperity for the Palestinian Arab press. As literacy grew, more people were engaging 
with newspapers and magazines, including those which focused on literary, cultural and 
aesthetic issues. At the same time, Jordanian authorities also sought to control the 
Palestinian press when questions were raised in the press about the legitimacy of 
Hashemite rule over the West Bank. Many Arab countries distrusted King Abdullah of 
Jordan and suspected him of being in league with the Israelis, claiming that he had no 
intention of resisting the partition of Palestine. While visiting Jerusalem in July 1951, 
King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian. King Husain came to power in May 
1953 and appointed Dr. Fawzi al-Mulki, considered a liberal towards the press, as his 
prime minster. Al-Mulki suspended the Emergency Regulations which were passed in 
1945. The relaxation of restrictions contributed to the escalating press, as many new 
newspapers and magazines were launched while others were restarted (Aruri, 1972).   
 
During the Hashemite rule in the West Bank, the Palestinians opposed the close ties 
between Jordan and the United States. This tension was also visible in the media and the 
Jordanians authorities were careful to impose restrictions so that anti-American or anti-
Western rhetoric did not enter the public sphere. The Palestinian frustration towards 
their Jordanian and other Arab leaders, made them realize that their salvation lay in their 
own hands. Therefore, in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was 
established: Jordan resisted the establishment of the PLO and imposed restrictions on its 
publications. Opposing King Husain and his rule was the main focus of some 
Palestinian newspapers which enraged authorities in Amman. For example, Bashir Al-
Barghuti, editor in chief of Al-Taliaa (The Frontier) newspaper and owner of Al-
Jamahir (The Masses) newspaper, was imprisoned by  the Jordanian government who 




Despite such restrictions, Palestinian politicians recognized the importance of the press, 
as it became a direct means for expressing their concerns and aspirations. In 1953, 
Mahmoud Abu Alzoulof established Al-Jihad (The Struggle) newspaper in Jerusalem. 
Other newspapers to emerge included Al-Manar, while two others - Al-Difa’a (The 
Defence) and Falastine (Palestine) - were restarted. Later, Al-Jihad (The Struggle) and 
Al-Difa’a (The Defence) merged under the new name Al-Quds while Al-Manar and 
Falastine were merged under the name of Al-Dustur (The Constitution) (Terban, 2009). 
The Palestinian press struggled to represent the Palestinian identity, experiencing 
different degrees of political use and misuse as well as creating a social space within 
which a Palestinian public sphere could develop. However, all these newspapers were 
forced to stop after the Israeli government occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
in 1967.  
 
3.5 Media and Palestinian diaspora 1948-1994 
After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian 
Administration and the West Bank was ruled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Palestinian people fled to neighbouring Arab countries and became refugees in their 
own homeland. This tragedy galvanized many Palestinian intellectuals to set up political 
movements to highlight the problems faced by the people of Palestine. Some of these 
had an impact on both the Arab and the international arena. In this context, Palestinian 
media practitioners played a leading role in influencing the media agenda. Apart from 
the official newspapers and magazines of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
such as Falastine Al-Thawra (Palestine Revolution), Falastin Al-Mohtala (Occupied 
Palestine) and Sout Al-Belad (Voice of the Country), there were non-official newspapers 
and magazines for Palestinian factions such as Al-Estiqlal (The Independence) and 
others. 
 
Following the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, 
and appointment of Ahmad Al-Shukiri as its president, the PLO was concerned about 
communicating with the Palestinian peoples not just in Gaza and the West Bank but 
also those living in the Palestinian diaspora, scattered all over the Arab world. 
Therefore, in 1965, he ordered for the establishment of Eza’at Sout Falastin (Voice of 
Palestine Broadcast), which was considered to be the official voice of the PLO. At the 
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beginning, it was broadcasting from Cairo as a two hour daily programme on the short 
wave of Middle East Radio. Though the station played an important role in uniting the 
Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation, its occasional criticism of the Egyptian 
government did not go down well with the authorities in Cairo. Consequently, the 
station was subjected to closure several times. Subsequently, the station moved to 
Baghdad and then to Beirut to continue its broadcasts (Abu Shanab, 2001). 
 
The trials and tribulations of the media mirrored the social reality of Palestinians. After 
the Israeli occupation of Palestine, Palestinians were divided; some people were still 
living in Palestinian territories (The Gaza Strip and West Bank) under the occupation 
while others fled to refugee camps established by the United Nations in the 
neighbouring Arab countries. Despite the dispersal of the Palestinian people in refugee 
camps and extremely difficult living conditions, they were able to organize and develop 
political movements to effectively put the Palestinian issue onto the global media 
agenda. Palestinian intellectuals and journalists recognized the importance of media in 
communicating their struggle and sought to establish newspapers in the service of the 
Palestinian cause. The newspapers in exile were run by Palestinian factions who lobbied 
to bring together anti-Israeli forces to highlight the Israeli occupation of their territories 
(Totry, 2005). The reason behind deploying all means of information and 
communication was to influence international public opinion in favour of the 
Palestinian cause and to put continued pressure on decision-makers to make the 
Palestinian issue the centrepiece of international community's attention. 
 
Palestinian movements employed the mass media to demonstrate the suffering of the 
Palestinian people and to highlight the injustice caused by the Israeli occupation as well 
as to counter the Israeli propaganda. Initially, this work was done by different 
newspapers and other media, but in 1969 the Palestinian National Council decided to 
consolidate the media into a single entity. The aim was to focus on the importance of 
advocacy to address the question of Palestine against Zionist propaganda. Furthermore, 
the entity was responsible for monitoring the Palestinian media and develop a unified 
opinion to promote the Palestinian cause (Abu Shanab, 2001). Accordingly, the Fatah 
Central Committee in 1972 decided to establish the Central Information Council (CIC) 
for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The CIC included all Palestinian 
media offices and radio stations operating from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, 
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Kuwait and Libya. It also established Falastin Al-Thawra magazine (Palestine 
Revolution) which was a platform for all and provided a unified media perspective. 
Although CIC’s main aim was to form a unified Palestinian opinion, not all Palestinian 
factions were committed to participate, and many continued to publish their own 
newspapers and magazines (ibid).   
 
With the acceleration of technological progress, the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
felt the need for a news agency to collect and distribute news to local and international 
media. Accordingly, in 1972, the decision was made to establish the Palestine News 
Agency (WAFA) (Abu Shanab, 1988). It started to broadcast from its headquarter in 
Beirut and subsequently opened branches in many countries. WAFA focused on the 
dissemination of news all over the world and worked on providing a true picture of 
conditions at home and abroad of Palestinians, as well as reporting Israeli violations 
against the Palestinian people. In 1982, after Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, the 
Palestinian resistance movements were expelled from Beirut. Consequently, WAFA 
headquarters moved to Tunisia, and other magazines and newspapers such as the 
Falastine Al-Thawra (Palestine Revolution) magazine moved to Cyprus. Later in 1995 
and as part of the Oslo Agreements and the return of the Palestinian Authority, WAFA 
and other media activities started to work from the Palestinian territories. 
 
3.6 Media and Israeli occupation 1967-1994 
The Israeli war in 1967 led to the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
including East Jerusalem. Consequently, Palestinian newspapers had stopped 
publications. To fill the media void in the occupied Palestinian territories, Israel sought 
to establish its Arabic newspaper Al-Yaom ‘Today’. The newspaper was the voice of 
Israeli government and therefore not popular among Palestinians. Eventually, Israel 
realized that the newspaper was not reaching its intended audience and therefore, in 
1968 Israeli government closed the newspaper and replaced it with Al-Anbaa (the 
News) newspaper (Yehoshua, 1974). This new newspaper was less hostile and more 
interested in the problems and conditions of the local people, but in 1985 this too ceased 
publication.  
 
Most of the Israeli media supported Israeli government policies, justifying its military 
actions, while the Palestinian media reported the violations committed by the Israeli 
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occupation. Israeli government was concerned that the Palestinian factions were using 
the mass media as a tool in the struggle for freedom and therefore imposed limitations 
on freedom of expression which were implemented by military force. Jamal (2003) 
affirmed that Israel through its military procedures had manipulated every dominion of 
Palestinian public and private life. These procedures have had a profoundly negative 
impact on the lives of Palestinian people and have violated their basic human rights. 
 
The 1967 war was a turning point for the Palestinians as it profoundly affected 
economic, social, political and cultural life. Palestinian press too faced many difficulties 
including Israeli attempts to thwart any new publications, and yet despite this, secret 
newspapers emerged, calling for resistance (Abu Ayyash, 1987). Eventually, the 
occupying power started granting licenses for newspapers and thus Al-Quds 
(Jerusalem), Al-Fajr (the Dawn), Al-Sha’ab (the People), Al-Ahed (the Covenant) and 
other newspapers and magazines were established (Abu Shanab, 1988). However, under 
Israeli occupation both television and radio was restricted (Kuttab, 1993). Thus print 
media was the dominant medium for resistance and mobilization. During this period 
some Palestinian media was owned by various Palestinian factions, some based outside 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Nossek and Rinnawi stated that: ‘There 
were three basic types of Palestinian media ownership during the period under Israeli 
military rule: (1) media wholly owned and controlled by Palestinian political parties 
inside and outside the PLO, and therefore lacking in independence; (2) independent 
media indirectly controlled and partly funded by either the Jordanian regime or the 
PLO; and (3) media wholly owned and managed by the Israeli military regime’ (Nossek 
and Rinnawi, 2003, p. 187). 
 
In 1968, Abu Alzoulof was able to merge Al-Jihad (The Struggle) and Al-Difa’a (The 
Defence) and to obtain an operating license from the Israeli Ministry of Interior to 
restart the newspaper under the new name Al-Quds. This newspaper enjoyed the widest 
circulation among the Palestinian daily press. Initially, most of its content was copied 
from other publications, and its news coverage for local issues was very limited 
(Terban, 2009). It maintained the mainstream of public opinion, and was eager to give 
space to Palestinian journalists and writers of all political affiliations. Despite its claim 
of independence, Al-Quds supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization during 




During the occupation, Palestinian press in Gaza and West Bank experienced a series of 
arbitrary actions, including issuing a series of orders and sanctions, which limited the 
freedom of journalistic work. Norman (2005) noted that ‘there is widespread popular 
support for democracy in Palestine, but the development of institutions to exercise the 
public will has been frustrated by both internal and external factors, most significantly 
the occupation’ (p.1). Israeli authorities considered the Palestinian press as a tool for 
political incitement and therefore sought to prevent publishing newspapers. In addition, 
they also regularly closed the borders, thus preventing other Arab newspapers from 
entering the occupied territories. However, Palestinians have had access to other sources 
of media which broadcast to the occupied territories. They could watch Jordanian, 
Egyptian and Israeli - both terrestrial and satellite – television. By beaming its 
programmes to the Palestinians, the Israeli authorities wanted to demonstrate the power 
they wielded in the region (Kuttab, 1993).  
 
In 1972, the PLO established the weekly newspaper Al-Fajr (the Dawn), started by 
Yousef Naser and in June 1974, the newspaper became a daily. The Israeli authorities 
were exercised by the political nature of this particular newspaper and they kidnapped 
its chief editor Naser who was succeeded as chief editor by Mohammed Batrawi. Apart 
from its political role, Al-Fajr was also close to its readers and showed deep concern 
about their local problems. During the early 1980s Al-Fajr started publishing 
supplements such as Al-Fajr English, Al-Fajr Hebrew, and Al-Fajr Al-Adabi 
(Literature) (Abu Ayyash, 1987). The PLO continued supporting the newspaper, but in 
1993, due to financial problems, the newspaper had stopped. Al-sha’ab (The People) 
newspaper, which began its publication in 1972, was also supported by the PLO (Shinar 
and Rubinstein, 1987). Ali Al-Khatib and Akram Haniya were among its founders and 
editorial staff. The paper was more radical in its tone and openly called for self 
determination for the Palestinian people. Consequently, Israeli authorities deported the 
two editors. The newspaper continued to be published until 1993 when it closed down 
after the PLO suffered from financial hardship. The militant newspaper Al-Taliaa, 
which openly criticised Israeli occupation and exposed military oppression, was started 
in February 1978 by Ilyas Nasrallah and Bashir Al-Barghuti. However, due to its 
criticism, Israeli government had forbidden the paper from distribution in the West 
Bank and Gaza (Idrees, 1987). In 1987, Palestinian journalists succeeded in establishing 
70 
 
a Journalists Association with Akram Haniya as its first chairman until Israel deported 
him to Jordan. Later, Radwan Abu ayyash led the Association but he too was arrested 
many times by Israeli authorities (Abu Ayyash, 1987).  
 
In Gaza the press was even more limited, though by the 1970s, some newspapers and 
magazines had emerged. Zohair Al-Rayis was able to publish Al-Oloum (the Science) 
magazine while in 1978, Mohammed Khass started his Al-Shorouq magazine. This was 
a weekly publication which concentrated on investigative reporting about the political 
situation in the Gaza Strip (Suleiman, 2009c). However, the difficult conditions and 
restrictions were taking many forms including temporary or permanent closure, 
restrictions on distribution and regular detention of journalists. According to Najjar 
(1997), Israeli authorities resurrected the two main regulations imposed during the 
British mandate of Palestine: the 1933 Press Ordinance and the 1945 Emergency 
Regulations. The strict censorship imposed by Israeli military regime severely limited 
the journalistic activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israeli authorities also 
pressurized the Palestinian journalists to pursue the official political line but generally 
failed to implement this policy. Israeli military continued to monitor all Palestinian 
media to verify that they did not contain any hostile message against the state of Israel 
(Friedman, 1983). 
 
One consequence of such censorship was that the Palestinian journalists failed to do 
their jobs properly and did not link up with the public or to report their problems and 
therefore largely failed to function as a local press. Self censorship obliged journalists to 
write about international news instead of local news while Israeli censorship was 
encouraging the Palestinian press to mostly cover social conditions and habitual 
practices. Publishing under the Israeli occupation raised concerns among Palestinian 
journalists and intellectuals who argued that such coverage can propagate the myth of 
Israeli democracy, and social news about the Palestinians activities would provide 
information for Israeli intelligence. Moreover, it was argued that Israel was not even 
bearing any criticism for its illegal actions. Ali Yai’ish, the publisher of Al-Sha’ab 
newspaper, was threatened by Israeli military for criticizing the Israeli settlement policy 
in the West Bank while editors of Al Fajr, the most nationalist newspaper, which called 
for fighting against the Israeli occupation were censored by the Israeli government 
(Ashour, 1995). According to Friedman (1983) in August 1982, the Israeli government 
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confined the editors of the three East Jerusalem publications Al-Fajr, Al-Sha’ab, and Al-
Talia, and imposed restrictions on their editors. In November 1982, the Israeli military 
court jailed Samaan Khoury, the editor of Al-Fajr English edition, and forced him to 
pay a $100 fine. These actions were taken against him because he had published two 
issues of the bulletin of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In 
1986, the Palestinian journalist Zeyad Abu-Zeyad started the first Palestinian newspaper 
in Hebrew language (Terban, 2009) while in 1987, Abu-Zeyad started a pro-Jordanian 
newspaper Al-Nahar (The Day) (Shinar and Rubinstein, 1987; Abu Shanab, 2001). 
During the negotiations between the PLO and Israel, the newspaper criticised the PLO 
for not coordinating with Arab countries, especially with Jordan. This led to the closure 
of the newspaper when the Palestinian Authority took control of the West Bank (Jamal, 
2001). According to Abu-Shanad (2001), by 1987, about 22 newspapers, some weekly 
and others dailies, had received a license to publish. During the 1987 first Intifada, the 
Israeli government accused the Palestinian newspapers of inciting popular opinion 
against Israeli occupation. This situation led to Israeli banning some newspapers 
permanently and others temporarily. According to the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre, during the first Intifada as many as 39 Palestinian journalists 
were detained (JMCC, 1989). 
 
In 1977, Palestinian journalists sought to establish a Palestinian Press Service (PPS) 
office in Jerusalem. The PPS was pro-PLO and tended to provide information for local 
and foreign press in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Shinar, 1987). The aim was to 
provide an alternative to Israeli news coverage of events in the occupied territories. The 
press offices functioned as a local news agency; it distributed news to local and foreign 
correspondents and international newspapers and news agencies. However, Israeli 
occupation continued suppressing Palestinian journalists and press institutions, forcing 
some newspapers to transfer their offices from East Jerusalem to the West Bank. In 
addition, Israeli authorities implemented a need for permission to enter Jerusalem or to 
provide press cards and thus in some cases denied Palestinian journalists access to 
Jerusalem, where most of the press offices were located. Consequently, many 
journalists lost their jobs. Despite the daily conflict with Israeli military, Palestinians 
continued to bring their side of the story to the world. During the intifada, Palestinian 
used the media to achieve international solidarity and raise awareness among the 
international community about the plight of the Palestinian people fighting for their 
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freedom. This had irritated Israeli authorities and they sought to impose further 
restrictions to control the media. Moreover, with the news of intifada reaching the 
world’s news rooms, Israel realized that it was getting a bad international press, 
therefore, as a pretext of providing security and protection to foreign press crews, its 
governmental press office sought to accompany international journalists in pre-planned 
trips to selected areas. 
 
Israeli occupation directs all sectors of Palestinians life, including media institutions. 
Israeli rule of the Palestinian territories is characterized by the military regime. 
Therefore, military censorship is applied to media institutions, affecting how the media 
function in all of its processes, from news production to circulation. Israeli censors not 
only impose restrictions on terms used by Palestinian journalists, but also provide 
alternative terms and expressions as requirements for publication. The editors are 
obliged to accept censored terms or abandon the whole article.  According to the 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights ‘The Israeli government’s harassment of 
independent media coverage has taken several forms: Violence against Palestinian and 
international journalists; interference in confiscation of news material; harassment and 
intimidation of journalists; and arbitrary closure of news organizations and independent 
media outlets.  In their abuse of personnel, Israeli authorities have threatened, 
interrogated, detained, beaten, fired at, and shot journalists and other media 
personnel. They have also shelled and destroyed media institutions, confiscated press 
equipment and press cards, and occupied foreign media offices’ (PCHR, 2000). 
 
Israeli control of Palestinian media can take various forms: administrative custody, 
closure of newspaper offices, raids of journalists’ houses, deportation of journalists, 
equipment confiscation, and detention without charge or detention with the charge of 
belonging to banned Palestinian factions. According to the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre foreign press can also be subjected to daily harassment (JMCC, 
1989). Israeli occupation practices against Palestinian and foreign journalists represent 
violation of international conventions. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights affirms the right to freedom of expression as a fundamental human right, 
and the right to search for and receive information without restriction is essential to 
guarantee the exercise of the freedom of expression. In addition, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 affirms in Article 19 that ‘Everyone 
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shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’ 
(UNHCHR, 1966). Moreover, Article 79 of the additional protocol of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 on the protection of victims of international armed conflict, 
granted journalists protection when it considered ‘Journalists engaged in dangerous 
professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians…’, and 
affirmed that ‘They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol, 
provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians…’ (ICRC, 
1949). 
 
Even though military censorship obstructed the Palestinian press, Palestinian journalists 
have developed a number of ways to subvert the censorship, including formulating new 
words, choosing soft language or using simple images.  According to Diamond (1999), 
democracy is a guarantee of human rights, and the role of media in promoting 
democracy is to reveal abuses against human rights. In this context, Palestinian 
journalists were able to report human rights violation committed by Israeli occupation. 
Over the years, they have built a relationship with human rights organizations working 
in the Palestinian Territories and they report abuses for publications around the world. 
Consequently, these reports from human rights organizations represent good material 
for the international media and human rights activists.  
 
3.7 Media under Palestinian Authority  
According to the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel had to 
withdraw from Gaza and Jericho city of West Bank. As a result in 1994 the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) had been established and returned to take over the Palestinian territories. 
This situation has made the Palestinian media expect to work freely and enjoy the 
freedom from the Israeli censorship. In addition, the PA had committed to respect 
freedom of expression and Human rights. But the expectations have failed where the 
Palestinian Authority have to suppress the freedom of speech in order to satisfy the US 
Administration and to commit with its agreements with Israel. 
 
The creation of Palestinian Authority formed a new socio-political situation. The 
political groups were divided into two main parties; one that supports the PLO and its 
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negotiations with Israel and others that refuse and condemn the agreements. Realizing 
the importance of the media in mobilizing public opinion, each party tried to use its own 
media to shape the public sphere and to succeed in gaining the public support. There 
was race to control and own the media in the Palestinian Territories. The PA started two 
newspapers Al-Haya Al-Jadida (The New Life), and Al-Ayyam (The Days). Started in 
November 1994, Al-Haya Al-Jadida replaced the official PLO newspaper Falastine Al-
Thawra (Palestine Revolution) and continued to represent the official PA political line 
while Al-Ayyam started in December 1995 and represented new editions of Al-Fajr (The 
Dawn) and Al-Sha’ab (The People), which were linked to the PLO and had been 
recently closed. 
 
The other parties which condemned the negotiations with Israel are the Islamic parties, 
led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These parties sought to own the media to mobilize the 
public and gain their support (Jamal, 2005). Hamas established its weekly newspaper 
Al-Watan (The Homeland) and criticised the Palestinian Authority for its agreement 
with Israel and subsequent actions. Another newspaper, Al-Resala (The Message), 
started in 1996, presented Hamas views and also criticised the PA. The Islamic Jihad 
founded their newspaper Al-Estiqlal (The Independence) which reflected the party 
position and criticised the Palestinian Authority’s strategies. The appearance of such 
critical voices irritated the Palestinian Authority and they began to harass the 
newspaper. According to Jamal (2003) the Palestinian Authority has cancelled the 
licenses of Al-Watan and Al-Estiqlal and closed eight television stations in the West 
Bank.  
 
At the beginning of the Palestinian Authority period there were two newspapers in the 
Palestinian territories, Al-Nahar and Al-Quds, in addition to other weeklies and 
periodicals. The former was pro-Jordanian, criticising the PLO for negotiating with 
Israel and signing the Oslo agreement. Such an editorial line contributed to the closure 
of the newspaper in July 1994, ordered by the Palestinian Authority, after a lengthy 
campaign of repression against the newspaper and its staff. The second newspaper, Al-
Quds, supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization in its negotiations with Israel 
and avoided any criticism of the PA or of Israel (Jamal, 2001). Though the Palestinian 
Authority claims that it believes in democracy, its actions against journalists and media 
organizations opposed to it paint a different picture.  To deal with such drastic 
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measures, many Palestinian newspapers started to practice self censorship in order to 
avoid harassment and closure.  
 
It should be noted that soon after Arafat became the head of PA he started to establish 
national institutions in Gaza and the West Bank. He and his close colleagues managed 
to control all official Palestinian institutions, prevailing over every level of decision-
making by appointing people loyal to him in central, sensitive positions. Arafat was 
acutely aware of the power of the mass media and in July 1994, the PA started the 
Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), to be led by his appointee, Radwan Abu 
Ayyash, a former head of the Palestinian Journalist Association in the West Bank. Abu 
Ayyash, a Fatah activist and an Arafat loyalist, also ran a public radio station, Voice of 
Palestine, which started broadcasting in July 1994. Its objectives were to spread the 
message of solidarity and to create harmony among Palestinians in order to achieve an 
independent Palestinian state. The television station started broadcasting in 1996 from 
its main office which was located in Gaza at Arafat’s headquarters and was run by 
Hisham Micki, another Arafat loyalist. 
 
Outside the PA media system, there was also a boom in television as more and more  
Palestinian factions sought to establish local private cable television stations to express 
their views. The large number of private television and radio stations reflects the 
freedom of expression that the Palestinians have acquired under the PA. In this context, 
the Ministry of Information in Palestine referred to these stations as allowing ‘people to 
express themselves in matters concerning their daily life. The authority should not 
monopolize information about cultural, intellectual, and political activities. This 
deepens democracy and the public freedom and creates a large space for argumentation 
between different ideas’ (Al-Bayader Assiyasi, 1997, p.54).  
 
Despite the large number of private television and radio stations in the Palestinian 
territories, there were no broadcasting laws to arrange its functions.  Though plans have 
been made to issue such laws, they have not been finalized even in 2011. The question 
of spectrum and radio frequencies for the Palestinian territories is still being negotiated 
between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. However, a small number of frequencies 




In the context of state-building, the interdependence of the media and the dominant elite 
is essential; it works as a constructive tool and contributes to the success of national 
development. However, in the case of the PA – which controls much of the media – this 
relationship has been deeply problematic, with the media functioning as a mouthpiece 
of the PA elite, who use and abuse it in order to present their views and defend their 
political agenda (Jamal, 2001).  
 
Despite PA’s apparent commitment to protect the freedom of the press, many media 
offices have been closed and Palestinian journalists jailed. In addition, different forms 
of censorship continue to take place. The Committee to Protect Journalists condemned 
the decision of the Palestinian Authority in July 2009 to close the Aljazeera office in the 
West Bank after the channel aired a contentious interview with one Fatah member (CPJ, 
2009).  
 
The creation of the Palestinian Authority symbolised the establishment of a mini-state 
with its ministries and a bureaucratic system. The Ministry of Information was 
established in June 1994 to deal with the media, the press and the right to freedom of 
expression, according to which all Palestinian factions could own media entities 
(Nazzal, 1999). Moreover, the Palestinian press law was signed by President Arafat and 
issued in June 1995. This law replaced the 1933 Press Ordinance and the 1945 
Emergency Regulations which were adopted by Israel during its rule in the Palestinian 
territories. Arafat was aware of criticism by local and international human rights 
organizations. Therefore, he frequently spoke publically about democracy and freedom. 
In an interview with Larry King on CNN, Arafat affirmed that the Palestinians have a 
free press and that they can even criticise him and his government because criticism and 
disagreement was part of the Palestinian experience. He added, ‘it is part of my power 
and part of democracy’. However, there was a clear gap between what Arafat declared 
and what was being implemented on the ground.  
 
According to the International Centre Against Censorship and the Centre for Media 
Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, ‘the law provisions are not compatible 
with Palestine’s international commitments to respect and protect freedom of 
expression’ (Article 19, p. 2). Given this context, freedom of expression is an essential 
element of democracy. This has been accepted by many international organizations. The 
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United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights 
‘Freedom of expression, to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas are essential both (i) to the individual’s self-fulfilment and thereby the person’s 
quality of life; and (ii) one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one 
of the basic conditions for its progress’ (Greve, 2007). 
 
In order to gain public support, the Islamic movement Hamas launched its Al-Aqsa TV 
station in Gaza. The launch was in January 2006 and came a few days before Palestinian 
legislative elections. The station reflects Hamas views and demonstrates the positive 
aspects of a movement considered a terrorist organization by the US and Israel. Just 
three weeks after the launch, the Palestinian Authority closed the station on the grounds 
that it did not have the proper license to broadcast. The head of the station Raed Abu 
Dayer admitted to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights that the station could not 
have the license because the Ministry of Information did not accept its application 
(PCHR, 2004).  
 
Away from this political battle over control of the airwaves, the Palestinians are 
watching TV through satellite dishes which have become affordable. Indeed, even 
before the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the construction of television 
and radio stations, Palestinians were watching Jordanian, Israeli and Egyptian 
programmes (Kuttab, 1993). The Palestinian Authority barely established a public 
broadcasting service as the Israeli occupation restricted TV and radio stations during its 
occupation of the Palestinian territories. Even though the broadcasters started airing, 
there were restrictions over what should be broadcast. They were obliged to support the 
Oslo agreement so as to stabilize the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and 
Israel. Palestinian politicians took advantage of the new medium to promote their 
interests: it was normal to see programmes supporting the Fatah party, represented by 
President Arafat.  
 
Despite restrictions by the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian businessmen, political 
factions and other groups were able to start their own TV and radio stations. The 
proliferation of these stations led to a remarkable shift from a state-owned media system 




Some of these stations presented the voices which opposed the Oslo agreement and 
criticised Palestinian Authority practices. Consequently, the Palestinian Authority 
sought to close many unauthorized stations. Later, after the start of the Second Intifada 
in 2000, the PBC served as a tool of struggle against the Israeli occupation. The PBC 
covered the Israeli invasion and attacks on Palestinians extensively. This coverage 
irritated Israel and Israeli troops attacked the PBC and its correspondents (PCHR, 
2002).      
 
In January 2006, Hamas won the legislative elections in Gaza, indicating the end of the 
Palestinian Authority rule there. Clashes between Fatah and Hamas factions led to the 
creation of two authorities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In 2007 all Arab efforts 
to form a national unity government failed. Consequently, the tensions had risen to the 
level of an armed conflict during which Hamas took over the Palestinian Authority 
institutions in the Gaza Strip. This political conflict between Fatah and Hamas also 
affected freedom of expression. Many journalists and media entities in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank had witnessed several attacks. A number of radio and television 
stations as well as newspapers were attacked and their equipment confiscated (MADA, 
2009b). The dispute between the two factions led the Palestinian Authority in the West 
Bank to ban Hamas newspapers; meanwhile Hamas prohibited Fatah newspapers from 
entering Gaza. In addition, Hamas raided Palestine Television and confiscated its 
equipment. The Palestine Television office in Ramallah was taken over while the Al-
Aqsa television station continued broadcasting.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
As the above overview of the historical development of the media and Palestine shows 
that the press has always been a highly politicised institution in the region. The Ottoman 
powers attempted to be democratic through the constitution they proclaimed in 1908. 
This constitution allowed for the emergence of a political press. There were disputes 
over the media between the Arab-Palestinians and the Jewish groups who were living in 
close proximity in Palestine. The role of the democratic media is to survey state actions, 
however during the Ottoman period media performance was aligned with the state.  
 
As was the case with other colonial systems, the freedom of expression was extremely 
limited under the Ottoman Empire, which proscribed any criticism of the colonial 
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power. Media outlets and journalists were subject to constant threats. Ottoman rulers 
came into power without election and thus were anti-democratic, and people were 
unable to participate in the decision-making process. During the period of the British 
Mandate, the press experienced relative openness, leading to rapid developments in the 
field of journalism. However, the British Mandate also sought to impose restrictions 
over the press.  
 
Palestine is a conflict zone because of its position geographically and historically as a 
holy place for the world’s three major religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The 
media in Palestine has been a target of all the powers which have ruled over it during 
the last century. Independent media remained an illusion and varying forms of 
censorship and self-censorship continued to shape journalism. The different forms of 
censorship prevented journalists from taking part in promoting debate and democracy in 
Palestinian society. During the Egyptian period, the government adopted a press law 
which was first enacted during the British Mandate. This increased censorship and 
obstructed the media from functioning fully. Even during the Jordanian regime the 
government imposed restrictions upon the Palestinian press, despite its relative 
prosperity. The press in the diaspora had made use of several mediums and played an 
important role in uniting the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation. The 
diaspora – with its access to media outlets in different countries - also contributed to 
bringing the world’s attention to the cause of Palestinian freedom. 
 
Political instability and continued Israeli occupation also severely damaged the 
evolution of democracy in Palestine. Palestine is at an early stage of state-building. 
Therefore, media independence and the protection of human rights are essential tools 
for the execution of democracy. Israel too sought to influence Palestinian opinion by 
establishing newspapers specifically aimed at the Palestinian population. However, the 
venture failed. Israel was deeply aware of the importance of the media in exposing its 
abuses of Palestinian rights; consequently, it imposed several forms of censorship on 
both the Palestinian and international media operating in the Palestinian territories. The 
Palestinian press in Gaza and the West Bank experienced a series of arbitrary actions 
against them during the occupation. However, despite such restrictions the press was 
able to maintain a close relationship with the Palestinian people. Despite the Israeli 
occupation, the Palestinian press was able to galvanise public sentiment against the 
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occupation. It must be remembered that the crucial role of the media in a democratic 
society is to reveal human rights violations. Accordingly, Palestinian and foreign 
journalists in the Palestinian territories were able to report human rights abuses 
committed by the Israeli occupation.  
 
Unfortunately, the situation of the media under the Palestinian Authority was not 
particularly better. The institutional structure of the Palestinian Authority was highly 
bureaucratic and, in addition, the dominant role of the Palestinian elite had a major 
impact on the media system. The Palestinian Authority committed to the Oslo 
agreement, to peace with Israel and tried to absorb the Islamic parties, but they have 
been uncooperative. Both sides were struggling to own the media to gain public support 
and therefore started to establish media institutions. Palestine Television had to back the 
Palestinian Authority and its programme features had to support the Oslo agreement. 
This did not correspond with the policy of opposing Islamic parties which continued to 
resist the Israeli occupation. Therefore, the Islamic movement Hamas established its TV 
station prior to the 2006 Palestinian elections and tried to compete with Palestine TV. 
Consequently, the PA closed the station because it did not have a license, and imposed 
restrictions on the media. After Hamas won the legislative elections, the conflict 
between the PA and Hamas has intensified. Subsequently, Hamas took over and 
controlled Gaza. Different media outlets engaged with this political struggle, with each 
party trying to use the media as a means to electoral gains.  In such a polarized political 
situation, the media – especially television - has been used to realise political projects. 
Ultimately, the Palestinian media failed to fulfil its duty and lost some of its credibility 
in Palestinian eyes. The next chapter will describe the methods that I deployed as I 
approached my field research and collected data from Palestinians in order to answer 










This chapter describes the methods I deployed as I approached my field research and 
collected data in order to answer the key research questions in this thesis. These 
questions aim to explore the extent to which the two leading Palestinian television 
channels, Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV, enhance democratic communication. They 
also aim to explore the perceptions of the Palestinian people of the two television 
networks and their role in state-building. The two channels, which are allied to the main 
political parties, Fatah and Hamas, seek to influence the public sphere and both 
channels have played an important role in the socio-political development of Palestinian 
society: consequently their contribution to state-building deserves special attention.  
 
It is also essential to look into the ideologies and policies of both channels to see to 
what extent these influence coverage of particular events. This provides an 
understanding of the nature of the media organizations operating within Palestinian 
society - a society making conscious moves towards the establishment of a democratic 
political system. It is essential to triangulate a number of methodological strategies and 
so both qualitative and quantitative methods were deployed. Social survey, semi-
structured interviews and focus groups were combined in order to examine the 
questions raised in this thesis. Indeed, combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be very useful and result in enriched data (Winslow et al., 2002). The 
strength of data collected through each method combined to provide an opportunity to 
triangulate the results. Combining these methods was also a useful tool for investigating 
the relationship between media and democracy in the context of state-building.   
 
After the justification of the rationale for my methodological choices, it is important to 
shed some light on the different ways in which these methodologies have been 
deployed. Different approaches were employed to develop a scientific set of data that 
reflects the stratified structure of Palestinian society. This chapter discusses the variety 
of research approaches, divided into three sections, each dealing with one of the 
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methods used in this thesis. The first part will concentrate on focus groups, the second 
will discuss semi-structured interviews, and the third will focus on survey methods.  
 
4.1 Research challenges: media research in a war zone 
Conducting academic research in politically difficult circumstances such as those 
prevalent in the Gaza Strip was a major challenge for the researcher. On the one hand, 
there is state censorship, bureaucracy and harassment and on the other there is suspicion 
among many towards researchers. This can create a lack of willingness to participate in 
discussion and a lack of honesty when answering research questions. In such 
circumstances researchers need to overcome interviewees' suspicion and to build 
rapport and trust (Clark, 2006). Clark’s study showed that conducting qualitative 
research in Arab countries is a big challenge, especially any research related to 
authoritarian political situations.   
 
Given this context, I was aware of the problems I might encounter as I embarked upon 
my research. In addition, I was aware of the need to find a way to deal with or to avoid 
such difficult circumstances. I would have to avoid traditional sensitivities and provide 
a comfortable environment for my informants. Indeed, being a Palestinian myself and 
having grown up in Palestine was a huge help. My existing social network helped me to 
overcome some of the problems, for example those involving such issues as trust and 
confidence – a crucial dynamic between a researcher and his informants. Moreover, 
using the snowballing method, especially through my social contacts, I managed to 
create trust among my informants and avoid harassment from the bureaucratic 
establishment.   
 
Being a male researcher was another challenge as it was not always easy to meet and 
interview female informants in Gaza. Indeed, most females will not agree to meet with 
men in public places. Clark’s study showed that most female researchers found that 
being female was helpful when conducting research related to, or involving interviews 
with, women (Clark, 2006). Therefore, in some areas of my research it was necessary 






4.2 Socio-political contexts of Palestinian society  
Being a Palestinian facilitated the task of interacting with Palestinians from different 
backgrounds. Being an insider from the same background meant I understood expected 
cultural norms and could avoid offending people through ignorance of their 
circumstances and culture. The residents of the Gaza Strip are currently living through a 
very difficult period, especially since the war of 2008. The internal political divisions 
and rivalries within various Palestinian factions have further compounded problems.  
Living conditions are dire: there is no fuel, and electricity is available for only about 
eight hours a day. The number of unemployed young people is constantly rising and, to 
compound the suffering, there are regular Israeli attacks on towns and villages in Gaza. 
Not surprisingly, most people are desperate. In addition, the takeover of political power 
in the Gaza Strip by Hamas in 2006 and the resultant Israeli siege have made the life of 
Gazans even more challenging. Therefore, my research trip to Gaza to conduct 
fieldwork presented a range of difficulties. After the Hamas movement succeeded in 
extending its control over Gaza in June 2007, Israel closed the borders and prevented 
civilians from entering or leaving the Strip. Entering Gaza was, for me, a real problem. 
The British Consulate had arranged my exit from Gaza in 2008 when I joined the PhD 
programme at the University of Westminster, so I asked my supervisor to write a letter 
to the consulate in Jerusalem in order to arrange my entrance to Gaza to do my field 
work: the consulate had responded to my request saying they would do their best, but 
were unable to make any guarantees.  
 
It is important to note that in 2008 human rights organisations in Gaza, Israel and the 
European Union had pressurised Israel to allow students from Gaza to be allowed to 
leave the territory to pursue higher education. The result of this was that Israel had an 
agreement with European embassies in Israel that each embassy had to make 
arrangements for the students studying in its country. Thus a representative from the 
British Embassy had to come to the Gazan border and escort me through the Israeli 
territories to Jordan. So my return journey for this research was from Jordan to Gaza, 
where an embassy representative had to meet me at the Jordanian border to accompany 
me through the Israeli territories to the Gazan border. Eventually, I succeeded in 




Once I had completed Israeli formalities and entered Gaza, I had to deal with the Hamas 
security system. Hamas soldiers stopped me once I was through the border and took me 
to a room where I was to be searched and questioned. Needless to say, Hamas soldiers 
are usually suspicious of anyone entering from the Israeli territories. After they searched 
all my bags and questioned me, I was released. Some days later my telephone rang. A 
Hamas official was on the phone asking me to go to their office: after a lengthy 
interrogation, I was released during the night. 
 
In Gaza Strip, Hamas has banned the Fatah movement and arrested its members in 
response to Fatah actions against Hamas members in the West Bank. Consequently, 
residents have to be very cautious when they talk to researchers. But being Gazan has 
helped me to create mutual trust with people I interviewed during my fieldwork. This 
trust allowed them to speak to me without any constraints caused by lack of trust. I 
heard comments such as, ‘What democracy we can talk about while our people are 
fighting’, or ‘Our democracy is better than any other country: in elections the president 
gets 99.99%’, or ‘The two television channels are like fighting between a man and his 
wife’. I spent a great deal of time learning about people's hopes and ideas for the future 
of Palestine and the role of the media in state-building.      
 
While doing my fieldwork in Gaza I was regularly monitoring the two channels, 
Palestine and Al-Aqsa. The content of these channels enabled me to understand their 
policies, ideologies and principles and to assist my research I recorded some news 
programmes. While I was recording I encountered many problems: on occasion 
electricity was cut off and there was regular disturbance of satellite signals. This meant I 
could not follow the news regularly. Israeli drones (spying flights) interfere with 
television signals: these drones are routinely used in the skies above Gaza to track 
Palestinian militants. The drones work through digital signals which interfere and 
intersect with satellite signals. This situation results in very bad satellite signals in 
which watching television becomes impossible.  
 
Despite the difficult circumstances of my research, I tried to provide the participants 
with a secure and non-threatening environment. This included assuring my informants I 
would not mention their names in this thesis, in accordance with their requests. 
Although most participants were personal contacts, the main challenge was to overcome 
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their suspicions as the research topic is largely, if not completely, political. Yet my 
informants were initially cautious about sharing their real views and opinions. I was 
careful to explain myself and the purpose of my research to the participants, clarifying 
my need to record their responses but promising maximum privacy for them and 
promising that the data would be used only by me and for my research. To ensure this, I 
asked each to choose an alias to be used instead of real names.   
 
Exit from Gaza after completing my research was another challenge. After the incident 
in May 2010, in which the Israeli navy attacked a ship and killed nine Turkish activists, 
the world pressurised Israel to end its siege of Gaza and to open the borders to allow 
humanitarian aid to enter. Subsequently Israel had allowed some humanitarian aid to 
enter Gaza. In addition, Egypt had opened its borders to allow people and aid to enter 
Gaza. When I finished my field work and decided to exit Gaza, I again contacted my 
supervisor requesting a letter to the British Embassy in order to arrange my exit. This 
letter had reached the embassy, but they refused to arrange my exit. Their explanation 
for this was that the Egyptian borders were open and they could not pressure the Israelis 
to give permission.  
 
The only way to exit Gaza then was to pass through Egyptian borders. On 24 July 2010 
I packed my luggage and went to the Egyptian border. All Palestinians who pass 
through Egypt have to be questioned by Egyptian intelligence. Thus, I was questioned 
about my activities in Gaza and where I was going, what I was doing in London, and the 
subject of my PhD. In addition, Egyptian security gather all Palestinians intending to 
pass through Egyptian territories and deport them by bus, guarded by security 
personnel. I reached Cairo International Airport after six hours of travelling and the next 
day I took my flight to London. Even at Heathrow Airport problems seem to continue: 
when I submitted my passport to the immigration officer, I was asked many questions, 
especially after the official knew that I had been in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, he called 
a colleague to examine my passport and to interrogate me. The officer identified himself 
and started to ask me about my visit to Gaza, the purpose of my visit to London and the 
nature of my research work. He insisted that I tell him all about my PhD, including my 
methodologies and why I went to Gaza. I was even asked whether I had interviewed 
anyone from Hamas, and was questioned about the general political situation in Gaza. 
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My passport was stamped and I was allowed entry only after the official was satisfied 
with the answers I gave during a prolonged interrogation session. 
 
4.3 Focus groups pilot study  
As focus groups are a relatively new phenomenon in the Arab world (Clark, 2006), I 
decided to conduct two pilot focus groups. These groups were to test the questions and 
to see how participants would respond and participate during the discussion. Ultimately, 
I managed to establish two groups of university students representing both sexes. Each 
group consisted of six members; three male and three female. Conducting these focus 
groups was very useful as it was the first time I had conducted interviews in such small 
groups. Moreover, it took me a while to get the discussion going with the first group. I 
also discovered how some students from both groups were trying to dominate the 
discussion while others responded only when asked specific questions. In addition, 
some questions had to be rephrased to make them clearer and more concise. 
 
4.4 Focus groups as a social laboratory: recruitment difficulties 
Winslow et al (2002) note that focus groups can provide rich data and enable the 
researcher to learn more about participants' feelings. In addition, focus groups generate 
interaction among group members, in which they validate, verify or challenge one 
another (Morgan, 1996; Hollander, 2004; Berg, 2007). Participants in focus groups 
considered the main source of information about themselves and issues affecting their 
lives. In this thesis focus groups are the main means of information gathering. For my 
focus groups, I decided to use the snowballing method to choose the participants. It 
suffices to note that snowball sampling is defined as a technique where the researcher 
finds members by  establishing an initial contact who then contacts a second potential 
participant, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Atkinson and Flint, 
2001). However, the snowballing method is a non probability sampling technique used 
to locate participants with certain characteristics necessary in a study of a particular 
population (Berg, 2004). It was important to choose this method because participants 
knew each other which created a secure environment. This was essential, especially as 
my research involved sensitive topics. Indeed, conducting research in complex 
circumstances such as those existing in Gaza was very challenging. Therefore, 
participants needed to feel completely secure and able to trust each other when talking 




In total, eight focus groups were conducted in different parts of the Gaza Strip. It was 
very difficult to go to the West Bank, the other part of the Palestinian Territories, 
because of the restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities. The focus groups included 
Palestinian university students, human rights activists and journalists as well as 
Palestinians from a range of backgrounds. I chose universities because students are a 
key target of Palestinian political factions, which consider the educated young to be an 
important constituency among which they seek to extend their political base. The 
Palestinian political factions consider universities to be good places to practise politics 
and conduct political campaigns. In addition, these factions are very much concerned to 
have a presence within universities in order to attract new converts to their cause. It is 
not surprising then that a majority of university students are politically affiliated and to 
find representatives of all political factions in the universities.  
 
I also consulted some NGOs in Gaza as these are places where training courses, 
workshops and conferences are regularly conducted in which people of all economic, 
social and political backgrounds participate. The main reason for this was to choose 
people with diverse backgrounds and from different locations within the Gaza Strip. All 
focus group discussions were recorded on my mobile phone which was placed in the 
centre of the table. In addition, all discussions were conducted in Arabic and then 
translated and transcribed into English. I have manually transcribed, translated, analysed 
and selected quotations to present the data in this thesis.  
 
Each focus group consisted of at least eight participants. The groups targeted eight sub-
groups categorized as follows: 
 
 • Fatah faction, both sexes (two groups) 
 • Fatah and Hamas faction, males (two groups) 
 • Fatah and Hamas faction, females (two groups) 
 • All factions and independent, both sexes (except Hamas and 






4.5 Recruitment of participants for focus groups 
Many Palestinians, like other Arabs, are not familiar with focus group techniques. This 
view is supported by Winslow et al (2002), who noted that focus groups are used widely 
with western populations but in only a limited way in cross-cultural research. This 
means that western populations are more familiar with focus groups, while in the Arab 
world they are a relatively new phenomenon. The advantages of conducting research 
based on focus groups are many: it can give participants time to recall and reflect on 
their experiences while discussion takes place. This may prompt further discussion as 
others agree or disagree and introduce experiences of their own.  
 
In Gaza Strip, I have good contacts which helped me to recruit participants from 
different political backgrounds. I had chosen universities and NGOs as the basis for my 
focus groups because of the nature and significance of these two forums in Palestinian 
politics. Most universities and NGOs in Gaza are considered to be a very good arena for 
politics. For example, Al-Azhar University, a well-known university in Gaza, has 
various Palestinian factions represented among its staff and students. Every major 
faction has its own community within the university. These communities conduct 
political activities such as elections, workshops and conferences. I decided to approach 
the university to establish my focus groups research. Initially, I pursued the institutional 
route, for example requesting permission from the university administration office to 
conduct focus groups within the university. The university authorities were suspicious 
of researchers and worried about anyone talking about the political situation. Therefore, 
they refused to give permission. Ultimately, I decided to approach a contact who works 
as a lecturer at Al-Azhar University. I asked him to put me in contact with a student 
with an affiliation to Fatah and another student from Hamas. Later, I asked the students 
to recruit others from their factions. I had a meeting with the students and explained the 
purpose of the research to them. We agreed to set two different dates for the groups’ 
discussion outside the university where I had to find a location to conduct the sessions. 
Indeed, these groups were the hardest to set up, because it was very difficult to gather 
students representing Fatah and Hamas together in one place. But eventually the two 
groups agreed after my contact at the university and I reassured and convinced them of 
the importance of the research. I asked the students to meet outside the university 
because it was difficult to discuss political issues on the campus. However I was able to 
find a venue: I asked one of my friends, who owns a restaurant, ‘Délice’, to arrange a 
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quiet space for us. Finally, two male groups from Fatah and Hamas were established. 
These groups were very challenging to manage: members of each faction tried their best 
to show the ugly side of the other and justify its own actions. The tension was very high, 
but I tried to control the situation.  
 
Given the political situation in Gaza, it was difficult to consult groups within civil 
society without having proper contacts. Therefore, I decided to approach a friend who 
works for the Society Voice Foundation in the city of Gaza. Society Voice Foundation 
is a well-known NGO which has played a leading role in empowering women, youth 
and children and has contributed to the development of Palestinian civil society. The 
centre runs programmes and workshops to enhance women’s and youth’s capacity-
building and improve their participation in civil society activities. Indeed, there was a 
workshop running about violence against women in marginalized places in Gaza. I 
asked my contact to help me in recruiting male and female participants from 
independents and all other factions. After we managed to recruit the participants, my 
contact and I set the dates and explained the intention of the research to those who had 
agreed to come and participate in the discussion. We used the centre’s conference room 
to deliver the session. My contact inaugurated the session then I introduced the 
discussion. I managed to conduct two mixed groups of both sexes from independent and 
all other factions. The first group consisted of nine participants, while the second group 
had eleven participants as staff working in the centre joined us.  
 
Similarly, I used my contacts at the Palestinian Centre for the Dissemination of 
Democracy and Community Development (PANORAMA), a well-known centre in 
Gaza, to organize another focus group. PANORAMA works in many areas such as 
democracy dissemination, community development and training and capacity-building. 
I had experience of working at the centre previously as I used to lead training courses 
and workshops for participants from different backgrounds, ages, and sexes in the Gaza 
Strip. 
 
While I was in Gaza during my field trip, I learned that there was a training course 
about good governance which the centre was organizing. I requested the centre’s 
director to connect me with one of the participants from Fatah faction. He was able to 
recruit other participants from both sexes for the two groups. After confirming the 
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names of participants for the two groups – each comprising of ten participants - I 
managed to set dates for the two sessions. The plan was to target an equal number of 
males and females in each group, but unfortunately two participants from the first group 
had to leave the session during the discussion, so the first group ended with eight 
participants. Eventually, two mixed groups from Fatah faction took part in the 
discussions. The participants were initially very suspicious, as Fatah faction in the Gaza 
Strip is restricted. But ultimately they became more relaxed when I reassured them that 
their names would not be mentioned and my research was solely for academic purposes.  
 
In the case of the female groups for both Fatah and Hamas, I had chosen Al-Aqsa 
University to conduct my focus groups sessions. As a lecturer working at the university, 
I managed to have all the facilities to conduct my sessions. I contacted one of my 
students from Fatah faction and another from Hamas. I asked these students to recruit 
others from their respective factions. I managed to sit with the students and explain the 
purpose of the research then they all agreed to the dates that we set. Ultimately, two 
female groups from Fatah and Hamas were conducted. It is important to note that as the 
students are studying different disciplines, democracy to them meant only elections so I 
had to explain the term democracy in order to proceed with the discussion. 
 
4.6 Focus groups: methodology and difficulties 
Managing the focus groups in the Gaza Strip was difficult, in the sense that you cannot 
control other factors such as time, people’s concentration, adjustment, behavioural 
pattern and attitudes towards politics. Indeed, my field experience was very different 
from what I had expected from my own studies of academic literature on how to 
moderate focus groups. I already accepted that people’s cultures differ but managing 
focus groups has trained me to be patient and have more respect for cultural conventions 
and traditions. Before beginning the session at PANORAMA centre I asked the 
participants to switch off their mobile phones. They explained this would not be 
possible as they were working and have colleagues, friends and families who want to be 
in touch with them during the day. During the session, two participants had to respond 
to calls. I had to pause the session and wait, then restart again after they finished. Such 




Another unexpected situation occurred when I conducted the two male groups in 
‘Délice’ restaurant. It is expected that when you invite people to a restaurant they will 
be given some refreshments so I provided snacks. However, while I was carrying out 
the discussion with the first group, two friends of a student came and joined us. 
Stopping these students from joining the group would have been culturally 
inappropriate. Thus the first group ended up with ten participants.  
 
The commitment of participants to the focus groups was also sometimes an issue. 
Female participants were very committed: their attendance was regular and they could 
be relied on to be punctual. But male participants were less reliable – some in the 
groups would arrive late and I then had to repeat the topics under discussion. This took 
extra time and disrupted the flow of the discussion. 
 
4.7 Groups as a social laboratory     
The term ‘social laboratory’ is used by Lindlof and Taylor to refer to focus groups in 
which ‘interpretations, perceptions, and personal experiences’ are taking place (2002, 
p.182). It has been suggested that in focus groups, ideas and experience will be 
expressed by each individual and interactions and exchange will occur. Individuals 
express their views and add their own observations, and the most interesting aspect is 
the local language they produce. Indeed, the notion of ‘social laboratory’ was very 
successful in my focus groups. The interactions between the participants contributed to 
valuable data which gave me perspectives into Palestinians' views of media, democracy, 
state-building and the future of Palestine. These are some of the main questions asked in 
the focus groups.  
 
• What do you think about the general policy of Palestine TV?   
• What do you think about the general policy of Al-Aqsa TV? 
• How do you evaluate freedom of expression in the two television channels? 
• Do you believe people’s participation in decision making (or criticism of the 
authority) could lead to building trust between the government and the 
governed?  
• Do you think either Palestine TV or Al-Aqsa TV is capable of empowering the 
plurality of citizens? 
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• Do you think either Palestine TV or Al-Aqsa TV has a democratic purpose of 
enhancing the political effectiveness of different social groups? 
• How do you think the two TV channels could contribute to the process of state-
building? 
• Do you think the two TV channels' policies are affected by their political 
leaders? 
• What do you think about democracy in Palestine? 
• How can television contribute to promoting democracy? 
• Do you think the two TV channels fairly covered the recent election campaign? 
• How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in 
Palestine? 
• Do you think Palestine TV acts as a fourth estate and monitors democratic 
procedures during election time? 
• Do you think TV channels cover human rights abuses by the Palestinian 
Authority or any other factions? 
• How do you think the Israeli occupation affects media performance? 
 
4.8 Interviews  
Arksey and Knight (1999) argue that qualitative interviews are used to understand the 
interviewee’s actions and ‘to examine the context of thought, feeling and action… and 
exploring relationships between different aspects of situation’ (p. 32). Interviews also 
allow people to express themselves and convey embedded feelings and thoughts, and ‘it 
allows answers to be clarified, which is not the case with self-completion questionnaire’ 
(ibid). However, ‘…A semi-structured interview allows more opportunity for probing 
and gives respondent considerable freedom to extend on a given question’ (Huitt and 
Peabody, 1969, cited in Peabody et al., 1990, p. 452). Overall, 19 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with leading Palestinian journalists, human rights activists, 
political analysts, academics and officials. These were: 
 
• Hani Habib, a well-known political analyst and general director of Al-
Dimocrati (Democratic) magazine;  




• Hamdi Shaqoura, General Director of the Palestinian Human Rights 
Organization in Gaza; 
• Eyad Abuhjayer, Deputy manger of the Palestinian Centre for 
Democracy and Conflict Resolution; 
• Fathi Sabah, Independent Palestinian journalist and correspondent of Al-
Hayat Al-Landaneya (The London Life) newspaper in Gaza Strip; 
• S.Q., Programme General Director at Palestine Television (wishes not to 
be named); 
• S.K., Director of newsroom at Palestine TV (wishes not to be named) 
• Emad Zaqout, Programme Manager at Al-Aqsa TV; 
• Samer Abumuhsen, Political News Manager at Al-Aqsa TV; 
• Dr. Zohair Abed, Deputy Dean of Media College at Alaqsa University; 
• Hasan Abuhashish, Director of governmental media office at the 
Ministry of Information in Gaza Strip; 
• Emad Eaid, Independent journalist and director of Mann News Agency 
in Gaza; 
• Lana Shahin, Independent journalist; 
• M.S., Independent journalist (wishes not to be named); 
• S.E., Independent journalist and BBC TV correspondent (wishes not to 
be named); 
• W.Y., A Palestinian journalist working for Palestine TV and Al-Hurra 
TV correspondent (wishes not to be named); 
• Emad Draimly, Independent journalist and director of China News 
Agency in Gaza; 
• Sami Abusalem, Independent journalist;  
• Dr. Ahmed Abusaid, Academic lecturer at Media College at Al-Aqsa 
University.  
 
The interviews with the above-mentioned revolved around issues concerning Palestinian 
media and society, media and democracy in Palestine, human rights and freedom of 
information, media and politics in Palestine, and the Palestinian state-building process. 
The objective of these interviews was to enrich and to support the theoretical framework 
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of the thesis with debates taking place among Palestinians. However, government 
bureaucracy was an obstacle that I encountered when I asked to interview an official at 
the Ministry of Information. I had approached the office to arrange an interview with 
the director of the Governmental Media Office (GMO). The secretary questioned me 
about my background, occupation and the intention behind the interview. In addition, he 
asked me to submit an application to meet the director or another official. I was told that 
they would contact me within two or three days, if the director agreed to meet me. I 
waited for an entire week, but there was no response. Subsequently, I decided to 
approach one of my contacts who had access to the director. With his help, I managed to 
organize a meeting with the director of GMO. 
 
Meeting with journalists in the Gaza Strip also proved challenging. As Gaza is a conflict 
zone, journalists work under tremendous pressure and constant tension. I had to call the 
director of the newsroom at Palestine TV many times to set up an appointment for an 
interview. I managed to make an appointment, but at the last moment he apologized and 
cancelled the appointment. I then called him several more times and managed to set up 
another appointment in his office at which I was able to conduct the interview 
successfully. Another problem arose when I planned to meet the directors of Al-Aqsa 
TV, a partisan and fundamentalist channel which takes orders from the Hamas 
leadership. In addition, they are discouraged from speaking to any researcher or 
journalist from outside the organization. I was trying very hard to get permission to 
conduct the interviews. I had been advised to contact the public relations office to 
arrange the interviews so approached them and submitted a request. The office insisted 
that I submit my questions before arranging the interview, and specifically asked me if 
there were any political or sensitive questions. I had to explain that the questions were 
not fixed because I was planning a semi-structured interview in which I could modify 
and/or add supplementary questions. In addition, I also mentioned that if the 
interviewee did not want to answer any question that he thought was too sensitive, that 
was his prerogative. I was told the office would contact me to inform about the 
interview appointment. I waited the whole week and there was no response. Finally, I 
was able once again to make contact via an intermediary who arranged the interviews 





4.9 Unstructured interviews 
During my fieldwork, I spoke to ordinary people about their opinion of the media in 
Palestine and how they see the future of the Palestinian state. In addition, I explored 
their opinions about television, democracy, the human rights situation and freedom of 
opinion. These people showed respect when I told them about my PhD research, 
revealing to them my identity as a researcher. However, they were very suspicious of 
anyone asking about the situation in a direct way. I went to considerable trouble to 
ensure I did not offend people's sensitivities. Sometimes, I found people who would talk 
at length about political issues, but at the outset I always had to build a relationship of 
trust.  
 
I had chosen public cafés as places where I could talk to people. In these cafés, I had to 
sit with people smoking Hubble bubble (shisha) and smoke with them in order to build 
trust. I used to go there during the evening when most people visit for a coffee, a chat 
and a smoke. As I entered the public space in the cafés, I learnt more about the political 
and social situation in Gaza as well as people's perspectives on television channels and 
the future of democracy in Palestine. Indeed, I was interested to hear the local language 
of the people when they talk informally and made a point of using simple language and 
letting them talk without interruption. At least three people sat at each table. It was 
difficult to jump from one table to another, and discussion with a group took time, as 
people had to interact with each other. Therefore, each table took one evening. Overall, 
I visited four different cafés. I had to record the talk, but because of the crowds and the 
noise it I also had to take notes. In addition, I have carried out interviews with people 
working for NGOs in different places in the Gaza Strip.  
 
People who are associated with the world NGOs tend to have a good overview of the 
situation in the Gaza Strip. These NGOs, as I found out, were another important public 
forum for democratic discourse. I managed to visit four different NGOs in different 
places in the Gaza Strip. However, doing interviews in different places in Gaza taught 
me that politics is a social phenomenon and an invasive part of Palestinian culture. 
Within these NGOs, I deployed an overt policy where I introduced myself as a 
researcher and the intention of my research was explained to the participants. Wherever 
I have been, I always had my mobile phone for recording and my notebook for writing 
notes. Even though I am Gazan and familiar with terms that people use, I usually record 
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events and people’s responses. As Palestine is a conflict zone, Palestinians are 
interested in politics and always following political developments – domestically as 
well as in the region. Many people I interviewed had a vision of the future of Palestine 
and were deeply aware of the daily struggle with Israeli occupation and blockade. The 
data from the interviews, which will be discussed in a separate chapter, shows that the 
Palestinian has definite views about the future of democracy in Palestine and the role of 
television in achieving this.   
 
4.10 Social survey  
This part of my research represents the quantitative aspect which was intended to 
provide statistical data to support the key research questions of this thesis. The 
advantage of using a questionnaire was to save time and cost. This view is supported by 
Sapsford and Jupp (2006), who noted that the survey saves researcher’s time and allows 
for much larger sets of data to be collected. However, Ruddock (2001) argued that 
‘surveys are often used to ask people about their reactions to the media in general’ (p. 
54). They can also be a tool to involve people in answering questions in a manner that is 
appropriate for statistical analysis.  
My social survey was designed to target Palestinians from different places in the Gaza 
Strip. Before distributing the questionnaire, a pilot of twenty questionnaires was 
conducted in different places in Gaza to give me an idea about the suitability of the 
questions. Conducting the pilot questionnaire was very helpful in the sense that I had to 
rephrase some questions for the real questionnaire as these questions were not clear to 
the pilot participants. In addition, I realised that I had to add extra questions related to 
the situation regarding freedom of opinion in the Gaza Strip.   
 
The questionnaire was divided into six parts, each with a different focus: 
  
• to provide information about Palestinians' consumption of the two satellite 
television channels;  
• to find out about television, politics and democracy in Palestine;  
• to find out about television independence and freedom; 
• to discover the role of television as a public sphere;  
• to learn about control of media and censorship;  
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• to discover the role of television as a fourth estate. 
 
The survey targeted 500 Palestinians in different places in Gaza such as sports clubs, 
universities and internet cafés. I chose two sports clubs, two internet cafés and one 
university. In addition, the questionnaire had been distributed to the participants in the 
focus groups. These places were chosen to be representative of different political 
affiliations and different areas in the Gaza Strip. For example, Namaa Sport Club is 
related to Hamas faction and is situated in the north of the Gaza Strip; Gaza Sport Club 
has links with the Fatah faction and is located in the middle of the Gaza Strip; Al Quds 
Open University represents a mixture of political factions and is based in southern Gaza 
Strip, ‘Internet Al-Maktaba’ is an internet café which is located in Gaza City and 
‘Internet For You’ is another internet café situated in northern Gaza City. 
 
These places are mixed in gender terms (males and females) except the sports clubs and 
‘Internet For You’ which is for males only. I used male and female research assistants 
to help me distribute and collect the questionnaires. I distributed 200 questionnaires at 
the sports clubs, 100 at the university, and another 200 in internet cafés. However, when 
I distributed some of the questionnaires, I could not distribute them all in one visit. 
Therefore, research assistants had to visit these locations several times and distribute 
questionnaires in order to get the maximum number of participants. Ultimately, I 
managed to get about 450 questionnaires from these locations and about 36 
questionnaires from participants of focus groups. Finally, the SPSS programme was 
used for storing, coding and manipulating the survey data. In addition, the tables and 
statistics included in this thesis were based on SPSS analysis.    
 
4.11 Strengths and limitations of research methodologies  
The responses obtained through questionnaires, focus groups and semi-structured 
interviews in this thesis only represent a tiny sample of Palestinian opinion. Despite a 
wide ranging sample of Palestinians among those in the focus groups and those who 
responded to the questionnaire from different parts of the Gaza Strip, it is not a large 
enough sample to permit valid generalizations about Palestinians' perceptions of media 
and democracy. Moreover, Israel’s movement restrictions have made it impossible to 
conduct research in the other part of Palestine; the West Bank. However, the data which 
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emerged through this sample is intended to enable the integration and interpretation of 
results in order to present an overview and valid interpretations. While 
representativeness is not an object in qualitative research, it is important when making 
generalization to aim for a fair representation of variation within the Palestinian 
population. Therefore, I tried to make my sample as representative as possible, thus 
covering a wide range of socio-economic and socio-political backgrounds and 
geographical regions. Needless to say, I am aware of the limitations of generalization 
concerning the Palestinian population. It is not my intention here to use the research 
findings in order to represent Palestinians as homogeneous society, but to present an 
indication of the situation, views and opinions of a representative section of the 
Palestinian population in Gaza.     
 
4.12 Conclusion 
The qualitative and quantitative methods which have been used in this study were 
designed to investigate Palestinians' perspectives about media, democracy and state-
building. In the interviews, focus groups and the questionnaires, I deliberately targeted 
people from different socio-political and socio-cultural backgrounds to reflect their 
perceptions of media, democracy and the Palestinian situation. These methods have 
helped me to understand their feelings and recognize their views and perceptions about 
the structure of the Palestinian state. In addition, these methods were deployed to 
answer the key questions raised in this thesis. The triangulation of the data has enriched 
my thesis and deepened my understanding of the complex relationships between media 
and democracy in a conflict zone such as Gaza. The next chapter will provide findings 
from a questionnaire-based which aimed to examine the perceptions among Palestinians 
of the two Palestinian televisions channels – Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV – and their 









The Social Survey: Findings and Analysis 
 
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents findings from a questionnaire-based survey which targeted 500 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, representing different ages, geographical areas and 
political affiliations. The questionnaire aimed to examine the perceptions among 
Palestinians of the two leading Palestinian television channels – Palestine TV and Al-
Aqsa TV. It inquired about the perceived contribution of the two rival channels to the 
enhancement of democratic communication and the development of state-building 
processes. The findings highlight the respondents’ media consumption and their views 
of television’s reliability and independence; they also pose questions about the freedom 
of opinion and expression in Palestine. In addition the respondents were asked about 
their views on television as a fourth estate and its role in promoting democracy and 
human rights in Palestine. 
 
The survey had a very good respondent success-rate: 486 out of 500 questionnaires 
were returned. It does not however in any way claim to be representative of the whole 
of Palestine or even of the Gaza Strip. The survey was designed to reflect respondents’ 
political affiliations, media consumption, views about the status of democracy and 
human rights and their perceptions of how the two channels contribute to the situation. 
Different places such as sports’ clubs, universities and Internet cafés were targeted in a 
range of areas throughout Gaza Strip. Namaa Sports Club, for example, which is 
identified with the Hamas faction and situated in the north of Gaza Strip, was targeted 
in order to reflect perceptions among members of Hamas, one of the main political 
parties in the Palestinian arena. On the other hand, Gaza Sports Club, affiliated with the 
Fatah faction and situated in the middle of Gaza Strip, was targeted to reflect opinions 
among Fatah members, the other major political party in the area. The other places such 
as universities and Internet cafés are environments in which members of all factions and 




The survey provides a useful overview of the prospects for media and democracy in 
Gaza. It is one of the three empirical aspects of this thesis: the findings of the other two 
– the focus groups and interviews – are discussed in the preceding chapter. The results 
from the survey show that 94% of the respondents said that the status of democracy and 
human rights in Palestine is in poor shape. Nearly all, 98%, said that independent 
television channels help to create democracy, although 99% believe that the two 
existing television channels would not contribute to the process of nation-building. A 
vast majority of respondents - 97% - expressed the view that freedom of expression is 
not guaranteed on the two channels, while 89% felt that the Palestinian Authority 
imposes censorship in the Palestinian Territories. There was overwhelming support - 
91% of those questioned - for the view that the channels do not discharge their fourth 
estate functions as a watchdog while 96% believed that the channels worked as a 
mouthpiece for Fatah and Hamas.  
 
This chapter is divided into six parts: the first part deals with findings related to media 
consumption, the second with television, politics and democracy in Palestine, while the 
third sheds light on findings related to the independence of television. The  fourth part 
focuses on findings related to television as a public sphere, the fifth is concerned with 
television control and censorship, while the final section reports findings related to 
television as a fourth estate.  
  
5.1 Mapping Media consumption in Gaza 
 
5.1.1 Watching television  
The survey illustrates that 51% of Fatah respondents watch television for more than 
three hours daily, 43% watch for between one and two hours, while only 5% watch 
television for less than one hour. This significantly high level of viewing among Fatah 
members is explained by the fact that they have been prevented from going out to work 
since Hamas took over the Strip. On the other hand, 43% of Hamas respondents said 
that they watch television for more than three hours a day, 40% watch for between one 
and two hours, and 14% watch television for less than one hour. In addition, 71% of 
independents said that they watch television for more than three hours, whereas 30% of 




It is important to note that during the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, 
Palestinians were not allowed to have their own television stations. This situation 
existed until 1994 when the Palestinian Authority took over the Palestinian Territories 
and established Palestine TV. Before this time Palestinians were watching Jordanian, 
Israeli, and Egyptian television channels (Kuttab, 1993).   
 
5.1.2 Watching Palestine TV  
The survey shows that 48% of Fatah members said that they sometimes watch Palestine 
TV and 46% said that they watch the channel regularly. This result is not unexpected, as 
Palestine TV is controlled by Fatah and its programmes reflecting the Fatah perspective. 
It is only to be expected that members of the faction would watch its programmes. The 
survey also illustrates that 86% of Hamas members do not watch Palestine TV. The 
growth in this figure is due to the establishment of Al-Aqsa TV which reflects Hamas 
ideology. Furthermore, its programmes are dedicated to promoting Hamas principles as 
an Islamist ideology (Zaqout, 2009). The results for independents and other factions are 
varied: 54% of other factions said that they do not watch Palestine TV, while 38% of 
independents said they sometimes watch the channel. Such an attitude could be 
explained by the quality of programming: a study conducted by Al-Abadlah in 2009 
showed that Palestine TV programmes are not professional and do not meet Gazans’ 
demands (Al-Abadlah, 2009).   
 
5.1.3 Watching Al-Aqsa TV  
The survey demonstrates that 94% of Fatah members do not watch the Al-Aqsa 
television channel. In addition, 60% of other factions and 60% of independents said that 
they do not watch Al-Aqsa TV.  In an interview with Habib (2010), a political analyst 
and director of Al-Dimocrati Magazine noted that Al-Aqsa TV is considered to be 
provocative and is seen to function as a tool for the Hamas movement. In June 2010, 
France's broadcasting watchdog ordered satellite operator Eutelsat to stop broadcasting 
Al-Aqsa TV because its programmes violate French law, as it is perceived to be 
promoting ethnic hatred and religious aggression (Feldner, 2010). Human rights’ 
organizations in Gaza Strip have condemned the decision, calling on the European 
Union to stop the implementation of the order (Al-Mezan, 2010a). However, the survey 
shows that 86% of Hamas members watch Al-Aqsa. Moreover, 5% of Fatah, 24% of 
other factions and 27% of independents responded that they sometimes watch Al-Aqsa 
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TV. This small number of respondents who watch Al-Aqsa reflects Gazans’ need for 
local news. Indeed, after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and banned Palestine TV, Al-




5.1.4 Fulfilment of requirements  
This survey illustrates that 62% of Fatah members said that Palestine TV fulfils their 
viewing requirements. On the other hand, 72% of Hamas members said that Al-Aqsa 
meets their viewing needs. This result shows that members of each party favour their 
own television channel. The higher numbers watching Palestine TV among 
independents and others show that it is more popular than Al-Aqsa. This may be 
explained by the fact that Palestine TV has recently developed and implemented a new 
plan to develop its staff and improve programming (Habib, 2010). However, we can see 
the variety in numbers of respondents who said neither television channel fulfils their 
requirements. For example, 38% of Fatah members, 29% of Hamas members, 66% of 
other factions, and 66% of independents said that neither Palestine TV nor Al-Aqsa TV 
provide what they require as audiences. These two channels are seen to be serving only 
the interests of political factions (Sabah, 2010), and this explains why many Palestinians 
are watching other channels and ignoring locally-generated programmes. Indeed, 
Palestine TV is a government channel and maintains good relations with the President’s 
office. Al-Aqsa TV is closely associated with Hamas and broadcasts information about 















5.2 Television, politics and democracy in Palestine  
5.2.1 Television’s perceived reliability  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Responses to the question, ‘Which television station is reliable?’ by political 
affiliation (%) 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that about 70% of Fatah members trust Palestine TV, while they do 
not trust Al-Aqsa TV. It also shows that about 86% of Hamas members trust Al-Aqsa 
and not Palestine TV. The opinions of members of other factions and independents 
vary: about 36% of other factions trust Palestine TV and only about 6% trust Al-Aqsa, 
while about 22% of independents trust Palestine TV and 11% trust Al-Aqsa. The 
significant levels of Fatah members trusting Palestine TV and Hamas members in 
trusting Al-Aqsa TV are because these channels reflect their political views and thus 
meet their demands. According to S.K.1 (2010), Palestine TV programmes support the 
president while Zaqout (2009) noted that Al-Aqsa policy is to support the Palestinian 
resistance. It serves the people from religious as well as political perspectives.  
 
It is important to note that the trust among independents and others towards Palestine 
TV, rather than Al-Aqsa TV, is due to the recent developments at the channel. These 
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began in January 2009 when the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appointed 
Yaseer Abedrabbo, secretary of the executive committee of PLO, to be head of 
Palestine TV. In addition, the president recently issued a declaration to turn the 
Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation from a governmental to a public institution with 
administrative and financial independence (Alwatanvoice, 2010). At the same time, 
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has approved the formation of a non-governmental media 
entity to create an independent body responsible for the sector, replacing the Ministry of 
Information. In spite of this, the chart also illustrates that about 54% of other factions 
and 66% of independents do not trust either channel due to their partisan nature. 
 
5.2.2 The perceived state of democracy and human rights in Palestine  
 
Figure 5.2 Perceived state of democracy and human rights in Palestine, by political 
affiliation (%) 
Figure 5.2 shows that about 97% of Fatah members, 90% of Hamas members, 96% of 
other factions, and 93% of independents said that the status of democracy and human 
rights in Palestine is very bad, and a further 3% of Fatah members, 7% of Hamas 
members, 4% of others and 5% of independents said that the status of democracy and 
human rights in Palestine is bad. The high level of negative opinion among Fatah 
members is explained by the violations carried out against them by the Hamas 
government in Gaza Strip. A mission from the Human Rights’ Council sent in 2009 to 
investigate the Gazan human rights’ situation asserted that Hamas security services 
carried out violence, including physical abuse and killings, against Fatah members in 
Gaza. The mission concluded that the actions of Hamas represented a severe violation 
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of human rights as well as being counter to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Palestinian Basic Law (HRC, 2009). Other political factions and independent 
civilians have also suffered from the actions of Hamas security forces.  
 
A recent report by the General Assembly of the United Nations showed that the human 
rights’ situation in Palestine is critical and witnesses to further deterioration (General 
Assembly, 2009). The Human Rights’ Council of the UN expressed its concern about 
the Israeli occupation’s violations of International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights’ Law in Occupied Palestinian Territories (HRC, 2009). Moreover, many 
human rights’ organizations in the Palestinian Territories have expressed concern over 
the recurrence of attacks by the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian 
Authority in the West Bank (PCHR, 2010; Al-Mezan, 2010b). The situation with regard 
to human rights worsened significantly after the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. During 
the Israeli occupation of Gaza in December 2009, civilian properties were destroyed, 
hundreds of Palestinians were killed and a blockade was imposed (HRW, 2010). 
 
 
5.2.3 Possibility of conducting elections 
The survey shows that 97% of Fatah members, 97% of Hamas members, 96% of other 
factions, and 93% of independents do not think it is possible to conduct elections. This 
significant level of pessimism among all factions is due to the mistrust towards Hamas 
and Fatah, the two main parties in Palestine, and their consequent lack of credibility. It 
also shows that Gazans do not believe in elections at the present time, especially since 
democratic elections happened in 2006. Habib (2010) noted that Hamas participated in 
the election after the USA administration agreed to create a democratic state. But after 
Hamas won the elections, he noted: ‘the world rejected the election’s result for the 
satisfaction of Israel’ (Habib, 2010). After Hamas took over the Strip and arrested Fatah 
members, they refused to conduct elections, despite repeated calls from the Palestinian 
president for elections. 
 
The Hamas faction’s view is that they won the 2006 election legally and hence have the 
right to rule Palestine. The Fatah faction, however, questions the legal basis of Hamas 
rule. In addition, Hamas does not recognize international and bilateral agreements 
signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The quartet of the USA, UN, EU and 
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Russia have already made it clear that they refuse to open a dialogue with the Hamas 
government as long as they refuse to renounce terrorism and honour the agreements 
signed by the Palestinian Authority. Hamas also refuses to recognize Israel as an 
independent state, thus making it difficult for the international community to do 
business with it. However, it is important to note that Hamas's victory in 2006 elections 
‘can be explained in large part by the corruption and negligence shown by Fatah while it 
governed the fortunes of the PA’ (Moniquet, 2006). 
 
5.2.4 Television and dialogue among parties  
This survey shows that about 99% of Fatah, 97% of Hamas, 60% of other factions and 
60% of independents do not think that television could contribute to facilitate dialogue 
between parties in Palestine. The high proportion of those who do not believe television 
has such a role is because of the belief that the two television channels are controlled by 
competing factions. According to Jamal (2005), politicians use the media for their own 
interests. Each of the two parties uses its channel as a mouthpiece (Habib, 2010) as well 
as an instrument to denigrate opponents. Programmes on Palestine TV are deliberately 
pitched against Hamas and its misrule in Gaza, while Al-Aqsa TV highlights Palestinian 
Authority abuse against Hamas members in the West Bank. Consequently, Gazans 
believe that as long as television channels are related to political factions, they will not 
be able to contribute to any meaningful dialogue between parties. 
 
The study by Habib (2010) reinforces this belief. He noted that Fatah and Hamas 
control the two television channels and thus shape and promote the media message and 
discourse. He added:  
 
 
I can see that the two parties are using their television channels to critique each 
other and initiate propaganda campaigns against each other. In addition, since 
the division is not ending and parties control the channels, political level would 
continue influencing these channels. Therefore, I do not think the two channels 
can contribute to the dialogue (Habib, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, 40% of other factions and 38% of independents believe that 
television channels could have a role in facilitating a dialogue among parties in 
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Palestine. W.Y.2 (2010) suggested that television could contribute to a dialogue if Fatah 
and Hamas would stop using the channels for aggravating their differences and instead 
broadcast programmes calling for reconciliation. 
 
5.2.5 Television’s policy and internal conflict 
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah members, 97% of Hamas members, 96% of other 
factions’ members and 98% of independents think that the two television channels are 
affected by the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Such high levels are due to the 
content of programmes which Gazans see on their screens on a daily basis. The majority 
of programmes on the two channels are partisan and propagandist, aimed at inflaming 
public feeling against their respective opponents. According to Abushamallah (2010), 
the two channels affect and are affected by the struggle between the two parties and 
their leaders. This also demonstrates that the two channels are heavily dependent on 
decisions taken by political leaders.  
 
It should be noted that the problems between the two parties stem from the lack of trust 
between the Hamas and Fatah leadership. Hamas feels that Fatah leaders should not be 
negotiating on behalf of Palestinians as they do not represent all Palestinian factions, 
while the Fatah leadership accuses Hamas of representing a minority view and one 
which is unrealistic within the current geo-political and security situation in the region. 
It is important to note that media disputes between the two parties have created 










                                               
2
 W.Y. Is an alias for a Palestinian journalist working for Palestine TV and Al-Hurra TV 








Figure 5.3 Responses to question ‘Is television promoting democracy?’, by political 
affiliation (%)  
 
As Figure 5.3 indicates, 67% of Fatah, 86% of Hamas, 54% of other factions, and 55% 
of independents think that the debates conducted on the two channels are not promoting 
democratic culture nor contributing to the creation of a pluralistic society. Fatah 
members I interviewed (see chapter 6) said that Al-Aqsa TV does not conduct social 
debates, and even when talk show programmes are broadcast, guests are from the 
Hamas faction and people who are participating are all from Hamas. Thus, there is no 
platform on which people from a range of backgrounds participate in debate. On the 
other hand, Hamas members said that Palestine TV is totally biased and controlled by 
Fatah. Accordingly, the debates conducted on the channel are biased against Hamas.  
 
Evidence indicates that these debates are indeed biased, in the sense that Palestine TV 
broadcasts debates that promote Fatah ideology and focus on Hamas shortcomings, 
while Al-Aqsa TV conducts debates that promote the ideology of Hamas and highlight 
the faults of Fatah. In an interview with Khaleel Abushamallah (2010), a human rights’ 
activist and director of Al-Dammer Human Rights’ Organization in Gaza, I asked about 
the debates broadcast by the two channels. He answered that: ‘I believe the two 
channels are tightened with certain policies by which social debates are monitored. In 
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addition, the two channels do not provide a democratic platform for debate in order to 
contribute to create a pluralistic society.’  
 
In addition, Sabah (2010), a well-known independent journalist and correspondent of 
Al-Hayat Al-Landaneya (London Life) newspapers, said that debates conducted on the 
two channels are designed only to serve the two political parties. People are not 
benefiting from these debates. Consequently, the two channels are neither promoting 
democratic culture nor contributing to the creation of a pluralistic society. In fact, as we 
learned from Curran (2005), media are generally considered an arena for debate: it 
needs to provide channels to link people with the government and enable them to 
express their views. This leads us to ask serious questions about the Palestinian media 
and its functions.  
 
A small proportion, about 13% of Fatah members, 12% of Hamas, 18% of other 
factions, and 16% of independents, do believe that social debates conducted on the two 
channels promote a democratic culture and contribute to the creation of a pluralistic 
society. More recently, Palestine TV has begun to develop programmes including talk 
shows in which guests from other factions and independent citizens have participated. 
S.Q.3 (2010), General Director of Programmes at Palestine TV, noted that the channel 
has changed its policy, committing itself to providing a range of opinions on topics 
under discussion. In addition, citizens are allowed to participate and can criticise 
government policies. In other words, the freedom of opinion is respected. Respondents 
from Fatah 16%, 11% from Hamas, 24% from other factions, and 23% from 
independents said that social debates do sometimes promote a democratic culture and 
thus contribute to the creation of a pluralistic society. Indeed, Gazans believe it is 
essential that the two television channels should be independent in order to contribute to 
promoting a democratic culture. Sometimes Palestine TV broadcasts programmes which 
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5.2.7 Occupation and television’s performance 
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah members, 100% of Hamas members, 96% of other 
factions, and 98% of independents think that the Israeli occupation affects television’s 
performance in Palestine. Evidence demonstrates that this occurs in many ways, 
including the bombing of television buildings, confiscation of equipment, the arrest of 
journalists, and the restriction of their movements. For example, Al-Aqsa TV was 
bombed by Israeli forces on 28 December 2008 (Al-Mezan, 2009).  
 
Palestinians have been living under Israeli occupation since 1967, and the Palestinian 
Authority has ruled the Palestinian Territories since 1994, in accordance with the Oslo 
agreement, and yet the Israeli occupation continues to undermine the authority. The 
Israeli blockade of the Palestinian Territories has had a negative impact on Palestinian 
media performance (see chapter 7), as media organisations suffer from a lack of 
equipment for broadcasting, photography and other essentials for television journalism 
(Al-Mezan, 2009).   
 
Interviews with Palestinian journalists revealed that Israeli occupation has resulted in 
multiple forms of violation against individual journalists and media organisations in 
Palestine. These violations include arrest, murder, beating, direct targeting and shooting, 
the confiscation of press equipment, destruction of media institutions and the restriction 
of freedom of movement (Abusalem, 2010, Draimly, 2010, Eaid, 2010). These factors 
limit the ability of the Palestinian media to function: according to the Palestinian Centre 
for Human Rights’ report (2009), the Israeli occupation targets its violations against 
local and international journalists and media institutions.  
 
5.2.8 Television and state-building 
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah members, 100% of Hamas members, 96% of other 
factions’ members, and 98% of independents do not think that the two television 
channels could contribute to the process of state building. The high level of these values 
is because all Palestinian factions, including independents, acknowledge that the two 
television channels are politically controlled. As we learned from Jamal (2003), media 
plays an important role in the process of state building, but the sovereignty of the media 
are an essential part of this process. According to Abed (2010), media disputes which 
take place on Palestinian television channels are adversely affecting the Palestinian 
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political agenda. Accordingly, these channels are contributing to the deepening of 
Palestinian divisions. In addition, as long as television channels continue to feed the 
division among parties, there will be no state. Habib (2010) noted that: 
 
TV does not create policy, but it covers the policy which is practised by the 
authority and creates public opinion, in order to play a role in political 
participation. In the process of state building, some elements have to be 
maintained. These elements are independence of media, political, social and 
economic structure. In Palestine, the new Prime Minister Fayyad is creating the 
state elements by building institutions, promoting industries and supporting 
sponsorships. However, television in state building stage is an important element 
and plays the role of promoting and not creating policies.  
 
In an interview with Abuhjayer (2010), Deputy Manager of the Palestinian Centre for 
Democracy and Conflict Resolution, I asked about what role the two channels can have 
in the process of state building. He answered that:  
 
Television has two roles in the process of state building; one is educating and 
the other is monitoring. The role of educating is to inform citizens about their 
rights, and the role of monitoring is to monitor government’s activities and keep 
checking on the state performance. But, as long as provocation is going on the 
two channels, then it is state destruction and not state building.    
 
 
5.3 Television independence and freedom 
 
5.3.1 Palestine television channel partiality 
The survey shows that 91% of Fatah, 100% of Hamas, 96% of other factions, and 93% 
of independents think that Palestine TV is not impartial. Previous research has 
demonstrated that Palestine TV is controlled by the Fatah faction (Jamal, 2003; Terban, 
2010). Indeed, political factions in Palestine consider media a very important method of 





The two stations, Palestine and Al-Aqsa are partial, in the sense that Palestine 
TV is related to Fatah movement and Al-Aqsa TV is related to Hamas 
movement. Both channels are manipulating and seducing the people, as their 
programmes, news, guests, all are calling for provocation. They contributed 
greatly in deepening the Palestinian division and the internal fighting. Their role 
is very negative because they are part of the political system. 
 
Interviews with Gazans (see chapter 6) revealed that there is no doubt among 
respondents that Palestine TV is biased. Indeed, according to what Gazans see on 
Palestine TV programmes, the material broadcast represents only Fatah views. 
According to Jamal (2003), Arafat as a head of the Palestinian Authority had 
established Palestine TV and appointed a loyal member of Fatah as head of the channel. 
In addition, Palestine TV headquarters was located in Arafat’s compound in Gaza Strip 
and decisions about programme content were taken at Fatah political level.  
 
5.3.2 Al-Aqsa TV partiality 
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah members, 65% of Hamas members, 96% of other 
factions, and 98% of independents think that Al-Aqsa channel is biased. The high 
numbers of respondents believing the channel to be biased is due to the control of 
Hamas over news coverage in Gaza Strip. It is important to note that, when Hamas took 
over the Gaza Strip, they banned Palestine TV and arrested its correspondents. 
Therefore, Al-Aqsa TV became the voice of the Hamas government. Gazans believe 
that programmes which are broadcast on Al-Aqsa TV support the Hamas faction. Sabah 
(2010) thinks that Al-Aqsa TV is biased because there is no diversity in its programmes 
and it functions as a mouthpiece for the Hamas faction. Despite international media 
working in Gaza, there are no other governmental channels operating in the Strip. The 
Hamas government in Gaza realized the importance of media, and so, through its media 
messages, it is trying to establish the legitimacy of its government and to influence 
Palestinians and the Arab-Muslim world against the Fatah government (Abed, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, 32% of Hamas members think that Al-Aqsa is not biased. In an 
interview with Abuhashish (2010), Director of the Governmental Media Office in Gaza 
Strip, he states that Al-Aqsa TV is not partial and does not represent the government, 
but is a private channel which simply works with the Hamas government. Abumuhsen 
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(2010), director of political programmes at Al-Aqsa TV, claimed in an interview that 
the channel is not biased and is unrelated to the Hamas government, although it 
functions in harmony with it and supports resistance strategy.   
 
5.3.4 Freedom of expression and opinion  
The survey illustrates that 97% of Fatah members, 97% of Hamas members, 96% of 
other factions, and 98% of independents think that freedom of expression and opinion is 
not practised by either of the two channels. Most faction members believe that the two 
channels are politically affiliated. The Palestinian political division has had a negative 
effect on the various rights and freedoms that the Palestinian citizens should enjoy. Both 
Fatah and Hamas have committed violations and abuse against journalists and others 
working in the media. The Hamas government has made it very hard for Palestine 
television and other media to operate from the Gaza. Similarly, the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in the West Bank has prevented Al-Aqsa TV from operating from there. 
In addition, the PA has closed the newspapers Palestine and Al-Resala, both considered 
politically close to Hamas. Many human rights’ activists such as Shaqoura (2010), 
Abushamallah (2010) and Abuhjayer (2010) affirmed that the two channels are 
consolidating their political agenda. Habib (2010) noted that:  
 
Recruitment policy in Palestine television is according to political affiliation and 
nepotism, not according to professionalism. Fatah faction is controlling Palestine 
television channel which affected the media message. On the other hand, Hamas 
government in Gaza Strip is controlling Al-Aqsa television which is pro Hamas 
and its government. Thus, Hamas and Fatah members are participating in their 
channels respectively. Independents and other faction members have tiny space 
for freedom of opinion. 
 
In a report by Al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights (2009), journalists and citizens in the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank became victims of political difference between Fatah and 
Hamas and of abuse against freedom of expression. Eaid (2010), an independent 
journalist and director of Maan News Network, noted that freedom of expression is 
restricted in the two television channels because the recruitment of staff to both 
channels is based on political affiliation, and even talk shows are skewed to serve 




Only 3% of Fatah, 4% of Hamas, 6% of other factions and 5% of independents think 
that the two channels demonstrate freedom of expression and opinion. S.Q. (2010), 
director of programmes for Palestine TV, claimed that the channel had begun to change, 
offering a variety of programmes, while Zaqout (2009) commented that Al-Aqsa TV 
has no issues with freedom of expression; all citizens are welcome to participate in talk 
shows and other programmes.   
 
5.3.5 Independent television and democracy  
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah, 97% of Hamas, 96% of other factions and 98% of 
independents think that independent television channels help to create democracy. This 
indicates that Gazans are aware of the role of independent media in creating democracy 
by providing information and acting as a forum for public debates. However, 
independent media needs a democratic constitution which provides guarantees of 
freedom of expression and the right to access information. If the media are controlled by 
political factions and used as a mouthpiece they can be anti-democratic, contributing to 
divisiveness and social mistrust. It is commonly accepted that for democracy to survive, 
an independent media are a principal condition. Habib (2010) noted that: ‘Independent 
media can work as an alternative to the parliament. It can spread the information which 
is related to democracy, it can enhance democracy through defending the freedom of 
speech, freedom to reach and to access information’. In the Palestinian case, an 
independent media are much needed in order to promote democracy and build a 
Palestinian state. This view has deepened by Shahin (2010) who argues that, if the two 
channels were independent, it would benefit Palestinian communal interest, not just the 
factions’ interest. In addition, it would play a role in reconciliation and reduce 
Palestinian divisions.  
 
 
5.4 Television as a public sphere 
 
5.4.1 Television and people’s participation 
The survey illustrates that 64% of Fatah, 4% of Hamas, 24% of other factions and 22% 
of independents said that Palestine TV allows people to participate and circulate 
controversial opinions. It is not surprising that Fatah supporters believe that their 
115 
 
channel places a greater emphasis on people’s participation. It is true that the channel 
has introduced new programmes that allow a greater degree of public participation. The 
channel started to change its strategy after Yaseer Abedrabbo, the secretary of the 
executive committee of PLO, became its head (Abed, 2010). W.Y. (2010), a journalist 
working in Palestine TV, commented that she can see the changes in which new 
programmes were introduced and talk shows started to host people from different 
political factions including Hamas. On the other hand, only 2% of Fatah, 60% of 
Hamas, 24% of other factions, and 22% of independents said that Al-Aqsa TV allows 
people to participate and circulate controversial opinions. In addition, other factions’ 
members and independents had similar opinions about both Palestine and Al-Aqsa 
channels.  
 
However, participants’ views were varied regarding public participation: 35% of Fatah, 
40% of Hamas, 54% of other factions, and 60% of independents said that neither 
Palestine TV nor Al-Aqsa TV allow the public to participate and circulate controversial 
opinions. During my interviews, I interviewed an independent journalist, M.S.4, who 
noted that Palestine TV is controlled by Fatah party, and Al-Aqsa TV controlled by 
Hamas, and both are biased. Furthermore, Palestine TV is allowing public participation 
but only to a limited extent. These restrictions ban participants from speaking against 
the government or Fatah faction and from harming anyone. M.S. added that:  
 
Palestine TV is trying to develop its programmes by adopting new approaches to 
improve its image and get more Palestinian viewers. On the other hand, despite 
having good staff and programmes, Al-Aqsa does not have a huge number of 
viewers in Gaza. This is because you cannot see variety in programmes. In 
addition, independents and other factions’ members do not appear on Al-Aqsa 
channel in order not to legitimate Hamas government in Gaza. Therefore, people 
participation is not as strong as Palestine television. Yet, their programmes 
clearly support Hamas and its government, and there is no circulation of 
controversial opinions (M.S., 2010).  
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 M.S. Is an alias for a Palestinian independent journalist. He asked me not to use his 
name because of the Hamas security forces. 
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Previous research has demonstrated that the participation of citizens is considered a 
basic principle of democracy (Hatem, 1996; Habermas, 1989). Public participation 
through media channels enables the exchange of information and open debate. 
According to Hatem (1996), a democratic media ensures active participation of 
individuals and diversity of opinions. Abed (2010) noted that there is a change on 
Palestine TV in which programmes such as talk shows include officials as well as 
ordinary citizens who are allowed to participate and question officials.  
 
5.5 Television control and censorship 
 
5.5.1 Government censorship in Gaza 
The survey shows that 99% of Fatah, 4% of Hamas, 84% of other factions and 82% of 
independents think that Hamas government in the Gaza Strip imposes censorship. Such 
high values among Fatah members, independents and other factions’ members shows 
how much Gazans, especially journalists, suffer from Hamas censorship. Indeed, Fatah, 
independents and other factions’ media outlets are suffering from Hamas-induced abuse 
against their journalists and media institutions. This became clear that after Hamas took 
over the Gaza Strip, when they prevented many newspapers including Al-Haya, Al-
Ayyam and Al-Quds from entering Gaza, exerted pressure on journalists, attacked and 
banned Palestine TV and arrested its correspondents, and attacked and confiscated the 
equipment of many radio stations. Hamas security forces had raided all media outlets 
that were linked to the Palestinian Authority such as Palestine News Agency (WAFA) 
and State Information Service and seized their equipment. Journalists have to deal with 
censorship on what they can report from the Gaza Strip, making their work very 
challenging. When I interviewed Sabah (2010), he said: ‘We all practise a strict self-
censorship in order to avoid collision with Hamas security forces’. Human rights’ 
organizations in Gaza have monitored a significant deterioration in press freedom in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza in its 
annual report (2009) said that: 
 
The period of the study had witnessed an escalation in violations of freedom of 
opinion and expression and the right to peaceful assembly. The majority of 
violations are attributed to the continuing of political division between Gaza and 
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the West Bank after the decisive military action carried out by Hamas in Gaza 
Strip in June 2007 (PCHR, 2009a, p.7).  
 
The centre called the two governments in Gaza and the West Bank to take serious 
actions to put an end to the increasing attacks on human rights and public freedom, 
including the violation of the right to freedom of expression and attacks on journalists 
and the media.  
 
Al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights in Gaza in its report (2009) noted that ‘…a sense of 
fear and hesitation has spread among Palestinian journalists in Gaza when covering 
events and circulating information because of their worries of killing or chase, which 
enhanced self-censorship and limited their ability to cover objectively. This has resulted 
in absence of the truth and objectivity when covering events’ (p.30). In an interview 
with S.E.5 (2010), a BBC correspondent in Gaza Strip told of a report he broadcast of a 
man in Gaza who made homemade wine. The following day, when the report was 
broadcast on BBC TV, Hamas security forces called him for investigation, accusing him 
of betrayal and supporting the enemy.  
 
It should be noted that Hamas security forces in Gaza chase journalists who cover 
events organized by Fatah and other factions. On the other hand, 3% of Fatah, 97% of 
Hamas, 12% of other factions, and 16% of independents think that the Hamas 
government in the Gaza Strip does not impose censorship. I interviewed Dr. Abuhashish 
(2010), Director of the Governmental Media Office in Gaza Strip, and asked him about 
the censorship in Gaza.  
 
To be honest there is nothing called absolute freedom. Your freedom ends when 
you violate others’ freedom. We are working according to press laws of 1995. 
This law regulates the relationship between the government and the journalists. 
During the Palestinian Authority rule, there was self censorship. I do not deny 
that there is a self censorship, but this is because of the situation that we are 
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living now. We know that some news agencies are focusing on Gaza. Therefore 
we are aware of what they write (Abuhashish, 2010). 
 
 
5.5.2 Palestinian Authority censorship 
The survey shows that 81% of Fatah, 94% of Hamas, 90% of other factions and 93% of 
independents think that the Palestinian Authority imposes censorship in the Palestinian 
Territories. These high levels are due to the actions of the Palestinian Authority against 
journalists, media institutions and the freedom of expression. The Palestinian 
Authority’s regime of censorship has been implemented since the Israeli occupation, 
when Israel ruled the Occupied Territories. It is important to note that the Palestinian 
President Yasser Arafat had signed the press law in 1995 without the Palestinian 
Legislation Council’s approval. The law is an amendment of the 1933 Press Ordinance 
and the 1945 Emergency Regulations which were adopted by Israel during its rule in the 
Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedoms 
(MADA) in its recent report (2009b) noted that, despite the press law and the 
Palestinian basic law commitment to protect the rights of freedom of opinion and 
expression, the Palestinian Authority had the ability to ignore these rights. 
 
Palestinian Authority rule can be divided into two periods: the first when the Palestinian 
Authority was controlling the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the second period 
when Hamas controlled the Gaza Strip and expelled the Palestinian Authority to the 
West Bank. A report by the Palestinian Centre of Human Rights (2006) accused the 
Palestinian Authority during its rule in Gaza of imposing restrictions on freedom of 
expression and publications and adopting a set of procedures that restricted the right of 
citizens to express their opinions. In addition, the PA arrested many citizens because of 
their opinions or political backgrounds. It imposed restrictions on the press, arrested 
journalists and closed many media institutions. The report also stated that the 
Palestinian security forces were abusing and arresting journalists. Media institutions 
under the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank are Palestine TV, Palestine News 
Agency (WAFA), and the newspapers Al-Hayat and Al-Jadeda. The Palestinian 
Authority sought to ban Al-Resala and Falastin newspapers, which were considered to 
be close to Hamas. It also blocked Al-Aqsa TV in the West Bank and arrested its 
correspondents. It is clear that the Palestinian Authority has almost succeeded in 
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establishing control over the Palestinian media through its censorship mechanism. A 
small proportion of respondents, 19% of Fatah, 4% of Hamas, 6% of other factions and 
5% of independents, think that the Palestinian Authority does not impose censorship. 
Indeed, with the growing internal and external criticism against its practices of 
censorship, the Palestinian Authority has taken some steps to review legislation that 
governs the right to freedom of expression and press freedoms. But these steps are not 
enough to allow journalists and citizens to enjoy the right of freedom of expression.  
 
5.5.3 Television functions as a mouthpiece 
The survey shows that 94% of Fatah, 97% of Hamas, 96% of other factions and 93% of 
independents think that the two television channels function as a mouthpiece for Fatah 
and Hamas. This indicates that the two factions use the two television channels to 
influence and provoke the public. Evidence shows that the two factions had launched 
smear campaigns against each other in the media. Al-Aqsa was referring to the 
Palestinian Authority security forces as ‘Abbas Gangs’, whereas Palestine TV was 
referring to Hamas forces in Gaza as ‘Hamas Militia’. The Palestinian media 
environment reflects the struggle of both factions.  
 
I think both TV stations are working as a mouthpiece for both parties. Palestine 
TV since its establishment was dominated by Fatah members who were loyal to 
Arafat. Therefore, I believe Palestine television channel is spreading Fatah 
agenda. It is a partial television. On the other hand, Al-Aqsa television is 
completely partial television because you cannot see the diversity in its 
programmes. All we see is religious programmes plus some other programmes. 
But, all programmes in both channels are meant to serve the political party 
(Sabah, 2010). 
 
However, Gazans believe that when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and the divisions 
in Palestinian politics became more pronounced, the two factions turned the media into 
a forum for the struggle for political and ideological supremacy.  
 
Abuhjayer (2010) notes that: ‘When Palestinian division started in June 2007, in which 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank were divided, the two parties Fatah and Hamas used their 
television channels as a mouthpiece to legitimate their policy and defend their actions’. 
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A very small percentage of respondents – 5% of Fatah, 4% of Hamas, 6% of other 
factions and 5% of independents – believed that neither of the two television channels 




5.6 Television as a Fourth Estate 
 
5.6.1 Television functions as a fourth estate 
The survey illustrates that 91% of Fatah members, 90% of Hamas members, 96% of 
other factions members and 82% of independents think that the two television channels 
do not function as a fourth estate. The editorial policies of the two channels are dictated 
by their respective political leadership. Palestine TV focuses on covering violence 
committed by Hamas against Fatah members in Gaza Strip, while Al-Aqsa highlights 
violence committed by Fatah and the PA against Hamas members in the West Bank. In 
an ideal situation, in which media functions as a fourth estate, government transparency 
would be guaranteed. However, to guarantee this function, the media have to be 
financially and editorially independent (Kumar, 2006) - a situation which clearly does 
not exist in the Palestinian situation.  
 
Habib (2010) noted that it is the main role of media to function as a fourth estate to 
watch authorities’ activities. But it has to be independent, and staff recruitment policy 
should be based on professionalism rather than being influenced by political affiliation 
or nepotism. He gave two examples of the two television channels and their coverage of 
violent actions. The first example was when Hamas members organized a 
demonstration in the West Bank against the Israeli war in Gaza. The Palestinian security 
forces had attacked protesters with bullets, tear gas, and beaten them. At that time, 
Palestine TV, in the West Bank, did not cover the event. Al-Aqsa TV had, however, 
covered the event in collaboration with other channels. The second example was when 
Fatah members held a memorial ceremony for the late president Yasser Arafat in Gaza 
Strip, Hamas security forces attacked Fatah members and arrested them. That incident 
was not covered by Al-Aqsa, but Palestine TV covered the event with other news 




Needless to say, the level of freedom in the two channels is small. Both Fatah and 
Hamas governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are exerting pressure on the 
independent media in order not to expose the governments’ violations. Consequently, 
the role of the independent media are small. Batrawi (2001) noted that Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) had sought to control Palestine TV because of political and 
financial considerations as had Al-Aqsa in the context of Hamas government in the 
Gaza Strip. According to Al-Abadlah (2009) neither channel meets the public’s 
demands, instead focusing on partisan political issues and activities. Abuhashish (2010) 
commented that Palestine TV does not function as a fourth estate and therefore does not 
monitor Fatah government activities in a critical way. Neither does Al-Aqsa TV 
discharge a watchdog function in relation to Hamas government activities. According to 
Abumuhsen (2010), ‘there is a sense of harmony between the channel and the 
government’. Consequently, the channel will not criticise the government or even watch 
its activities, thus undermining its credibility and limiting its role in building trust 
between government and citizens.  
 
Just 8% of Fatah, 11% of Hamas, 6% of other factions, and 16% of independents think 
that the two television channels function as a fourth estate. This very low level of 
confidence among respondents indicates that the two channels just occasionally 
broadcast programmes for people’s interests, rather than for the government. Zaqout 
(2009) noted that Al-Aqsa TV policy is supporting the Palestinians. He added that: ‘In 
Al-Aqsa television channel, we started to change our policy in order to end the 
Palestinian division. We started to change the language to create a climate for 
reconciliation’. At the same level, SK (2010) noted that Palestine TV has recently 
changed its policy and started to raise issues which concern the daily lives of 
Palestinians, bringing these to the notice of the authorities.  
 
5.6.2 Television criticises those in power 
The survey shows that 94% of Fatah, 97% of Hamas, 96% of other factions and 98% of 
independents think that Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV cannot criticise those in power in 
the Palestinian Authority and Hamas respectively. Undoubtedly, both Fatah and Hamas 
are using the media as a tool for political manipulation. Gazans believe that both 
political parties rely on stories and programmes in the media to sell their ideas, while 
the two television stations have become a part of the power structure of the political 
122 
 
parties and are relentlessly used to spread their ideologies. This means that media 
criticism is absent. As we learned from Kumar (2006), an independent media are 
essential for democracy as it can adopt a strategy of monitoring governments and 
criticising those in power. Gazans believe that the two television channels are not 
independent and therefore it is hard for them to criticise those in power. 
 
With regard to Palestine TV, Jamal (2000a) notes that ‘political affiliation and personal 
allegiance appear to be an important factor in Palestine Broadcasting Corporation 
(Palestine TV) staff appointments, and few decisions, even of a very routine nature, are 
made without direct authorization from the very highest levels’ (p. 54). Shahin (2010), 
an independent Palestinian journalist, notes that the two television channels are 
defending their respective governments, and the two governments control what is 
published and prohibit any media criticism of ministries and government officials. 
Despite the press law and the Palestinian basic law, freedom of expression is not 
implemented by the two channels. In addition, there is a gap between what is claimed 
and what is the reality in the two television channels. Sabah (2010) notes that Palestine 
TV is not considered to be representative of Palestinians; it represents the government 
and those in power. Therefore, it will not be able to criticise them. At the same time, Al-
Aqsa TV is linked to Hamas and spreads its ideology. He adds: ‘It is not independent 
and most of its programmes are related to Hamas faction. Therefore, it is impossible to 




5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the situation of the two television channels Palestine and Al-
Aqsa in Palestine from the Gazans’ point of view. Respondents believed that each of the 
two channels are used as proxy by its controlling party – Fatah and Hamas – in the 
battle between the rival political groups. They introduce divisiveness rather than 
harmony, hatred instead of rational debate, and suspicion rather than social trust among 
Gazans. This undoubtedly leads to the undermining of media credibility, public mistrust 
and debasing of democratic structures. Yet the two channels cannot avoid their 
responsibility for shaping public opinion, building peace and social consensus. It is 
important to note that at this stage of state building, the two television channels can 
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function as a fourth estate, promote democracy by encouraging tolerance among various 
factions, and protect human rights. But their actions so far, as noted by Gazans, are 
insufficiently democratic as they are not even able to promote reconciliation between 
the two factions. As a result of these conditions, respondents have characterize the two 
channels thus:  
 
• They do not perform a watchdog role or check on the government’s 
performance;  
• There is a lack of coverage of human rights’ violations by both governments;  
• There is insufficient public discussion and expression of diverse opinion;  
• There is a lack of independence and the free flow of information; 
• There is little critical coverage of those in power in the two factions.  
 
The next chapter will provide an overview of comments and views expressed by the 
participants during the focus group sessions about the two channels and their 
contribution to enhance democratic communication in Palestine and towards processes 
























Focus Groups: Data Analysis 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the results from the discussions of eight focus groups which were 
conducted in different parts of the Gaza Strip. As stated in Chapter 4, most of the 
participants were recruited through the snowballing method with the help of my social 
contacts. The purpose of using this method was to avoid harassment by the authorities 
and to create trust among focus group members. The participants were taken from 
different groups – university students, human rights activists, journalists and non-
governmental organization (NGO) employees. My intention was to target both the 
politically affiliated and independents in order to examine their perceptions of the 
television channels Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV and their perceived contribution to 
the democratization of Palestine. This chapter provides an overview of comments and 
views expressed by the participants during the focus group sessions in response to a set 
of questions (see chapter on Methodology). The comments are organised in five themes 
that emerged from the discussions. 
 
6.1 Key themes and sub-themes 
The first theme, Palestinian television and public participation, examines the role of 
Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV in providing a platform for open discussion of divergent 
opinions and a consideration of whether the two channels create an arena for different 
groups to communicate freely with each other. In addition, it explores the views of 
Gazans on whether they have the freedom of expression to participate in debate and 
their perceptions of how the structures of the two channels influence this.  
 
The second theme, Political dimensions of television in Palestine, arises from the 
comments and views expressed by the participants which demonstrate how the two 
channels relate to both political parties – Fatah and Hamas – and function as a 
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mouthpiece for the factions. It will also explore to what extent these channels help in 
bridging or expanding the political divide in Palestine.  
 
The third theme, Television performance and promotion of democracy, will discuss the 
participants’ comments about the role of the two television channels in fostering 
democracy, in relation to the three functions of media in a democracy: information, 
forum and critique. This will show to what extent the two channels are seen to promote 
these three functions.  
 
The fourth theme, Television’s role in monitoring government actions, arises from 
participants’ perceptions of the role of the two channels in monitoring government 
activities. I will try to elicit from the focus groups’ responses to what extent these two 
television channels function as a fourth estate, able to take a stand against government 
corruption and to criticise those in power.  
 
The fifth and the last theme, Television and the project of state-building, will illustrate 
how the control of the two channels affects the state-building process, and the 
importance of an  independent media at this stage. In addition, it will illustrate practical 
evidence of how the measures against the media and restrictions on journalists affect the 
process of state-building.       
  
6.2 Theme 1: Palestinian television and public participation 
The discussion in the focus groups showed that public participation could mean several 
things. For some, it meant that the media had to provide channels for discussion, while 
for others it was the arena in which different social and political groups presented their 
views. Most agreed that it was the role of the media to provide citizens with an arena to 
discuss different issues and that citizens should have free access to media channels to 
present their views.  
 
Groups 1 and 2: Fatah faction, mixed gender, students and NGO workers  
 
These two mixed gender groups came from different backgrounds: students (aged 18-
22) and professional workers in their 20s and 30s. However most of them referred to 
public participation in television channels as Musharaka Fe Al Araa, meaning ‘opinion 
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participation’. Most of the group members had critical comments to make about public 
participation in both television channels, but Al-Aqsa TV received more criticism 
because it is run by their opponents, the Hamas faction.  
 
For university students, Al-Aqsa TV was seen as radical in its orientation, serving 
Hamas and its political agenda. For the professionals, the objective behind public 
participation was to enable greater involvement of citizens. But both channels allowed 
only their own members to participate in their programming. A female university 
student described Al-Aqsa TV as a Hamas monopoly: ‘Since its establishment, Al-Aqsa 
Television channel only allows Hamas members to participate in discussions on the 
channel’ (18-year-old female Fatah supporter).   
 
A male journalist described how participation was affected by those who controlled the 
channel:  
 
Both television channels are controlled by political factions, therefore, members 
of each faction participate in the channel which belongs to them. If anyone from 
Fatah participates in Al-Aqsa Television channel, they will simply fade out his 
phone call. The same with the Palestine Television channel. They will not allow 
anyone from Hamas to participate (28-year-old male Fatah supporter).  
 
However, one female participant suggested that sometimes the channels provided their 
opponents with space to express their opinions: 
 
I think both television channels would not allow anyone to criticise any political 
party. The freedom of someone ends when it harms others. Their editorial policy 
is not allowing anyone to criticise. When they hear any criticism, they end the 
call. I agree that for some time when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, Palestine 
Television channel allowed people to participate and insult Hamas. On the other 
hand, when Al-Aqsa Television was covering Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip 




Gazans, especially Fatah members, believe that the Hamas movement is radical and 
fundamentalist.6 A male from Fatah described Al-Aqsa Television as ‘radical and 
fundamental; we cannot express our opinions freely. Many thanks for Palestine 
Television channel’ (24-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
Groups 3 and 4: Male Fatah and Hamas students 
These two groups were all students from Al-Azhar University with ages ranging 
between 18 and 24, from different backgrounds. The students from both groups were 
either politically affiliated to or supportive of the Hamas or Fatah faction. In both 
groups, Fatah members had the same view of public participation in relation to Al-Aqsa 
TV. At the same time, Hamas members had equal perceptions of Palestine TV in terms 
of public participation. Fatah members described participation in Al-Aqsa TV as 
impossible for themselves and other people, while Hamas members said they were not 
allowed to participate in Palestine TV, although it is supposed to be the national 
television channel.  
 
Both groups disagreed about the two channels’ policy towards the political division of 
Palestine and recognised the role of the two political leaderships in feeding this division 
through their television channels. A Gazan student from the Fatah faction described Al-
Aqsa TV as biased: ‘Al-Aqsa Television is totally partial; it does not represent the 
Palestinian people, and does not allow them to express their opinions (21-year-old male 
Fatah supporter).  
 
Another Fatah member, who criticised Al-Aqsa TV policy and described it as a servant 
for Hamas ideology, said:  
 
Al-Aqsa Television channel attacks all Palestinian parties. All its news focuses on 
Fatah faults. Its policy is only to serve Hamas faction. They don’t tolerate any 
criticism. Therefore, they don’t allow people to participate (19-year-old male Fatah 
supporter). 
                                               
6
 It is important to note that since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, they have tried impose an Islamic 
agenda. One incidence which led to huge criticism among Palestinians was when, in July 2009, Hamas 
took the decision to impose the wearing of headscarves and robes on female lawyers. The Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights condemned it as illegal and an unwarranted interference in the lawyers’ affairs 




Indeed, the language used by the Fatah members shows how much they were against 
Al-Aqsa TV policy. A young Gazan man from Fatah, in his description of Al-Aqsa TV, 
asserted that: ‘When Al-Aqsa Television channel is conducting talk shows, they 
purposely choose their guests. They don’t allow anyone to call during the show, 
especially if it is a live programme’ (18-year-old male Fatah supporter).  
 
However, Hamas members’ criticisms of Palestine TV were also harsh. A member from 
the Hamas faction argued that Fatah controlled Palestine TV and imposed its own 
agenda: 
 
I can say that Palestine Television channel is partial, serves the Fatah political 
party, does not focus on Fatah violations and faults, functions as a mouthpiece 
for Fatah, and attacks other parties. Only Fatah members and who support them 
can participate during their programmes (23-year-old male Hamas supporter)7. 
 
Another member of Hamas criticised the Palestine TV channel, especially its 
performance in the recent past: 
 
As a national television, Palestine TV channel should unite Palestinians. It 
should reflect the Palestinians’ aspirations and end Palestinian division. But, it 
seems the opposite. Fatah controls Palestinian institutions, including television, 
and prevents others. This increases animosity and deepens the Palestinian 
division (20-year-old male Hamas supporter).  
 
Hamas members saw Al-Aqsa TV as an alternative to Palestine TV which represented 
the Palestinians and their aspirations for the freedom of Palestine.  
 
Groups 5 and 6: Female Fatah and Hamas students 
These two groups were all students from Al-Aqsa University with ages ranging between 
18 and 24, from different backgrounds and locations in the Gaza Strip. They were 
                                               
7
 All the Hamas participants prefaced their comments with ‘In the name of God’ as a mark of respect but 
this is not reproduced here every time. 
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politically affiliated to and supportive of either Hamas or Fatah. These groups were 
quieter than the Fatah and Hamas male groups. In terms of participation, their answers 
focused on channel content and programmes that allowed public participation. 
However, they also perceived bias in the approaches of the two channels. 
 
A female student from Fatah accused Al-Aqsa TV of selectivity in its programmes: ‘In 
Al-Aqsa Television channels, when they invite someone from Hamas for a talk show, 
they don’t allow others to participate. They choose their guests and callers from outside’ 
(19-year-old female Fatah supporter).  
 
Another student from Hamas talked about the bias evident on both channels. She 
acknowledged that guests and callers broadcast on channels were politically biased: 
 
In both TV channels, I can see the partiality by which guests who are invited to 
talk shows are related to political parties. Callers who participate in these talk 
shows or any other programmes are also from the same political party (20-year-
old female Hamas supporter).  
 
However, some thought that participation in television could be liberating if people 
were given a space to express their opinions and discuss issues related to their lives. But 
when a media channel becomes a monopoly for governments or political factions, 
public participation is undermined. A female student from Fatah described how much 
Al-Aqsa TV was controlled by Hamas and how this affects public participation: 
 
Al-Aqsa Television does not raise sensitive issues which relate to, for example, 
their rule in Gaza. They raise issues which are against the Palestinian Authority 
and Fatah. They discuss these issues in talk shows in order to have more 
participants and to open the platform for their members to criticise. And the 
people who participate are all supportive of their ideology (21-year-old female 
Fatah supporter).  
 
For Hamas participants, Palestine TV is not seen as a credible source of information. 
They trust Al-Aqsa TV and participate in its programmes because they believe it 
reflects their aspirations. They mention how Al-Aqsa TV focuses on the criminality of 
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the Israeli occupation and how the Hamas military wing defends Palestinian rights. A 
student from Hamas expressed her view of Palestine TV when she criticised its 
contents: 
 
I believe Al-Aqsa Television channel reflects our traditions and values. As a 
conservative people, I think we need to stick to our religion and enhance our 
traditions. Palestine Television broadcasts some programmes which are against 
our traditions. My values do not allow me to participate in or even watch the 
Palestine Television channel (22-year-old female Hamas supporter).  
 
On the other hand, a student from Fatah argued that Al-Aqsa Television served Hamas 
ideology: 
 
I believe we have more freedom of expression on the Palestine Television 
channel. Even its programmes are more moderate, and we can participate. In 
fact, what we watch on Al-Aqsa Television is either religious or political 
programmes. There is no variety as on the Palestine Television channel (21-
year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
Groups 7 and 8: Mixed gender and faction and independents  
The participants in these two groups were in their 20s and 30s, from different 
backgrounds and locations within Gaza. There was also a mix in terms of political 
backgrounds; there were participants related to Fatah, the Popular Front for Liberation 
of Palestinian (PFLP), the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the 
Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), and independents. There was no-one related to Hamas 
or any other Islamic political party because conservative females usually do not mix 
with males, but that did not mean there was no-one expressing support for Al-Aqsa TV.  
 
The groups’ discussions and their concepts of public participation reflected their variety 
of backgrounds, revealing different comments and views from other groups. The 
concept of public participation among participants was embedded in ideas of liberty, 
freedom of expression and the right to communicate. These groups believed that the 
media should not be political, promoting a political agenda, but there should be a public 
channel working for the public interest. In addition, the state should not seek to 
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monopolise any media channel and should regulate the situation with laws that protect 
public broadcasting. A male from Fatah described how Hamas had the monopoly over 
Al-Aqsa TV: ‘As a Fatah supporter, I can see the lack of freedom of expression on the 
Al-Aqsa Television channel. No-one can criticise government actions or anything 
related to Hamas. If anyone criticises the Hamas government in Gaza, they simply arrest 
or shoot him’ (26-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
Comments from independents varied: some favoured Palestine TV while others were 
supporters of Al-Aqsa TV. In addition, some participants criticised both channels. 
Indeed, what distinguished their comments was that their concept of public participation 
within the two channels was related to the structure of political parties and how they 
were seen to be trying to influence public opinion. A female human rights activist 
revealed her views about Palestine and Al-Aqsa Television channel and the differences 
between them: 
 
We like Palestine TV, but when we compare it with Al-Aqsa, it does not have a 
strong message like Al-Aqsa channel. Al-Aqsa TV channel is very successful in 
its media message. It has huge potential because it is financially supported by 
Hamas. Its contents are very professional. But, when it comes to participation, I 
think we can participate, but we cannot critique Hamas’ actions. So, there are 
limits for this participation (33-year-old independent female).  
 
It is important to note that Palestine TV is officially defined as a national institution. 
According to its definition: 
 
Palestine Broadcasting Corporation is a public national institution that 
constitutes a major and significant component of the national structure of the 
Palestinian society in its march towards achieving its basic rights of liberation 
and independence and the establishment of its independent state over its 
homeland (PBC, 1994).  
 
As we can see, this definition states clearly that it is a public national institution and 
should reasonably be expected, therefore, to work for the public interest and provide a 
platform for public debate. But there is a contradiction between this definition and the 
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reality as experienced by those questioned. A female participant from DFLP argued that 
Palestine TV is monopolized by the Palestinian Authority:  
 
It is supervised by Fatah elites. Indeed, being a government channel has 
prevented the channel progressing. That is why it’s not widely watched. As a 
national television, Palestine Television channel has to be pluralistic and ensure 
public participation. Furthermore, the PA does not only control Palestine 
Television channel, but also other media institutions such as Palestine News 
Agency (WAFA), the voice of Palestine radio station, and other websites. I think 
the government should not monopolize any media channel and should regulate 
laws that protect public participation (29-year-old female DFLP supporter). 
 
The political parties’ control over media channels has been criticised by many scholars 
and non-governmental organizations (Al-Mezan, 2009; Hammad, 2010; Okal, 2009). 
Not only do they fail to provide a platform for public debate, the two channels could not 
ensure freedom of expression for all citizens irrespective of their political affiliation 
(Abed, 2010). According to Sabah (2010), both Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV are 
manipulated by the two political parties. Opinions and comments which are expressed 
by their members on the two channels are promoting hatred and hostility. However, 
Sabah believes that the right to participate should be maintained.  
 
6.3 Theme 2: Political dimensions of television in Palestine 
It is important to note that after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the 
Palestinian media flourished. Accordingly, Palestinian political parties sought to 
compete to establish their media channels to monopolize the public sphere. But the 
Palestinian Authority had to prove its ability in governing the local opposition group 
and so they set limitations on media channels.   
 
After violence erupted between the two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas  
resorted to using the media to justify their actions. Specifically, they used television 
channels as a tool to hide or fabricate facts to achieve their goals. Indeed, Hamas’ 
control over the Gaza Strip and Fatah control over the West Bank has led to 
encroachment on media institutions that goes against their policies. In addition, 
journalists who have an affiliation to a political party have engaged in an open war that 
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reflects their ideology in an attempt to win public support. Moreover, all forms of 
media, including television, radio stations and websites have engaged in that war. This 
is borne out by participants’ comments on how the two television channels are related to 
Fatah and Hamas and whether they functions as political mouthpieces. I will analyse 
how the two factions used their media channels in the internal conflict and how that 
affects media performance. 
 
Political parties in Palestine have realized the importance of mass media in 
psychological warfare and winning public support. In recent years, each has focused on 
establishing its media infrastructure to be able to utilise it in their media war. For 
example, Hamas owns a large number of mass media outlets such as radio stations, 
newspapers, electronic forums, websites, and satellite television channels, while Fatah 
is trying to catch up and establish its own media channels to counter the strong 
influence of the Hamas media.  
 
Groups 1 and 2: Fatah faction, mixed gender, students and NGO workers  
Participants in these two groups were very disappointed by Al-Aqsa TV and its 
contribution to ending the Palestinian division. They criticised the way in which Hamas 
monopolised the channel. A female participant accused Al-Aqsa of fundamentalism and 
discrimination. ‘The Al-Aqsa television channel is using abusive words which should 
not be used in media. In addition, there are no programmes related to women. There are 
no female announcers. It is more fundamentalist, and there is no space for others’ (28-
year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
The Hamas faction considered that the official media represented by Palestine TV did 
not meet people’s demands. They found that there was a huge vacuum in the media 
system run by the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, they focused on establishing their 
own media and created the necessary infrastructure to build a strong media system. This 
has been backed by supporters from inside and outside the Palestinian Territories. One 
of the participants expressed his view about Al-Aqsa Television and how it serves 
Hamas. ‘I feel that the Palestine Television channel has more credibility than the Al-
Aqsa channel. It is clear that Al-Aqsa functions as a mouthpiece for Hamas and a guide 




The media carries a great responsibility for reducing conflicts and disputes between 
communities but it must have credibility and objectivity when reporting events. 
Moreover, journalists have responsibilities in relation to serving the public, to provide a 
broad scope for discussion to inform public opinion and to provide a basis for political 
development. A female participant criticised Al-Aqsa TV for being neither responsible 
nor credible: 
 
I think Al-Aqsa Television channel should be more responsible. It has played a 
major role in fuelling the conflict when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. Indeed, 
it aimed to influence the public opinion to justify Hamas actions. It was not 
objective when it presented the events and the images of Hamas taking over the 
Strip; what Hamas did was in the interest of the Palestinian people (24-year-old 
female Fatah supporter). 
 
 
Groups 3 and 4: Male Fatah and Hamas students  
Both Fatah and Hamas participants admitted that the two channels served the two 
factions politically and function as a mouthpiece but at the same time they claimed that 
each gives a space for people to express their opinions. However, each party member 
expressed criticism of the other party’s channel. A male participant from Hamas 
described Palestine TV as biased and only recruiting Fatah members. ‘In Palestine 
Television channel, the recruitment of people is restricted to Fatah members, and the 
channel controlled and dictated by the elites in Fatah party. This has clearly appeared by 
the low level of journalistic performance especially when the television occupied the 
role of being the main tool in the struggle’ (22-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
 
On the other hand, a participant from Fatah responded to this view by saying:  
 
... you can’t deny that all people who work in Al-Aqsa Television channel are 
members of Hamas. I admit that the recruitment in Palestine Television channel 
is restricted to Fatah, but at the same time you find other people from different 
factions. But in Al-Aqsa television, it is impossible to find a member of staff 




The internal conflict in Palestine has taken up a significant amount of broadcasting time 
in the media. This has affected the coverage of other important topics such as the 
suffering of people and issues of conflict arising out of the Israeli occupation. The 
media have played a provocative role in putting out inflammatory broadcasts and has 
reinforced the existing atmosphere of accusation and mistrust. There was clear evidence 
that the political parties were using the media as a tool of struggle. A male participant 
from Hamas claimed that Palestine TV was using provocative language. 
 
I don’t trust Palestine Television channel because it was clearly partial when 
they described Hamas as a ‘black militia’. The channel is clearly functioning as 
a mouthpiece for Fatah. It covers the events that serve the Palestinian Authority 
and Fatah. In addition, any recruitment for Palestine Television channel is based 
on their political affiliation, which means he or she should be from Fatah, and if 
not, they have to work according to the channel policy (20-year-old male Hamas 
supporter). 
 
Another participant from Fatah responded by saying:  
 
I don’t trust Al-Aqsa Television channel too. Their policy is based on ‘if you are 
with us then you are against them’. They described the Palestinian president as a 
traitor and the Palestinian police as ‘Abbas Gangs’. It is good that you admit that 
Palestine Television recruit people from Fatah and other parties. But Al-Aqsa 
Television recruits people only who are very loyal to Hamas (20-year-old male 
Fatah supporter). 
 
Groups 5 and 6: Female Fatah and Hamas students 
Since its establishment, the Palestinian Authority has tried to control the media in the 
Palestinian territories. However, politicians always seek to control the media in order to 
present their views (Randall, 1998). A female member from Hamas reflected on the 
extent to which Fatah elites have influence on Palestine TV. 
 
I think Palestine Television is manipulated by the Fatah party as it has to reflect 
the party’s goals. Elites in Fatah are keen to have such a channel because they 
seek to reflect their opinions. The channel office is located in the President’s 
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compound; the orders are given from the President’s office to the channel 
director. The channel gives favourable treatment to the President and Fatah party 
members (23-year-old female Hamas supporter). 
 
Another female from Fatah argued how on the other hand Hamas leaders intervened in 
Al-Aqsa TV. 
 
Al-Aqsa Television channel is manipulated by the Hamas party; it has been 
launched by party support. The party determines what programmes should be 
broadcasted. I am sure the hierarchy system in the channel does not allow any 
member working in the channel to take decisions. The decisions are being taken 
by the high position leaders in Hamas. In fact what we see on the screen reflects 
Hamas political message about power control and the replacement of the Fatah 
regime (22-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
It is important to note that Hamas has established its own media in the Gaza Strip to 
control and influence the information broadcast from Gaza. There is no doubt that both 
parties consider the media to be a function of their authority and believe that the media 
should not be overseeing their actions. A member from Fatah expressed her view about 
Hamas control of media in Gaza: 
 
Hamas has concentrated all the media ownership in its hand to hold the 
information that is disseminated to the public. By doing this, they guarantee that 
all the media work under their control. They use all media forms as a 
mouthpiece to spread their ideology. These forms are television channels, 
websites, newspapers and radio stations (21-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
However, regular interventions in the conduct of the media have created a major threat 
to the professional activities of journalists and the credibility of media channels. A 
participant from Fatah described how the Hamas government seized journalists’ work in 
Gaza. 
 
The Hamas government attacked all radio stations in Gaza and shut it down and 
confiscated Palestine Television equipment in order not to reveal the truth about 
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their taking over the Strip. In addition, they prevented Palestine Television 
channel journalists from covering events in Gaza. They arrested all journalists 
who wrote against them. They used to call journalists and offer them to work 
with them or otherwise they would be arrested (24-year-old female Fatah 
supporter). 
 
A female from Hamas responded to that: ‘Fatah represented by the Palestinian 
Authority has done the same thing in the West Bank; they arrested journalists and 
closed many television stations. They closed Al-Aqsa Television channel and arrested 
its journalists’ (22-year-old female Hamas supporter). 
 
Groups 7 and 8: Mixed gender and faction and independents 
There is no doubt that the continuing situation that created the political division between 
Fatah and Hamas, as well as the use of media channels in smear campaigns against each 
other, has had a negative impact on sympathizers with the Palestinian cause. Indeed, the 
media campaigns between the two parties have contributed to increasing the tension and 
caused clashes that led to many victims on both sides. An independent participant 
articulated the situation of both channels: 
 
On the Palestine Television channel, they continually mention that Hamas was 
responsible for attacking the Palestinian Authority and the death of innocent 
civilians when they took over the Strip. On the other hand, Hamas on Al-Aqsa 
Television channel repeatedly accuse the Palestinian Authority of betrayal and 
illegality. This shows how much both parties are using their own media as a 
propaganda tool and to defend their actions. I think they have to stop 
manipulating the media because people do not trust these channels. They have to 
be reliable and function for the people’s interest and not for their party’s 
interests (35-year-old independent female).    
 
Another independent participant explained how the two factions used the media to 
favour their leaders and to defend their views. 
 
I think both television channels in their coverage are favouring their parties. The 
official Palestine Television channel gives favourable coverage to the 
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Palestinian president and Fatah party and on the other hand, Al-Aqsa Television 
channel gives favourable coverage to Ismail Haneya (Hamas prime minister and 
head of government in Gaza) and the Hamas party. I think none of them are 
independent; employees in both channels are paid by their governments. They 
usually use it as a propaganda tool to defend their views and gain the public 
support (28-year-old independent female). 
 
Another politically-independent participant voiced his opinion about both factions and 
the way they use the media. 
 
Fatah have created a Ministry of Information and Hamas government have 
established the Governmental Media Office by which they control and regulate 
all the media in Gaza Strip. I think it is one way of censorship. They give license 
to any media channel that operates with their political line or they shut the 
channels that are against their policy. By broadcasting programmes that support 
their political agenda, they are trying to influence the Palestinian people and the 
Arab world. But these programmes are expanding the Palestinian division. I 
think using such channels like Al-Aqsa and Palestine as a trumpet for their 





A participant from PFLP described how Fatah and Hamas control television channels 
for their own interests: 
 
In fact both Palestine and Al-Aqsa Television channel function as a mouthpiece 
for both political parties. Since its establishment, the Palestine Television 
channel is controlled by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian 
Authority elites sought to impose their orders to broadcast programmes related 
to Fatah achievements. It is a governmental channel. Thus, the first article in the 
news is about the president. At the same level, Al-Aqsa Television channel is 
owned by Hamas. Hamas sought to gain more support from both the Arab and 
Muslim world. Therefore, they broadcast programmes supporting resistance 
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against Israeli Occupation and religious programmes. I think both television 
channels have to give a space for the people to express their opinions (27-year-
old female PFLP supporter). 
 
However, some participants were in favour of the concept of a single public 
broadcasting channel instead of multiple partisan channels, while others preferred 
multiple media channels as a form of liberalization. One participant commented on the 
role of the public broadcasting channel and how it should function: 
 
If we have multi television channels where each channel related to one political 
party, they would function for each party interest and use it as a mouthpiece to 
spread their political agenda. But if we have only one public channel, it would 
work for the public interest and ensure public participation (31-year-old male 
PPP supporter).  
 
He was interrupted by another participant:   
 
I think if we have multi channels, we would have different opinions and views. 
But if we have only one channel, it could be manipulated by the government, 
and then we will have only the government point of view. In addition, we will 
not be able to participate or have access. To be honest, I don’t think there is an 
independent channel in the real world, but different views are better than one 
view (26-year-old female PFLP supporter).    
 
 
6.4 Theme 3: Television performance and the promotion of democracy. 
This theme explores how the participants’ comments about the two television channels 
raise questions about the relationship between media and democracy. Nordenstreng 
(2001) defined three key functions of the media in a democracy. These functions are 
information, forum, and critique: individuals have the right to access information in 
order to make informed choices and to enhance their contribution in decision-making 
regarding issues affecting their lives. The basic principle of democracy is that 
individuals have a right to have the information that affects their lives and to be 
guaranteed participation in decision making (Hatem, 1996). The reference to a ‘forum’ 
140 
 
highlights the requirement for media to provide a platform for debate, so that different 
opinions can be aired and discussed and rational outcomes reached which are based on 
democratic dialogue. The objectives of democratic media are to ensure active 
participation of individuals, diversity of opinions, and the extension of public 
participation from the grassroots. The third function, ‘critique’, refers to the role of a 
democratic media in monitoring state actions and reporting violations committed by 
those in power against individuals.  
 
Groups 1 and 2: Fatah faction, mixed gender, students and NGO workers  
There is no doubt that the Palestinian media, especially television channels, have been 
affected by political circumstances arising from the Israeli occupation, Palestinian 
Intifada, internal division, and the freezing of the democratic process. All these factors 
have played and continue to have a significant role in the development of Palestinian 
media. A member from Fatah pointed out how Hamas censors the information being 
broadcast: ‘Only their television channel in Gaza is allowed to cover the local news. 
They are doing this because they want the local news to be covered from their point of 
view’ (22-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
When the two movements resorted to the media to conduct their disputes, many 
intellectuals and journalists rejected a media discourse lacking objectivity and 
professionalism, and called the two movements to keep away from the media and to 
look after the country’s interests. Although there are many newspapers and foreign 
agency correspondents in the Palestinian Territories, they are not usually free to cover 
events. In many cases, the security forces of the two governments deal directly with 
journalists. Their practice is to send veiled threats to journalists telling them to keep 
away from the sensitive topics that affect their security and safety. A member of Fatah 
expressed her view about the relationship between Hamas and journalists and how this 
affected journalists’ work in Gaza: 
 
Politicians and elites in Hamas are trying to maintain good relationships with 
journalists in order to present their views. This would decrease the criticism. On 
the other hand, if journalists do not cooperate, they will try to harass them. By 
doing this, they monopolize what is broadcasted or printed which is considered 




When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, their security forces raided Palestine Television 
and radio stations that belonged to other factions and closed them. In addition, they 
confiscated media equipment and arrested journalists who tried to cooperate with the 
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. A female participant from Fatah described how 
much the Hamas closure of media institutions affected the dissemination of information: 
 
When Hamas took over the Strip, they closed all radio stations and television 
channels in order to prevent any information being disseminated that could harm 
them. I think withholding such information and preventing people knowing is 
considered anti-democratic and against basic human rights (23-year-old female 
Fatah supporter). 
     
It is worth noting that Hamas considered ‘Jihad in media’ as a real Jihad in its war 
against the Israeli Occupation. Recently they have recruited people who are fluent in 
Hebrew to attack Israeli websites and send warning messages to the Israelis that Hamas 
is strong and capable of fighting the Israeli military. 
 
Their policy against media institutions is an attempt to force the media to work for their 
interests, and to prevent the dissemination of truth. In the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, journalists are too afraid to write about violations committed by the two factions. 
Hamas has resorted to violence against Fatah journalists and its media institutions in 
Gaza Strip. Fatah too has practised restrictions on Hamas media institutions and arrested 
its journalists in the West Bank. Undoubtedly, these actions do not meet international 
standards for the freedom of the press and many reports have been issued by human 
rights organizations describing the violations carried out by the two governments 
(MADA, 2010; PCHR, 2010). 
 
Groups 3 and 4: Male Fatah and Hamas students 
The two factions have launched media campaigns in a process of intimidation to smear 
their opponents. Participants in these two groups were very tense when criticisms from 
both factions’ members were revealed and showed how much they were trying to justify 
their factions’ actions. The discussion was polarised among two members from the first 
group when a member from Fatah said: ‘Hamas violates freedom of expression for both 
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citizens and journalists. They think that their actions can be hidden from the public’ (22-
year-old male Fatah supporter).  
 
A member from Hamas responded by saying: 
 
It is not only Hamas. You have to admit that Fatah government in the West 
Bank is also violating freedom of expression and opinion. It’s not just that, they 
also undermine freedom of media, arrest journalists, and impose censorship. 
This is to show that they are able to control the situation and to satisfy the 
Israelis and the West. The Palestine Television channel is not capable of offering 
the platform for the people to criticise the government because it is controlled by 
the Fatah party (23-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
 
The way that the two governments deal with journalists has been criticised by local and 
international human rights organizations. Journalists are not allowed to criticise or write 
about the two governments. In this context, many journalists have confirmed that they 
were not able to capture images of the tortures, beatings, and arrests that citizens and 
defenders of freedoms have suffered (Eaid, 2010; Sabah, 2010). This is because their 
lives are at risk, as they receive threats of detention, torture and death. A member from 
Hamas articulated the situation in the West Bank and how the Palestinian Authority 
deals with journalists:  
 
I think there is no protection for any journalist who writes against the Palestinian 
Authority in the West Bank. They don’t respect the law. The judicial authority is 
unwilling to oppose the executive power. The military forces decide what is 
harmful and what is not; they take decisions about freedom of expression and 
how to deal with it (22-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
 
Another member of Fatah responded by commenting on how the Hamas government in 
the Gaza Strip violates press law: 
 
The Hamas government doesn’t implement the press law in the Gaza Strip; they 
have established a Governmental Media Office to deal with media institutions 
and the journalists. This office decides what is legal and what is not. The 
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authorities violate constitutional rights and impose sanctions according to their 
interests. All these actions are against democracy and freedom of expression 
(24-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
Group 5 and 6: Female Fatah and Hamas students 
The Palestinian media are characterized by their partisan nature and non-objectivity 
because of the financial support required from their supporters. This has led to a 
diversion from protecting national interests to protecting their faction’s interest, and 
consequently they have lost their credibility. While this media dispute is taking place 
between the two parties, any adherence by the media to generally accepted values and 
ethics of journalism has become very difficult. This is because the media cannot 
function as a propaganda tool and a tool for knowledge dissemination at the same time.  
 
Members of these two groups had very useful interactions in which they tried to analyse 
the situation in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A member from Hamas illustrated the 
situation of media institutions in the West Bank:   
 
Fatah has concentrated all media channels in the West Bank under its control. 
They have the Palestine Television channel, Palestine News Agency, Voice of 
Palestine radio, and Al-Hayyah newspaper. In addition, they cooperate with 
other media channels related to Fatah such as Al-Ayyam newspaper. All this 
ownership concentration is preventing others freely establishing new 
independent media. Therefore, Fatah represented by the Palestinian Authority is 
not just undermining democracy and freedom of media, they also violate 
constitutional rights, monitor the media, and restrict journalists’ work (22-year-
old female Hamas supporter). 
 
A member of Fatah responded by noting Hamas ownership of media institutions:  
 
We have to be realistic. Hamas also owns the media in the Gaza Strip. They 
have created their media empire in Gaza and prevented others to create their 
own media. Their media include Al-Aqsa Television channel, Al-Resala 
newspaper, Falastine newspaper, radio stations, and several websites. They 
employ all these tools for the confrontation battle between them and Fatah. They 
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consider it as part of the struggle between them and Fatah. They have prevented 
the media from anti-Hamas coverage. But their anti-democratic actions have 
been exposed by international media working in Gaza (21-year-old female Fatah 
supporter). 
 
The freedom of journalists in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is greatly restricted, in 
some cases virtually absent. They are not able to report what is going on in the streets, 
because the security forces consider certain areas to be a closed military zone. Security 
forces are taking repressive actions against journalists and media institutions, if they 
dare to cover stories which show citizens being tortured. These actions are aimed at 
imposing a complete blackout on news of what is happening and at preventing citizens 
from knowing the truth. In this context, human rights organizations have urged the two 
governments to respect freedom of opinion and expression and to stop journalists’ arrest 
and torture, allowing them to practise their profession freely. 
 
Groups 7 and 8: Mixed gender and faction and independents 
In these two groups, independents and members of other factions confirmed how much 
the two governments control the media channels so that these channels do not provide a 
platform for citizens to express their opinions. An independent male argued this clearly:  
 
I think free and independent media are the key for democracy. These television 
channels are not free and not independent. We as Palestinians have the right to 
freedom of expression. But the two television channels are not implementing 
this right. I as a member of Palestinian society and independent person do not 
have the right to express my opinion freely in either channel. For example, I 
cannot criticise any of the two government’s policies or any other action which I 
don’t like (35-year-old independent male). 
 
 
Another member from the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) confirmed the view 
expressed by his colleague: 
 
I believe that for democracy to survive, both television channels have to provide 
the platform for people to express their opinions. The two channels provide this 
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to their members only and restrict others to participate. In this way, it is very 
clear that both governments undermine freedom of opinions in Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank (29-year-old male PPP supporter). 
 
A member of the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine expressed her opinion 
about how press laws restrict the journalist’s work in Palestine and how the two 
governments deal with journalists: 
 
The Palestinian press law was passed by the late Palestinian President Yasser 
Arafat but has not been approved by the Palestinian legislative council. It has 
many articles that violate freedom of opinion and freedom of expression. It also 
restricts journalists’ work and offers harsh punishment for offenders who write 
against the government. I think these articles are totally unacceptable and against 
democracy (33-year-old female DFLP member). 
 
Many human rights activists have affirmed that neither of the two television channels is 
independent and they get their orders from the political wings of both factions 
(Abuhjayer, 2010; Abushamallah, 2010). A member of Popular Front for Liberation of 
Palestinian criticised Palestine TV and expressed his view about how the channel 
should fulfil its role as a national television station: 
 
Palestine Television should broadcast programmes that encourage citizens to 
interact with officials in the government. ... I think for democracy to function, 
the media have to be independent. Palestine Television as a national television is 
not independent. It is a governmental channel, financially supported by the 
government. Therefore, in financial terms, we don’t expect it to be independent. 
But, at least it should act in public interest and reflect citizen’s problems (31-
year-old male PFLP supporter). 
 
 
6.5 Theme 4: Television as a Fourth Estate: monitoring government actions 
After the Oslo Agreement and the creation of the Palestinian Authority, the new media 
experience that emerged expected to witness a new era of freedom and to be a real 
influence in the development of democracy. The Oslo Agreement imposed an obligation 
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on the Palestinian Authority that it should restrain opposition parties in order to 
moderate criticism of Israel or the United States. The weakness of the Palestinian 
Authority in the face of external political pressure resulted from its dependence on 
Western donor countries. 
 
During the Israeli occupation, the Palestinian media experienced severe restrictions in 
terms of freedom of expression, but the arrival of the Palestinian Authority led to the 
establishment of a great many media channels. The Oslo Agreement also created a very 
difficult situation for those opposition groups representing other Palestinian parties who 
refused to participate in the government. Because of its role as the dominant player 
within the Palestinian Authority, Fatah was able to control the radio and television 
station. The other parties tried to create their own media channels, but the PA did not 
tolerate opposition and closed down their institutions and arrested journalists who 
criticised its performance. The Palestinian Authority became like many other 
undemocratic Arab regimes, violating media freedom by acting against journalists and 
media institutions. What made the situation even more difficult was the lack of 
separation of powers between government and the judiciary. The often unrepresentative 
elite controlled both the judiciary and the executive power, thus compromising the 
independence of the judiciary. Such a flawed political arrangement undermined the 
democracy and freedom proclaimed by the Palestinian Authority. 
 
As Jamal has noted:  
 
The Palestinian process of state formation is taking place in a situation of 
strangling dependency. This confines the PA’s sovereignty and cripples its 
judicial potency. Beside the internal pressures exerted on the PA by local social 
and political groups, there are clear external pressures that limit its governing 
capabilities. To cope with these pressures, the PA has set limitations on the local 
media. These limitations empty the media of any substantial plurality and 
subvert the democratic role that it could play in the process of national 
construction (2000b, p. 498).  
 
The focus groups were asked to what extent the two channels are monitoring the two 




Groups 1 and 2: Fatah faction, mixed gender, students and NGO workers  
The concept of ‘fourth estate’ was clear to the groups in that they understood that the 
media must be able to criticise the government. But they were aware that very few 
media outlets in Arab countries can function as a fourth estate due to state censorship. 
Therefore, given that Palestine is an Arab country, they did not expect the media to 
function as a fourth estate. The establishment of the Palestinian Authority has created a 
new socio-economic situation, in which a large number of political and economic elites 
have emerged. It is argued that elites, especially those with political influence, view 
democracy and the freedom of opinion and expression as a threat which would 
undermine their control and authority, because they may contribute to the mobilization 
of a popular revolution to remove those in power. Therefore, they enact laws and 
legislations that limit freedom of opinion and expression, claiming this is necessary in 
order to maintain national unity and serve the national interest. In addition, they exploit 
the mass media as a mouthpiece for their own party interests.  
 
Although there are many different political parties in the Palestinian arena, none have 
challenged such an authoritarian regime to create a space for freedom of opinion and 
expression, so that they could express their views and urge the media to serve the 
people. Indeed, evidence shows that the ruling elites believe that they are the only ones 
who care about the country’s interests and the people have no right to express their 
opinions or to participate in political life. A member from Fatah tried to justify why the 
Palestinian Authority controlled the media: 
 
In fact our political situation does not allow the media to function as a watchdog 
because it is not that powerful to discuss issues related to government corruption 
or violation against human rights. If such issues were discussed in media, public 
feelings would be inflamed which could even result in a coup. This is what 
happened when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and expelled the Palestinian 
Authority. Therefore, television has to be secured and governed by people loyal 
to the government (28-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 





I think if the media criticise the government, this situation would create 
divisions in the Palestinian national project. We are in a situation where we need 
the people to support their government not to criticise it. Therefore, I see the 
government holding the national television channel is the right strategy (27-
year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
The continuation of the conflict in the Palestinian arena has led to the destruction of 
media infrastructure as well as the values of freedom of expression in both the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank. This has helped to undermine Palestinian social structure 
because of the false information that has been broadcast by the two television channels 
as part of their propaganda strategy. It has become difficult for the two channels to 
function as a watchdog or fourth estate. In addition, freedom of opinion has become one 
of the victims of the Palestinian conflict, in which many journalists have been tortured, 
detained, or harassed to force them to remain silent. Human rights organizations have 
challenged the two parties to stop the ‘covering mouths’ policy, and respect human 
rights and freedoms. A member from Fatah expressed her opinion about the policy of 
Al-Aqsa TV: 
 
Hamas killed many citizens when they took over the Strip, but television did not 
cover any of these violations. They usually harass journalists and torture them. 
The channel was presenting Hamas’s takeover of the Strip as a victory when 
they broadcast live programmes to receive calls of congratulations. It is clearly 
defending Hamas actions. Therefore, we don’t expect Al-Aqsa to function as a 
watchdog for Hamas government (33-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
The struggle between the two parties has also split international solidarity with the 
Palestinian people and has distorted the image of the Palestinian struggle, which had 
long been known for its sacrifice and upholding of rights. In the current situation, in the 
absence of robust laws, the ability to protect human rights has been diminished. With 
growing threats to journalists and civil society organizations, it has become difficult for 
human rights organizations to provide statistics and information about abuses and 
violations committed against freedom of opinion and expression. The two television 
channels have been monitoring each other’s violations, so in that sense each has been a 
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watchdog over the other faction: Al-Aqsa TV revealed violations committed by the 
Palestinian Authority and Fatah members against Hamas and its institutions in the West 
Bank, and on the other hand, Palestine TV revealed violations committed by Hamas 
forces against the PA institutions and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip. 
 
Groups 3 and 4: Male Fatah and Hamas students 
A member from Fatah illustrated how the Hamas government deals with journalists in 
Gaza Strip and how they control the information that is disseminated from Gaza: 
 
Hamas creates fear among editors and journalists and guarantees that none of 
them would write against the government and their actions. I think the lack of 
legitimacy of Hamas government puts it in a position to practise censorship and 
violate freedom of expression (23-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
A member from Hamas described how the media could function as a watchdog:  
 
I think for the media to function as a fourth estate it has to be financially 
independent. This is very hard because the media needs stable financial 
resources. In addition, journalists working in media have to be independent and 
not politically affiliated. I think most of journalists in Palestine are politically 
affiliated or at least supportive of political parties, and media institutions are also 
financially dependent on parties. I am sure there are independent journalists, but 
they are very few and they cannot criticise the governments because of heavy 
censorship in both Gaza and the West Bank (24-year-old male Hamas 
supporter). 
 
A participant from Fatah justified Palestinian Authority control over the media as part 
of the national project: 
 
Palestine Television has a national responsibility to explain the policies of 
Palestinian Authority and at the same time reflect the public demands. It has a 
role to emphasize the national project as we are in a stage of building our state. 
Therefore, I see that the Palestinian Authority has the right to control the 
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television channel and thus we don’t expect the channel to function as a 
watchdog at this stage (22-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
A member from Hamas contributed to the discussion and responded by criticising the 
policy implemented by Palestine TV: 
 
The hierarchy in the Fatah party and especially in Palestine Television does not 
allow journalists to raise sensitive issues such as investigating allegations 
against the Fatah elite. The employment policy in the Palestinian Authority 
institutions and especially Palestine Television channel is based on nepotism. 
There is lack of transparency in the programmes that are being broadcast and the 
way they tackle sensitive issues. How can we expect such a channel to function 
as a watchdog? (23-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
 
Another member from Hamas supported this view and showed to what extent Fatah has 
influence over Palestine TV: 
 
The power structure, the process of centralization, and the interference of Fatah 
members in Palestinian television channel has made it impossible for people 
who are working in the channel to be creative in the programmes and the issues 
they tackle. The Palestinian Authority policy sought to watch the freedom of 
expression and media institutions in order not to provoke the public sentiments 
against the corruption that exist in the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, 
transparency would not be promoted and the channel will not be able to function 
as a watchdog (22-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
  
Groups 5 and 6:  Female Fatah and Hamas students 
A member from Hamas expressed her opinion about the Palestinian Authority and how 
it controls Palestine TV, which makes it impossible for it to function as a fourth estate: 
 
Palestine Television should monitor the government and expose human rights 
violations. It is supposed to be for the public because it is our national television 
but it is not functioning in a proper way. It is a channel which promotes Fatah 




Another member from Fatah from the same group countered by arguing that Hamas too 
used its television for promoting its agenda, as it considered television to be a good tool 
to mobilize the people: 
 
Hamas established Al-Aqsa Television channel just before the election in 2006 
because it realized that it is an important tool for propaganda. They have 
succeeded in mobilizing the people and get the necessary support. However, 
their television is not functioning as a watchdog. It is the opposite, it only 
glorifies Hamas achievements (21-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
A member from Hamas expressed her opinion about the election coverage and how the 
national television should function at election time. She criticised Palestine TV for 
manipulating the election campaign:  
 
Palestine Television is considered to be the national channel. But it did not give 
other factions’ members the opportunity to present their programmes during the 
election. Enormous amount of time was given to Fatah members. The channel 
did not brief the people of candidates’ programmes. I think it should have 
covered the election fairly, but it was totally biased (23-year-old female Hamas 
supporter). 
 
A member from Hamas said that Palestine TV was one of the key institutions of the 
Palestinian Authority: 
 
The Palestinian Authority sought to influence all media systems in the 
Palestinian territories. They built their media system to mobilize the public for 
their policy about Oslo Agreement. In fact they were worried that the public 
could reject the agreement, but they succeeded. This showed that rather than 
being a watchdog, Palestine Television was being used to manipulate the public 
opinion for endorsing the Agreement (23-year-old female Hamas supporter). 
 
A member from Fatah responded to that by saying: ‘I think it is the same in Al-Aqsa 
Television channel where they have consultation (Shura) system in which the directors 
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have to take orders from the high-level Hamas leaders’ (22-year-old female Fatah 
supporter). 
 
Groups 7 and 8: Mixed gender and faction and independents 
The pressure that is exerted on media institutions and journalists by the two 
governments, and their control of official mass media, has resulted in a uniform media 
message and a partisan media that functions as a mouthpiece for the respective 
governments. This has considerably restricted and compromised the opportunities for 
the media to function in its watchdog role. This has been made worse by the absence of 
freedom of expression. Governmental media have played an important role in 
mobilizing the Palestinian people, but only in reinforcing the divide between those who 
support the ruling Fatah authority in Ramallah and those who support the opposition 
Hamas party in Gaza. Such a polarisation in media politics has created a real setback for 
democratic values. 
 
An independent member summed up the media situation in Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank and how political factions were manipulating the media: 
 
I think for the media to function as a watchdog, it has to be independent. In 
Palestine we have many political factions with each one eager to own a media 
channel to mobilize the people and to win their support. It is impossible to have 
independent media or the media to function as a fourth estate (27-year-old 
independent female). 
 
Another member supported her colleague’s view. She analysed the situation in both 
television channels and explained the degree of liberty: 
 
As a governmental channel, Palestine Television is not expected to criticise the 
government. And as a partisan channel, Al-Aqsa Television channel also is not 
expected to critique Hamas government. I see that both channels are not having 
that degree of liberty to adopt a strategy of monitoring government policy. They 
are financially dependent on the two governments. Both television channels are 
protecting their faction’s interests instead of public interests. The policy of the 
153 
 
two channels is built to praise the two leaders and their governments (30-year-
old independent female). 
 
A member from the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestinian (PFLP) described how 
both parties committed violations against journalists and human rights in the Palestinian 
territories: 
 
Both parties have committed violations against human rights. Fatah violate 
human rights and suppress the freedom of expression in the West Bank. They 
arrest any citizen who criticises them. Hamas in Gaza Strip detain any 
journalists who write against them. Palestine Television concentrates on 
violations committed by Hamas in Gaza, while Al-Aqsa Television channel 
exposes those by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (28-year-old 
independent male).  
 
6.6 Theme 5: Television and the project of state-building  
Reversing its long-held policy of not taking part in elections, Hamas contested elections 
in 2006 and agreed to participate in the Palestinian Authority. It won the majority of 
seats in Gaza but due to ideological differences leading to political clashes with Fatah, it 
took over the Gaza Strip and thus contributed to the collapse of democracy and the 
state-building project. The events that followed the Hamas victory in the elections had a 
huge impact on the Palestinian national project and state-building process. Palestine has 
since been divided into two parts with two governments – Hamas controlling the Gaza 
Strip and Fatah the West Bank. Since then, the Palestinian dream, for which thousands 
of Palestinians sacrificed their lives over the last decades, has been lost. It is important 
to note that Hamas policy was based on resistance, and its ideology was to liberate 
Palestine from the Israeli occupation. Hamas was against the Palestinian Authority and 
the agreements signed with Israel. It refused to participate in the Palestinian Authority. 
Hamas has used all media outlets under its control to accuse Fatah and the Palestinian 
Authority of betrayal and giving up Palestinian land.  
 
Ideologically and politically the situation remains deeply divided and antagonistic. The 
political polarisation is reflected also in polarisation within the media and continued 
hostility between the two groups. Against this backdrop, laws on the protection of 
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human rights and freedom of expression have been constantly violated by both sides. In 
addition, the siege imposed on the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation has 
considerably limited the ability of media institutions to contribute to state-building. 
Many scholars have argued that the sovereignty of media are as fundamental for state-
building as it is essential to the success of the national project (Ayish, 2001; Ayubi, 
1995; Jamal, 2003). 
 
As already discussed, the two governments have consistently used the media to defend 
their political agendas. In order to avoid harassment by the security forces, the media in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have maintained close relationships with political 
elites in the two governments, which have imposed restrictions on the freedom of 
expression. This control of the socio-political sphere, with its restrictions of freedom of 
expression and violations against media institutions, has had a profound impact on the 
state-building process.  
 
Groups 1 and 2: Fatah faction, mixed gender, students and NGO workers 
Participants in the first group, all from Fatah, favoured the idea of the Palestinian 
Authority controlling the media. One of the participants argued that it benefited the 
Palestinian state-building process: 
 
The Palestinian Authority was right to control the Palestine Television channel 
because we are in a state-building process and we need to maintain our national 
security. If they hadn’t, others and maybe enemies will take advantage of this 
opportunity and disrupt the state-building project (26-year-old male Fatah 
supporter). 
 
Another member of the group suggested that the Palestinian political situation was 
unstable, and therefore the Palestinian Authority had taken the right decision to control 
the national media: 
 
We have a large number of not well-educated people and they are an easy target 
for deception. I think the Palestinian Authority holding the national television 
was the right decision. Our political situation is unstable and we have many 
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players in the Palestinian arena; everyone is trying to mobilize the public (22-
year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
A member from the second group raised the issue of Hamas using Al-Aqsa TV to 
deepen Palestinian divisions: 
 
The editorial policy of Al-Aqsa Television is deepening the Palestinian division. 
I think in the process of state-building the stability of the country is more 
important than the party interests. Therefore, I think the government holding the 
national television was the right decision (25-year-old male Fatah member). 
  
Another participant supported that view and pointed out how Hamas used Al-Aqsa TV 
to offend the Palestinian president and therefore disrupt the Palestinian national project: 
 
We are experiencing a major change in our history where we are building our 
state, therefore they have to support the president and the prime minister, not to 
betray them. It is clear that they are using their television channel to defame the 
Palestinian president and his prime minister (27-year-old female Fatah 
supporter). 
 
Groups 3 and 4: Male Fatah and Hamas students 
The Palestinian experience in democracy and freedom of opinion has been  traumatic in 
all senses. Because journalists feel so threatened they are using self-censorship in case 
their writings affect national security or Authority interests. They are restricted not only 
by the governments, but also by customs and traditions which restrict the topics they 
cover, especially sensitive topics. Taking all these factors in consideration, many 
commentators argued that the project of state-building has been deeply affected (Abed, 
2010; Shaqoura, 2010).  
 
In this context, a member from Hamas added to the discussion, criticising the 
Palestinian Authority for silencing other voices: 
 
For building the state, we need many voices and many points of view. This 
could be done through opening up television channels and allowing journalists 
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to write freely. But the Palestinian Authority censorship and violations of 
freedom of expression prevent others from starting media channels. Moreover, 
they threaten journalists who write against them. I think the Palestinian 
Authority has to revise its strategy and allow media freedom (22-year-old male 
Hamas supporter).  
 
Another member from Fatah was in favour of independent media channels, but at the 
same time he justified the Palestinian Authority position in controlling the media: 
 
I think an independent television channel could contribute in the process of 
state-building because it can allow more freedom of expression and more people 
participation. It plays an important role in defining the characteristics of the 
future of the Palestinian society. But we have to accept the reality that the 
Palestinian Authority is a part of the Arab world. They have to control the 
national media and maintain balance between being democratic and autocratic 
(23-year-old male Fatah supporter). 
 
A member from Hamas responded by criticising the Palestinian Authority’s actions in 
imposing limitations on freedom of expression: ‘The Palestinian Authority must accept 
others’ views. Al-Aqsa Television offers another aspect of freedom of expression. They 
should accept the fact that critical media channels are vital for democracy and state- 
building’ (22-year-old male Hamas supporter). 
 
Another member from Hamas attributed the limitation of freedom of expression 
imposed by the Palestinian Authority to the pressure of the Israeli occupation. He thinks 
that Palestine TV cannot discuss sensitive issues because it is related to the PA which 
has signed agreements with Israel. Al-Aqsa Television, however, can provide a space 
for others to criticise Israel.  
 
Israel is exercising pressure on the Palestinian Authority, forcing it to suppress 
other factions and individuals’ freedom of expression. This has created fear 
among oppositional factions. I think Al-Aqsa Television can discuss sensitive 
issues related to the national project and state-building, while Palestine 
Television cannot do that. Al-Aqsa channel gives the space for other voices to 
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emerge and I think it is serving the state-creation (22-year-old male Hamas 
supporter). 
 
Groups 5 and 6: Female Fatah and Hamas students 
A member from Hamas argued that because elites in the Palestinian Authority and Fatah 
are employing Palestine TV for their own interests, there is no democratic participation: 
 
Politicians in Fatah and the Palestinian Authority are using Palestine Television 
channel for their self-interest. It is not representing all sectors in our society. The 
process of state-building needs people participating in decision-making. 
Therefore, I think Palestine Television channel has to be for the public to reflect 
their views (22-year-old female Hamas supporter).  
 
Another member from Fatah argued that both political parties were trying to shape the 
public sphere: 
 
It’s not just Fatah, each party is trying to maintain its media channel because 
they have realized the importance of media. I think when each party has its own 
media channel, they would disseminate information that supports their political 
agenda. But if we have only one channel, it would function according to national 
interest. In my view, one channel is better than hundreds (21-year-old female 
Fatah supporter). 
 
It is worth recalling that Hamas established Al-Aqsa TV because Palestine TV did not 
give their members the opportunity to broadcast their election programmes. A member 
from Hamas argued for multiple channels. She thinks that this could contribute to the 
state-building project: ‘I think if we have multiple channels related to parties, they 
would cooperate to enlighten people and contribute towards the state-building project. 
In addition, we would have many views other than the government view’ (20-year-old 
female Hamas supporter). 
 
Another member from Fatah opposed the idea of multiple channels and at the same time 
did not favour the governmental channel. She preferred the idea of an independent 




I am against multiple channels because as we can see now we have two 
television channels one is governmental and the other is partisan – each one 
functioning according to its political interests. They are not contributing to the 
process of state-building. Therefore, I would favour an independent channel that 
could be for the public (21-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
The actions against Palestinian media institutions and journalists during the Israeli 
occupation had a significant impact on media in the Palestinian territories which is still 
continuing. Many scholars have argued that the Israeli occupation is one of the major 
obstacles hindering the development of Palestinian media (Hamad, 2010; Abu Shanab, 
2001; Abusaid, 2004). A member from Fatah had this to say about the impact of the 
Israeli occupation on the Palestinian state-building project: 
 
The Israeli occupation is trying to demolish the Palestinian state-building project 
by targeting all Palestinian media channels. Another element is which is 
disrupting the process of state-building is the Palestinian division. I think there 
will be no state while the Palestinian division exists. Hamas do not accept being 
under the Palestinian Liberation Organization umbrella. They have always 
projected themselves as the alternative to PLO. Therefore, I don’t think this 
would benefit the state-building project (24-year-old female Fatah supporter). 
 
Groups 7 and 8: Mixed gender and mixed factions and independents  
The control of Hamas and Fatah over media and information is aimed at preventing 
public access to the media, which is against the laws enacted in Palestine. However, 
observers confirm that the two television channels provide no opportunity for citizens to 
express their opinions freely (Habib, 2010; Shaqoura, 2010). Consequently, citizens are 
unable to exercise freedom of expression due to the absence of democracy and 
pluralism.  
 





All citizens have to contribute in the process of state-building; they have to 
participate by giving their opinions. Therefore, it is the role of media to link 
citizens with the government. In addition, they have to provide access to 
information. But the two television channels are functioning as a mouthpiece for 
the two governments and give only their members the opportunity to participate. 
This surely affects the state-building process (30-year-old independent female). 
 
Another member from DFLP suggested how television can also work as a mechanism 
for reconciliation between the two parties: ‘For the two leaderships to reconcile, the two 
television channels will have to stop using provocative language against each other. 
This is necessary at this stage of the state-building process. In fact, we need unity to be 
able to confront the Israeli occupation’ (28-year-old male DFLP supporter). 
 
A member from PFLP articulated the situation thus: 
 
I think the two governments demonstrate little social responsibility towards the 
Palestinian people. They do not have legitimacy to run the television channels, 
because they are using them as tools for public manipulation. In addition, both 
sides are threatening journalists and citizens. They have to get together and solve 
their problems. The Palestinian division should be ended. Otherwise this would 
have major consequences for the Palestinian state-building project (32-year-old 




In this chapter, I have examined the Palestinians’ perceptions about the two television 
channels and their contribution to the enhancement of democratic communication in 
Palestine. Different functions of media in a democracy such as information, critique, 
and forum have been examined from the participants’ point of view. These three 
functions were examined from different aspects such as freedom of information, 
watchdog, state- building, promotion of democracy, and public participation. By 
deriving empirical evidence from fieldwork, I have demonstrated how the two factions 
control the two television channels and how participants see the channels’ contribution 
to the state of democratic communication in Palestine. By doing this, I provided 
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information about the Palestinian socio-political situation and the role that these two 
factions played to manipulate the media in order to dominate the public sphere. I also 
explored the structure of the two channels, suggesting how the two factions regulate the 
Palestinian media. The differences in participants’ points of views showed how they see 
the two factions’ perception of the future of democracy in the Palestinian state.  
 
However, participants in focus groups have agreed that the two channels are functioning 
largely to safeguard and promote the political interests of their factions rather than 
serving the public interest. In terms of public participation, most Fatah members 
believed that Al-Aqsa TV provides a platform for their members and airs views that suit 
their political policy. Some Fatah members admitted that Palestine TV provides a 
platform for Fatah members only. They asserted that Al-Aqsa TV is biased and serves 
the Hamas party. They also agreed that Hamas government has restricted journalists’ 
work in Gaza and has committed violations against media institutions. On the other 
hand, Hamas participants confirmed that Palestine TV as a theoretically national media 
did not reflect their ambitions, but serves only the Fatah political elites. They affirmed 
that opposition media have supported the oppressed people in their struggle for freedom 
of opinion. In addition, they believed that Palestine TV is biased, allowing only Fatah 
members to participate in their television programmes. Few Hamas members think that 
Palestine TV is a credible source of information. They also agreed that the PA has 
restricted journalists’ work in the West Bank and closed many TV stations including Al-
Aqsa TV.  
 
A few independent participants agreed that they can get involved in Al-Aqsa TV 
without having to criticise Hamas government. They agreed that the PA should not 
monopolize media channels. Most of the politically-independent participants agreed that 
both parties are using their own media as a propaganda tool and as a way of defending 
their actions. They asserted that both governments control and regulate all the media in 
their territories, and impose censorship in order to manage the broadcast and published 
news. Members of other factions have favoured the concept of a single public broadcast 
channel instead of multiple partisan channels to ensure the public interests, while 
another member from a different faction was in favour of multiple channels as they 




In terms of critique and watchdog function, the focus group data showed that the two 
channels are unable to criticise elites in the two governments. In addition, they cannot 
fulfil their watchdog role because they are very much controlled by the elites from both 
factions. Participants noted that the channels are functioning as a watchdog against each 
other, in the sense that Palestine TV carries out a watchdog role against the Hamas 
government and Al-Aqsa TV has a similar role towards Fatah and the Palestinian 
Authority. A cluster of Fatah members believed that it is not the right time for Palestine 
TV to function as a watchdog because this could inflame public feeling and result in a 
coup. At the same level, most Fatah members agreed that Al-Aqsa TV does not function 
as a watchdog for the Hamas government and is only critical of Fatah members and the 
PA. On the other hand, most Hamas members believed that Fatah elites control 
Palestine TV which prevents the channel from tackling sensitive issues and functioning 
as a watchdog. However, independent members believed that for the media to function 
in this way it has to be independent. In addition, they asserted that it is difficult to have 
independent media in Palestine because all factions sought to manipulate the emerging 
public sphere. They affirmed that neither channel is expected to criticise the two 
governments as they do not have liberty. 
 
In terms of freedom of information, the majority of participants believed that the two 
governments continue to control the information disseminated from the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank. Participants felt that Palestinians do not have access to information as 
the two governments impose limitations on the freedom of opinion and expression and 
violate human rights. They also felt that the two channels try to disseminate information 
that could harm the other side. The information broadcast from Gaza suits the Hamas 
government and on the other hand, the information being disseminated from the West 
Bank suits Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.  
 
Overall, in terms of participation, the focus groups’ data shows that the control by the 
Palestinian Authority of the national media and the rise of opposition media has opened 
the space for a cluster of people to express their views against corruption and violations 
committed against human rights. In terms of critique, the focus groups’ data shows that 
as Palestine TV exposes violations committed by the Hamas government, and Al-Aqsa 
TV monitors the PA actions, such functions could be in the public interest. In terms of 
information, participants believe that the two channels disseminate information for their 
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party interests which could hinder democracy. The next chapter will synthesize the data 
from interviews, focus groups and surveys to paint a picture of the complex relationship 







Media and democracy in a conflict zone 
 
‘What democracy we can talk about while our people are fighting.’ 
 
‘Our democracy is better than any other country: in elections the president gets 
99.99%.’ 
 
‘The two television channels are like fighting between a man and his wife.’ 
  
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the reader to the structure and nature of the Palestinian 
media and the problems that hinder its contribution to the enhancement of democratic 
communication. In this discussion, I will demonstrate the different aspects of 
democracy that are taking place during the transition period. The discussion will use 
examples from fieldwork to explore democracy as an ideal that Palestinians seek and as 
an obstacle that hinders its progress.  
 
7.1 Audiences in stateless Palestine 
The study of television audiences in a stateless political context is full of challenges. 
Given the political polarisation of Palestinian body-politic and therefore its television 
audience, as we have noted in preceding chapters, it can be argued that Palestinians 
demonstrate affinities with ‘active’ audience tradition of media research. Most of the 
interviewees are aware of the intensely political nature and slanted coverage of the two 
television news networks and appear to be capable of decoding the various ideological 
messages that are routinely encoded in the news. 
 
The issue of television audiences in stateless Palestine is an area of interest for 
researchers. Abuzanouna (2006) notes that television occupies a wide space in 
Palestinian life. In his study of television audiences in Palestine he concluded that 
Palestinians are using television content to reflect their political ideas. However, Abed 
argues that television audiences have turned their attention to other media such as social 
media, having realized the partisan nature of television programming. New media 
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technologies that allow messages to reach massive audiences, and the potential of mass 
media to mobilize the public have always been a matter for government concern. The 
importance of television in Palestinian life has prompted the two governments in Gaza 
and the West Bank to maintain control of the two television channels in order to 
manipulate the public sphere.   
 
In contrast, social media have provided Palestinian audiences with more freedom of 
expression. As traditional media are under the control of the two governments, they 
cannot provide the platform for ordinary people to express their opinions and criticise 
government actions. Thus social media are the only forum in which they can share and 
exchange ideas that are not allowed in government or partisan media. There is no doubt 
that governments fear the power of social media, especially after what happened 
recently in Gaza when youths used Facebook to organize a protest to end the division of 
Palestine.  
 
Traditional media in the Palestinian territories face problems and constraints that limit 
their role in social development. At the same time, government-controlled media in 
Palestine have failed to serve audiences and have lost credibility. Violations of freedom 
of expression weaken the ability of media to contribute to the strength and stability of 
society. In contrast, Palestinians feel other media, such as social media are more 
credible and trustworthy. They are establishing blogs and social media accounts that 
allow them to create, participate and share news and events freely.  
 
Participants in focus groups affirmed that the media should play a role in ending 
divisions within Palestine by rejecting the language of incitement currently being used. 
They felt that there was a need for state-building, to recover from the difficult 
experiences they have gone through, especially during the internal conflict. They felt 
that it was the media’s responsibility to uphold freedom of expression and address 
internal divisions. Unlike in many states, Palestinian audiences have a direct effect in 
the Palestinian political arena and that is why they have resorted to social media to gain 
a platform to reach and influence public opinion. It is argued that forming an effective 
audience for media are an important element in state building, in order to create 
awareness among civil actors.  Palestinian audiences have expanded their participation 
in political life through an online public sphere, creating groups that provide platforms 
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for their members to express their opinions freely. Such platforms have liberated their 
thoughts and provided unprecedented opportunities to express, share, criticise and 
communicate with others.  
 
Palestinian audiences are becoming active participants in the communication process, in 
which they seek information that is relevant to them. In fact, they are becoming the 
makers of news as citizen journalists, getting around government restrictions and 
censorship, to record and report abuses and violations against human rights. The 
emergence of social media has enabled and empowered them to communicate to an 
international audience their daily conflict with the Israeli occupation, to gain sympathy 
for their cause by highlighting Israeli brutality. During the Israeli attack on the Gaza 
Strip in 2008, the Israeli government imposed a media blackout; local and foreign 
correspondents were banned from entering Gaza. However, Palestinian citizens were 
able to take images of Israeli forces bombing buildings and civilians and broadcast them 
through the internet. This demonstrates how a state-less audience can become producers 
of media and use on-line digital technologies to communicate globally. 
 
7.2 Democracy and freedom of expression under Palestinian law 
Democratic thought is based on basic elements, notably the freedom of expression and 
opinion. Theorists of democracy emphasize the need for a free media in any society that 
claims to be democratic, as without such freedom the democratic process 
remains incomplete. So a free media are considered to be a cornerstone in the 
democratic process. Indeed, democracy gives power to the media and keeps it free from 
exploitation. In addition, pluralism is considered essential for democracy. Pluralism 
does not mean simply an increase in the number of newspapers and magazines, but must 
involve the freedom for anyone, whether individuals or organizations, to publish 
newspapers in order to present their ideas through the media and thus make their voices 
heard. 
 
The ability to express opinions freely without fear or limitation has become an 
established right in democratic systems. It is one of the building blocks of social, 
political and cultural life. A democratic media are characterized by transparency and 
credibility: it is committed to professionalism when broadcasting news bulletins and 
reports and is expected to provide accessible information to its audience. There is no 
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doubt that freedom of opinion and expression creates a democratic space and a 
pluralistic and tolerant environment which are indispensable principles for the creation 
of a modern society dominated by humanitarian values. 
 
In the Palestinian context, in September 1993 the Palestine Liberation Organization 
signed the Declaration of Principles with the Israeli government, which led to interim 
conventions in May 1994 and September 1995. These agreements were considered the 
foundation for the redeployment of Israeli occupation forces and the establishment of 
the Palestinian Authority, and the beginning of a new era of relations based on 
cooperation between the two parties in many areas. The agreements emphasized the 
actions and behaviours expected of both parties in order to create an environment which 
would support co-existence and prevent incitement to terrorism or any form of media 
war. 
 
The Cairo Agreement of May 1994, for example, confirmed that Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority would seek to prevent incitement, hostile propaganda and 
terrorism. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement about the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip that was signed in Washington in September 1995 stated that the two 
sides would seek ‘to promote mutual understanding, tolerance and therefore abstain 
from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other, and without 
derogation from the principle of freedom of expression, and will take legal actions to 
prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their 
respective mandates’ (IMFA, 1995). 
 
The Palestinian Basic Law confirmed freedom of expression, and in 1994 the PLO 
proclaimed that the Palestinian Authority was committed to the treaties and covenants 
of human rights. At the end of September of the same year, the late President Arafat 
issued a presidential decree to establish the Palestinian High Commission on Human 
Rights. The Palestinian Basic Law includes Article 19, which stipulates ‘no prejudice to 
freedom of opinion, and everyone has the right to express his opinion verbally, in 
writing or other means of expression or art, taking into consideration the provisions of 
the law’ (MOFA, 1994). This echoes Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and is also included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
According to Article 9, ‘Palestinians before the law and judiciary are the same, without 
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discrimination because of race, sex, colour, religion, or political opinion or disability’ 
(MOFA, 1994). Believing in the Palestinian people's rights and equated with other free 
peoples, the Palestinian Basic Law has enshrined principles of justice, democracy and 
fundamental freedoms that are protected by international covenants and laws. Based on 
that assumption, media freedom and freedom of opinion and expression must be 
guaranteed and there should not be any control of information that can affect the 
practice of journalism or actions that threaten and intimidate journalists. 
 
The late Palestinian president Yasser Arafat issued the Press and Publications Law in 
1995 but one of its main drawbacks is that it was a temporary law and was not approved 
by the Legislative Council. The law consists of 51 articles that regulate and deal with 
freedom of expression, publication and journalistic work. For example Article 2 
affirmed that ‘The press and publishing are free. And freedom of opinion is guaranteed 
to every Palestinian who attains the absolute right to express his opinion freely orally, 
writing, photography or drawing, in [different] mediums of expression and information’ 
(MINFO, 1995). Article 3 states that ‘The press performs its duties freely in presenting 
news, information and commentary, and participates in the spread of knowledge, 
thought and culture and science within the limits of the law, and in the framework of the 
protections of freedoms and public rights and duties, and the respect of the privacy of 
others and its sanctity’ (MINFO, 1995).  
 
Such a statement suggests that the press is free within the limits of the law. But what are 
the limits of the law? In addition, the law has restricted the practice of these rights by a 
range of provisions but guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press within the framework of law. Habib (2010) notes that he was a member of the 
committee that established the press law. He adds that ‘such law has seized journalists' 
work and contributed to censor some publications. The law has raised large 
disagreement in Palestinian legal and political level because of the serious danger it 
causes to freedom of expression and freedom of the press’. 
 
Article 7(a) specifies that ’publications must not publish what is inconsistent with 
principles of freedom, national responsibility and human rights, and must respect 
the truth’ (MINFO, 1995). The problem is how to define those terms. Sometimes what 
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an individual considers to be a defence of national responsibility may be seen by 
another to be an offence. The word ‘truth’ is also subject to different interpretations. 
 
Paragraph 8 of the press law requires journalists to maintain strict adherence to 
professional ethics. They must:  
• ‘Respect individuals' rights and their constitutional freedom and not violate the 
freedom of their own lives.’  
• ‘Provide press materials in an objective, integrated and balanced manner.’ 
• ‘Maintain accuracy, impartiality and objectivity in commenting on news and 
events.’ 
• ‘Avoid publishing materials that could promote violence, intolerance, and hatred 
or encourage racism and sectarianism.’   
 
These paragraphs limit freedom of expression and publication. In addition, terms such 
as 'objectivity', 'balanced', and 'impartiality' are subject to different interpretations. Such 
vagueness leaves the door open for the authority to threaten journalists. Consequently, 
journalists have become fearful of violating the law when writing news articles. The 
reality is that many journalists have been detained, and newspapers closed. 
 
Article 27 also established freedom for the media. It confirmed that ‘the establishment 
of newspapers and other media is right for all, guaranteed by Basic Law and its funding 
sources are subjected to law. Freedom of media whether audio, visual or written, and 
freedom of printing, publishing, distribution and broadcasting, and freedom for workers, 
is guaranteed in accordance with this Basic Law and relevant laws. Censorship on 
media is prohibited, and cannot be warned, suspended, confiscated, cancelled or 
imposed restrictions except in accordance to the law and under court rule’ (MINFO, 
1995). According to Article 33, ‘the owner of the printing press or the responsible 
director has to submit, to the Department of Press and Publication, four copies of each 
non-periodical printed copy that printed in his printer prior to the distribution’ (MINFO, 
1995). This could suggest that the process of submitting copies assumes that distribution 
is conditional on obtaining authorization from the Department of Press and Publication 
prior to printing. On the other hand, it is possible that the printer will have produced the 
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publication but cannot distribute until after submission of the four copies and a 
subsequent granting of permission for distribution. 
 
The law contains some ambiguity. Article 35 stipulates that the ‘Distribution 
house or anyone who wants to import periodical publications such as newspapers, 
magazines and alike have to obtain a license from the Ministry of Information for one-
time’ (MINFO, 1995). The term 'alike' is subject to many interpretations and is 
not specific. This is clearly intended to control certain publications, especially non 
periodical, and suggests that human rights publications which do not appear on a regular 
basis could be the target of this law. It is important to note that vague terms can be used 
in different situations. For example, the third paragraph of Article 37(a) prohibits 
publications that publish ‘articles which are harmful to national unity or incite to 
commit crimes ...’ (MINFO, 1995). Scrutinizing this, the term 'national unity' is a 
serious constraint as it is unspecified and undetermined and can open the door to 
publishing restrictions. Moreover, it may grant a judge the right to prohibit publication 
under the pretext that permission to publish would undermine national unity. 
 
Article 42(a), which states that ‘The competent court deals with all breaches of the Press 
Law and the Public Prosecutor have the authority to investigate according to the validity 
of powers and procedures prescribed by applicable penalty codes’ (MINFO, 1995). 
Failure to define the concept ‘competent court’ raises concern. It is not clear what is 
meant by such a phrase; whether it is the civil court, state security court or Personal 
Status Court. It is necessary for the law to specify the competent court in order to 
consider appropriately violations committed against the provisions of the law. The 
absence of a clear definition may be seen as intentional on the part of the Authority, 
allowing it to take over the responsibility of state security courts in order to judge such 
offences. This would not help to create the open environment essential to the practice of 
the right to freedom of expression and publication. 
 
It becomes clear that freedom of opinion and expression has become blurred and 
vulnerable to legal standards that regulate this right. In addition, these standards 
legitimate government violations against citizens and journalists, resulting in a situation 
in which there have been arbitrary arrests and attacks against journalists. Government 
has dominated the official media and tightened its control over private media. Thus, 
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freedom of opinion and expression enjoyed a small margin of freedom, and the law is 
devoid of any provisions to ensure the protection of journalists and any guarantees to 
freedom of expression.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Palestinian press law was an area of discussion covered by the focus groups. A male 
from Hamas described the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the press 
law by saying, ‘The Press Law offers the Palestinian Authority the power to control the 
news in all the publications within the Palestinian territories. There are articles in the 
press law which appear to protect freedom of expression, but it does not have any legal 
power. Violations come from different parties such as the Palestinian Authority, militant 
groups, elites, Israeli occupation, families, and others’ (Male from Hamas, Gaza, 2010). 
 
7.3 Violation of freedom of expression in Palestine  
Violations against freedom of expression and the freedom of the press are common 
among regimes which abuse human rights. There is no doubt that violations of the 
freedom of expression are usually committed to hide information that could inflame 
public opinion. Undoubtedly, any subordination of a free media to the interests of 
political, economic, and religious groups constitutes a decline in the performance of the 
media which then does not provide a platform for discussion and interaction which 
could promote pluralism and competition, and encourage freedom of expression. 
 
The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories is characterized by the control of 
security by different parties and this results in violation of media freedom by a range of 
interest groups. On one hand, there is the Israeli occupation and settlers, and security 
forces in Gaza and the West Bank. On the other hand there are Palestinian militant 
groups. Violations by all these parties have led not only to a significant decline in 
freedom of expression and publishing, but also to a practice of extreme self-censorship 
among journalists, which has led to a decline in the general standard of the Palestinian 
media. 
 
During the discussion about violations of freedom of expression, a female from Hamas 
expressed her view about this situation in the Palestinian territories. She said, ‘Various 
parties violate the right to freedom of expression. The Palestinian security forces is 
arresting and assaulting journalists. Families have also committed attacks on journalist 
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because they express their opinion and publish news related to their family members. 
The PA does not take any action to protect journalists in order to ensure that such 
attacks would not happen in the future’ (Female from Hamas, Gaza, 2010). 
 
When the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994, Palestinians hoped this would 
mean the establishment of rights for citizens, especially the right of freedom of 
expression. Their hopes were raised by the Palestinian Authority's statement of intent 
including plans to build a democratic state, implement pluralism, and respect human 
rights. But the reality was soon seen to be very different from the political discourse. On 
a political level, the PA issued laws and constitutions that could not contribute to the 
enhancement of general freedoms; on the contrary, they restricted the right of freedom 
of expression. On practical level, the PA has carried out actions which restrict freedom 
of expression. With regard to the freedom of the press, the PA had detained and beaten 
journalists, and closed many media institutions. With regard to freedom of expression, 
the PA arrested many citizens because of their political affiliation or political views. 
The right to peaceful assembly was also undermined as the PA banned many 
demonstrations, conferences, and other peaceful gatherings. 
 
In discussions among the focus groups, a male from PFLP criticised the Palestinian 
Authority for imposing restrictions on freedom of expression. He said that ‘the PA 
continued to impose restrictions on freedom of expression and press. It arrested citizens 
because of their opinions and political backgrounds. In addition, it imposed restrictions 
on media and arrested journalists for covering certain events, and closed several media 
institutions for publishing certain news items’ (Male from PFLP, Gaza, 2010). 
 
The commitment of the PA to agreements with Israel and the continuing confrontation 
between Fatah and Hamas has played a fundamental role in creating a situation which 
involves duplicated and conflicting policies in dealing with citizen’s rights. Sometimes, 
the PA showed flexibility and tolerance when dealing with practices related to the 
freedom of expression concerning Israel, while on other occasions it showed prejudice. 
But the PA in contrast showed intolerance towards practices against its policy. 
Therefore, it was the political agreements with Israel, in some cases, have been the 




At the current time Palestinian society suffers from a lack of adequate sources of 
information and from violations against journalists and media institutions, which result 
in the restriction of freedom of opinion and expression. The margins of media freedoms 
in Palestine vary between the wide margin of social issues and the limited margin of 
corruption, murder, and lawlessness issues. The Palestinian media are experiencing a 
state of instability that threatens its existence, especially in light of the repeated attacks 
it experiences from the Israeli occupation as well as from internal Palestinian forces. 
 
The margins of freedom of opinion and expression granted to citizens, writers and 
journalists by the two governments are very limited. Indeed, the authorities consider 
activities related to freedom of expression to have a political dimension, intended to 
achieve control over the economic, social and political situation. It had been hoped the 
two governments would work towards protecting basic human rights including the right 
to freedom of expression, creating the legal framework to enshrine these rights. 
 
The year 2007 was the worst in the history of Palestinian media and freedom of 
expression since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (MADA, 2009b). 
Violations of freedom of expression have affected Arabic media outlets in the 
Palestinian territories, especially during the dispute between Fatah and Hamas. Fatah 
accused Al-Jazeera channel of being biased in favour of Hamas. On the other side, 
Hamas accused Al-Arabiya channel of being biased towards Fatah. For the first time 
since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian journalists were 
brought to trial because of their opinions. The PA forces would habitually announce 
areas where events were taking place to be a closed military zone to prevent journalists 
from following stories. 
 
Internal violations against freedom of expression in the Palestinian territories have also 
escalated. Violations included beatings, detention, and the confiscation of press 
equipment. The escalation of chaos has created armed clashes in which journalists 
become victims of the political conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Both parties used 
violence against journalists and media institutions in the areas under their control. In the 
Gaza Strip, police forces would chase journalists covering events organized by Fatah 
and other factions. Evidence shows journalists have been arrested and had their cameras 
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confiscated and have subsequently been forced to sign a pledge not to cover any other 
events in the future (PCHR, 2009a). 
 
The two governments have imposed restrictions on public meetings in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank. In addition, they required organizers to apply for a license to hold 
events. Security forces of the two governments have worked in a very focused way in 
order to prevent any public gatherings being mounted against their policies. Violations 
against media freedoms that took place during the year of 2007 and actions that 
prevented peaceful gathering and demonstrations have seriously affected citizens' rights 
in the Palestinian territories. 
 
The two governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank bear the full responsibility of 
ensuring the respect of human rights, including freedom of opinion and 
expression. And, because the two governments hold the legitimate power in the 
Palestinian territories and are able to enact laws and regulations within the areas under 
their jurisdiction, it is an essential part of their duties to implement the rule of law and 
respect freedoms. They should provide protection for journalists and prosecute those 
who violate their rights. The continuing situation which fails to provide protection for 
journalists encourages those groups to continue their aggression against the media, 
threatening their right of expression and putting lives at risk. 
 
The two governments attracted criticism from the participants in the focus groups. A 
male from DFLP criticized the two governments for their violations of freedom of 
expression. He said, ‘the two governments do not allow people to exercise their right to 
freedom of expression. Their security forces shoot many citizens because of their 
opinion. They are arresting journalists and issuing orders to close newspapers. Each 
party have prevented the newspapers of its opponent to enter its controlled zone’ (Male 
from DFLP, Gaza, 2010). 
 
In this context, the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) 
revealed about 280 violations of media freedoms in the occupied Palestinian 
territories during 2010. These violations were committed by Israeli occupation forces 
and settlers, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian 




Reports issued by organizations monitoring violations of media freedoms show that 
Israel was among the worst violators of the freedom of expression and press freedom 
during 2008 (PCHR, 2009c; MADA, 2009a; Al-Mezan, 2009). These organizations 
emphasized that the Israeli occupation forces make no serious investigations into crimes 
committed against journalists and media institutions working in the Palestinian 
territories (ibid). A study by the organization Reporters Without Borders into press 
freedom in 2009 reported that the Palestinian territories ranked very low, which gives 
an indication of the reality of media freedoms in Palestine ( cited in MADA, 2009a). 
 
The Israeli occupation forces continue to violate the right to freedom of expression and 
access to information, and to restrict freedom of the press in the Palestinian 
territories. Violations take many forms such as the direct bombardment of journalists or 
media organizations, shutting down of newspapers, arrests and beatings. Journalists 
have been targeted in many ways: media organizations and vehicles have been bombed, 
and journalists have been killed and injured. Despite journalists wearing bulletproof 
jackets clearly identifying them as representatives of the press, they are targeted by 
Israeli occupation forces who impose restrictions on their movements and announce 
event areas are closed military zones. Empirical data from human rights organizations 
indicates that the Israeli occupation forces deliberately target journalists and bomb 
civilians in those areas (PCHR, 2009a). 
 
7.4 Effects of the Israeli blockade on the Palestinian media  
Despite the political instability in the Palestinian arena and the continuation of the 
Israeli occupation, the Palestinian media are considered an important tool in the conflict 
between the Palestinians and Israelis. The Palestinian media functions in very complex 
circumstances, especially in the presence of the Israeli occupation and the absence of an 
independent Palestinian state. Palestinian people have been living under Israeli 
occupation since 1967. The Palestinian Authority was set up after the Oslo agreement in 
1994, to control the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank. But, in spite of the 
agreements, the Israeli occupation has undermined the Palestinian Authority and 
controlled the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Despite the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza 




Over more than three decades, the Israeli occupation has controlled all aspects of 
Palestinians' lives. Moreover, Israeli invasions of the Palestinian territories which 
involve its troops carrying out heinous crimes are aimed at disrupting Palestinians' daily 
life (PCHR, 1998). Palestinian journalists have endeavoured to document Israeli 
practices in daily reports issued by the local and international media and by human 
rights organizations operating in the Palestinian territories. Israel claims these reports 
distort its image in the wider world, where it claims to be a democratic state which 
respects human rights. Reports from the territories reveal the falsity of such a claim. The 
Israeli occupation is deliberately targeting journalists and media institutions in order to 
prevent them from exposing its crimes, committed against the Palestinian people. The 
Israeli occupation purposely prevents Palestinians from exercising freedom of 
expression through repressive practices against anyone writing about their crimes (Al-
Ajrami, 2008). 
 
One of the Palestinian journalists working in the Gaza Strip described during an 
interview the difficulties he faces during his work. He said, ‘while I was covering Israeli 
invasions to Gaza Strip in 2009, Israeli helicopter fired a missile towards me. The 
missile fell about 5 meters away from me where I got injured. My friends took me by 
ambulance to the hospital where it turned out that I had some shrapnel in my body.’ 
 
There is no doubt that the Palestinian media plays an important role in increasing public 
awareness (Shinar, 1987). In addition, it has succeeded in creating international 
sympathy for and solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and has activated international 
campaigns to support the Palestinian people. However, the blockade has had a negative 
impact on Palestinian media performance, as media institutions suffer from a lack of 
broadcasting and sound equipment, cameras and other necessary resources for the work 
of journalists. Reports of the Al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights reported that among 
the equipment that has been prevented from entering are cameras, tapes, recording 
equipment, sound mixers, connection cables for audio and video, editing equipment, 
camera batteries and studio lights (Al-Mezan, 2009). 
 
The decision to ban the import of such equipment is usually taken by the Israeli 
occupation under the policy aimed at restricting the Palestinian media in order to 
prevent coverage. Usually, the Israeli authorities are not clear about the reasons for the 
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banning of such equipment and present flimsy arguments related to their protection and 
security. However, media institutions in Gaza are not permitted to obtain press 
equipment without approval from the Israeli authority. Media institutions will usually 
provide the necessary licences for the Israeli authority, but the authority stalls and then 
refuses permission. This has led to the obstruction of journalists' work. Israel is 
exercising control over Palestinian journalists through a variety of vague legal 
mechanisms. 
 
Since the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Palestinian media have 
suffered from Israeli censorship which led to the closure of some newspapers and 
prevented others from publishing. It is worth mentioning that the political and military 
conflict was the most important feature of the relationship between the Israeli army and 
all sectors of the Palestinian people including media institutions (Nossek and Rinnawi, 
2003). Needless to say, the media sector, especially in the Gaza Strip, is suffering from 
a lack of qualified journalists who have the necessary experience. Journalism in the 
Gaza Strip depends on existing experienced journalists based in the Strip and others 
who have come from outside.  
 
The Israeli blockade has prevented local journalists from participating in external 
training courses to develop their journalistic skills. The occupation's refusal to allow 
Palestinian journalists to leave the Gaza Strip has meant members of the Palestinian 
media are unable to achieve required levels of training. Media institutions in the Gaza 
Strip are endeavouring to cover events on the ground, but the blockade makes this work 
very difficult and complex. It could be argued that reports which are produced by these 
institutions in such circumstances should be considered a major achievement. 
 
Among the negative impacts of the Israeli blockade is the restriction of fuel supplies, as 
the Israeli government allows only a small amount of fuel to enter the Gaza Strip. This 
affects journalists and their work. Media crews need to travel by car to reach events and 
set up live coverage. In addition, the daily power outages disrupt their work. It is 
important to note that during their war on Gaza in 2008 Israeli forces deliberately 
bombed the main power transformers. Thus, the power outage has become a part of 




Accordingly, journalists use generators that use fuel in order to operate their equipment. 
This increases their daily suffering and makes their work more difficult. Therefore, the 
blockade has resulted in a complex situation of violations against journalists and media 
institutions. It is important to note that Palestinian journalists have succeeded in 
covering invasions by the Israeli occupation and contributed to publicizing massacres 
against the Palestinian people (Al-Uwini, 2009). Through their reports and pictures, 
Palestinian journalists have played an important role in raising awareness of the 
Palestinian cause in the international arena. 
 
Despite the blockade of the Gaza Strip and the lack of equipment, journalists have been 
able to broadcast via satellite channels and reveal the enormity of the crimes committed 
by the Israeli occupation. It is important to note that the Palestinian media played an 
important role in pressing the Israeli authorities to investigate complaints about offenses 
and crimes committed by its soldiers and officers against Palestinians (Al-Mezan, 
2009). 
 
Palestinian journalists have faced a critical situation due to the repressive practices of 
the Israeli occupation. Their work became threatened and this directly affected the 
freedom of the press and the ability of journalists to deal with the situation. It is clear 
that the blockade has had a negative impact on media performance.  
 
7.5 Suppressing journalists and media institutions in Palestine 
In the absence of law and with the continuing conflict between Fatah and Hamas, 
attacks on journalists and media institutions increased. The attacks began to target 
foreign journalists working for international news agencies. The kidnapping of foreign 
journalists began when the photographer of France Press, Khaymi Razori, and BBC 
correspondent Alan Johnston were kidnapped in 2007. This insecure situation created 
fear among foreign journalists and forced them to leave the Palestinian territories. 
Accordingly, foreign news agencies had to rely on local journalists for coverage of local 
events. 
 
Statistics shows that 2007 was the worst year for journalists; they suffered beatings, 
shootings and attacks on their families and property. 2007 was the first year in the 
history of the Palestinian media that the Israeli occupation came second in the list of 
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those known to have killed and threatened journalists: Palestinian militant groups had 
carried out a greater number of attacks (PPCMD, 2007). The continuing political 
divisions and the escalation of violence between Hamas and Fatah led to infringements 
of press freedoms by Palestinian security forces in Gaza and the West Bank. Several 
media institutions were attacked or closed. Consequently, self-censorship has emerged 
among Palestinian journalists which had a negative impact on their performance.  
 
Since the Israeli occupation, journalists' freedom of movement has been restricted, 
especially after the unilateral disengagement plan in 2005 and the withdrawal of the 
Israeli occupation from the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that after the Hamas takeover 
of the Gaza Strip in September 2007 the Israeli government announced the Strip to be a 
‘hostile entity’ and closed its borders. This situation had restricted Palestinian 
journalists as Egypt was the only way to leave the Strip. They had to travel through the 
Rafah crossing point at the borders with Egypt. This led to a restriction of their 
movements due to the severe congestion which built up at the checkpoint. 
 
Recent years have witnessed an increase in Israeli violations against journalists working 
in the Palestinian territories which threaten the whole Palestinian media structure. 
Consequently, this has undermined journalists' ability to cover events in the Palestinian 
territories. Through its control of Palestinians' movements, Israeli is violating the 
international laws that relate to freedom of movement and human rights. In addition, the 
targeting of Palestinian journalists and media institutions became very obvious, as the 
Israeli government worked to undermine Palestinian journalism (Abu Shanab, 2001). 
 
Israeli occupation forces are targeting both Palestinian and foreign journalists. This led 
to a decline in Palestinian media performance. Israeli authorities, since their occupation 
of the Palestinian territories, have deliberately silenced the Palestinian press. The 
restrictions imposed on Palestinian media have included the closure of newspapers, 
detention of journalists, and refusal of press cards. Because of these restrictions, 
censorship had found its way into press rooms (Jamal, 2000b). Journalists became 
fearful when writing articles and stories that could irritate the Israeli censor. 
 
A Palestinian journalist has expressed his opinion about how the Israeli occupation 
prevented him from leaving Gaza. He said: ‘I have got an invitation to go to London to 
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get a press award. I tried to get out of Gaza through Israeli territories. I got the 
permission, but Israeli intelligences had to question me. They had interviewed me 
where they warned me for my writings against them. However, they refused to allow 
me to enter and prevented me to leave the Strip. Therefore, I had to go through Egypt’ 
(S.E., 2010).  
 
International conventions have emphasized the journalist’s protection during war and 
armed conflict and states they should be treated as civilians who must be protected. 
Paragraph 1 and 2 of article 79 from the additional protocol of the Geneva Conventions 
1949 affirmed that: ‘Journalists  engaged  in  dangerous  professional  missions  in  
areas  of  armed  conflict  shall  be considered as civilians….’(ICRC, 1949). But the 
Israeli occupation violates these conventions and attacks journalists and media 
institutions. Its troops have ignored international conventions and killed Palestinian and 
foreign journalists. 
 
On 2 May 2003, Israeli occupiers killed the British photographer James Miller. 
Investigations showed that an Israeli soldier had deliberately fired on Miller. It is 
important to note that 34-year-old Miller was shot while filming a documentary in the 
Gaza Strip (Al-Mezan, 2009). Moreover, on 6 April 2008, Israeli troops killed Reuter’s 
cameraman Fadel Shanaa. Shanaa was targeted deliberately, by a tank shell fired by an 




7.6 The role of independent media in building a democratic Palestinian state  
The media plays a vital role in a nation's life as it covers events on a daily 
basis. This role has grown with the rapid development of mass communication and the 
emergence of new technologies. International organizations have affirmed the role of 
the media in the service of humanitarian issues and state building. Freedom of 
information is seen as a human right and an essential element that contributes to state 
building (UNESCO, 2008). Moreover, democratic media theory affirms democratic 
participation by the people. It focuses on individuals and minority groups having the 




Palestinians are experiencing a critical period of transformation where public 
participation is much needed in order to contribute to the process of state building. But 
the existing media are not able to provide the opportunity for the public to participate 
and express opinions, and therefore freedom of expression cannot be fostered. It is 
essential for democracy and independence that citizens should have the right to express 
their views and contribute to decisions that affect their lives. This will then create trust 
between citizens and governments and contribute to the construction of a state based on 
democratic principles. 
 
The Palestinian media are controlled by governments and political parties where they 
serve their political agenda. In order to contribute to building a democratic Palestinian 
state, the media must be independent. In other words, in such a situation, people trust 
neither governmental nor partisan media, as each is seen to serve its owners. 
Independent media work to gain public confidence and meet their demands for news 
and debate. This could be achieved by adopting a clear policy and transparency 
regarding the owners and financial supporters of media groups.  
 
During the focus groups' discussion, a female from PFLP criticized partisan media 
channels and how the control of the media have contributed to the destruction of 
Palestinian society. She said, ‘Partisan media failed to meet public demands. In 
addition, it failed to broaden freedom of expression to include all public sectors. 
Partisan media remained hostage to the political dictators. This led to keep the people 
away from the realities and therefore, destruction of the society. I believe independent 
media could be the solution to provide the public the necessary platform to discuss 
sensitive issues’ (Female from PFLP, 22, Gaza, 2010).  
 
However, freedom must come from inside rather than being imposed from outside, and 
cannot be achieved unless people believe in it. In this regard, the Palestinian media 
should apply freedom and work to promote public participation in order to create an 
open society that can lead to the establishment of a democratic state. 
 
In such a state-building process, it is necessary for the Palestinian media to work side by 
side with the development movement and thus to play a strategic role in sustainable 
development. It is essential that it should provide data and information needed by the 
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public and professionals. At the same time, it should be able to play a pivotal role in 
nation-building, and thus contribute to socialization and the formation of public 
opinion. And, because it is considered such an effective tool, it must be enabled to 
strengthen the national principles. In contrast, when it is dominated by parties where 
each seeks to spread its own ideologies and political agenda, it undermines the state 
structures. Both television channels sought to spread their own ideologies and eradicate 
those of their opponents. Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV have both worked to mislead 
the public and inflame the internal arena. 
 
Governmental television is seen as a symbol of national sovereignty and has become the 
first thing to be seized in a coup. Palestine TV channel is one of the Palestinian 
Authority's symbols of sovereignty and has played a major role in the broadcasting of 
propaganda against the Hamas movement. The PA used it to convince the public that 
they are seeking to establish a Palestinian state. In addition, they tried to show how 
Hamas had tried to disrupt the national project. This inevitably inflamed Hamas opinion 
against the Palestinian Authority. Thus, when Hamas seized the Gaza Strip, Palestine 
TV channel was its first target, resulting in the seizure of the channel’s building and 
confiscation of its broadcasting equipment. 
 
Hamas uses the Al-Aqsa television channel to attack the Palestinian Authority's policy 
of negotiation and has sought to convince its audience that such political negotiation 
would not lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In such an unstable situation 
and in the presence of political crisis and internal conflicts, the Palestinian media cannot 
perform its functions and contribute to building a democratic state. 
 
Palestine TV, as a governmental channel, is linked to the political, economic, social and 
security situation. Therefore, it is crucial to achieve national security through even-
handed media coverage of all issues that concern citizens and which contribute to 
nation-building as well as protecting citizens against hostile media. On the other hand, 
the media plays a prominent role in promoting peace in communities where it 
contributes effectively to establishing the foundations of security and stability. But the 
two television channels have both contributed significantly to building hatred among 
citizens through analyzing controversial issues which contributed to internal instability. 




• disruption of national identity;  
• security chaos due to the absence of political consensus and conflict about who 
holds power; 
• corruption existing within the two governments.  
It cannot be disputed that the two governments have censored the media and used their 
official media channels to disseminate propaganda. In the light of these complexities, 
the Palestinian media cannot function properly, especially at this stage of state-building 
and democratic transformation. 
 
The focus groups' discussions centred on the topic of an independent media and its role 
in building a democratic state. One of the male participants from Fatah expressed his 
views about independent media. He said, ‘independent and pluralistic media are 
essential for fostering democracy. It provides the people access to information and 
enhances their participation. It is crucial to exercise freedom of expression. It can carry 
out a role of being watchdog for public interests. Overall, such functions can defiantly 
contribute in building democratic state’ (Male from Fatah, 30, Gaza, 2010).    
 
Although governmental media should be responsible for expressing people’s 
aspirations, a free and non-partisan media are considered the best way to clarify state 
policy. This means the Palestinian Authority should completely review and reform its 
policies through designing a media strategy that takes into consideration the 
development of media content and allows more freedom of expression. Such a strategy 
remains subject to the existence of real political will.  
 
7.7 Media as a Fourth Estate: contributing to democracy and human rights 
The authority of media is not legislative, executive or judicial, but it is a supervisory 
authority. Media are the unofficial supervisor of government actions and those of other 
authorities, judiciary authority being the only exception. The media work together with 
other social organizations to reveal practices which threaten human rights. A 
supervisory authority's primary aim is to reveal and highlight faults within the 
system. Media supervision includes critique of the system for society's 
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benefit. Accordingly, this can contribute to modifying the behaviour of officials and the 
performance of those involved in political and social life. 
 
The media have a range of functions. It provides knowledge and information which help 
the public in decision-making, contributes to the shaping of public opinion, provides 
education and awareness and, of course, entertainment. In addition to these functions, 
the media have an important role in the service of human rights 
issues and democracy, and the fight against corruption. 
 
In democratic systems, the task of the media is to provide accurate and unbiased 
information to citizens. Undoubtedly, the provision of such information is essential to 
the survival of any democratic system for the following reasons:  
 
• It helps citizens to take informed and responsible decisions regarding their 
country's future. In contrast, wrong decisions which are based on false 
information can be harmful to the ultimate interests of a country and its citizens.  
• By offering accurate and correct information, the media can perform supervisory 
tasks that serve the public interest.  However, serving the public interest 
involves revealing illegal or corrupt practices by government or other 
institutions that affect the public interest. The media can draw attention to these 
practices, bringing pressure for change. One of the benefits of this supervisory 
function is that the media helps government and other political forces in a 
country to achieve a better understanding of the problems within society in order 
to improve the political and administrative performance of the government. 
 
As a government channel, Palestine TV is unable to expose the corruption that is 
rampant in the Palestinian Authority. It is controlled by the ruling political elites, 
meaning it does not criticize the PA’s policy and consequently does not address those 
issues which affect ordinary people. It speaks only on behalf of the authority. On the 
other hand, the Ministry of Information imposes control over all mass media. This 
means other media cannot disclose such corruption because Palestinian security forces 
are known to threaten journalists. Palestine TV, as a tool for the authority, is very keen 
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to highlight corruption within the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and to reveal its 
actions against the citizens of Gaza. 
 
A female from Hamas revealed her feelings during the focus groups' discussions about 
Palestinian television. She said, ‘Palestine television remain as a hostage for the 
Palestinian Authority where Palestinian elites from Fatah movement impose their views 
on its content. They do not want their corruption authority to be exposed to public in 
order not to lose their control over the authority. I think, as long as the channel remain 
in Fatah hands, it will not function as a fourth estate’ (Female from Hamas, 23, Gaza, 
2010). 
 
However, the emergence of Al-Aqsa TV has played a role in revealing corruption 
within the Palestinian Authority. It criticizes the ruling elites and reveals practices 
carried out by the Authority in the West Bank. On the other hand, it cannot criticize the 
Hamas government and disclose its corruption. In addition, the existence of censorship 
in the Gaza Strip and the establishment of the Governmental Information Office have 
prevented the media from fulfilling its role as a Fourth Estate. 
 
It could be argued that the presence of both an official and oppositional media are in the 
public interest. However this position has created a situation in which the two television 
channels have focused on political issues and the struggle for power rather than the 
social issues that concern people in their daily lives. Thus, there is an absence of a 
fourth estate that analyzes the reality of people's situation and helps them to determine 
their priorities. Therefore an independent media could be a solution because of its 
ability to handle sensitive issues, especially violations against citizens' rights. 
 
An independent media are an effective tool in the fight against corruption. It could be 
argued that, if the Palestinian media had an absolute freedom, it could work for 
individuals and the development of society and could fight against corruption. The 
Palestinian media have to form an effective power that is not related to authorities or 
parties. Such a media could publicize those actions which violate human rights, and 




Diversity of media is important, as it provides freedom for people. But the focus groups' 
discussion made it clear that Palestine TV, as a governmental channel, is considered 
contrary to the ideals of democracy as it cannot function as a fourth estate. It is 
undeniable that Fatah and Hamas always tend to control the media in order to achieve 
their goals, controlling people’s minds by acting according to their own agenda. It is 
important to note that, when media becomes one of an authority’s institutions, it 
automatically glorifies the authority and becomes a tool of manipulation where it 
exercises neither caution nor objectivity when broadcasting information, and therefore 
does not fulfil its role as the fourth estate.  
 
However, the Palestinian media have played an important role in raising issues 
concerning the humanitarian situation in this conflict area. In addition, it succeeded in 
exposing the suffering of Palestinians and attacks by the Israeli occupation. The 
Palestinian media can play an important role in disseminating values such as tolerance, 
pluralism and acceptance of others. It could encourage the renunciation of violence and 
persuade people to engage in dialogue as a means to resolve conflict. But both Al-Aqsa 
TV and Palestine TV have inflamed the conflict and spread sedition between the two 
parties. 
 
The two governments usually order their security forces to prevent media institutions 
and journalists from covering events where violations against human rights are taking 
place. They still do not fully understand the international demand for respect of human 
rights and the freedom of information, and do not provide a secure environment for the 
press to fulfil its duty as a fourth estate. Violations against human rights and media 
freedoms are against international legitimacy. The two governments should allow media 
to function as a fourth estate. Unfortunately, the Palestinian media have lost its function 
as a fourth estate and become a tool for manipulation. Changes that occurred within the 
Palestinian media in recent years demonstrate that the two governments have 
intentionally misled public opinion.  
 
A Palestinian journalist discloses his opinion about how the two governments impose 
censorship over media content and how that affects media performance. He said, ‘Since 
the establishment of Arafat regime, there has been censorship imposed over media 
content in Gaza and the West Bank. He was using his forces in order to silence any 
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journalist. He ordered that Palestine television building to be in his compound in order 
to disseminate his views. Nowadays, Hamas government in Gaza Strip impose 
censorship over media channels and they use their forces to threaten journalists. That is 
why other media channel could not function as a fourth estate’ (S.K., 2010). 
 
The Palestinian media have lost its objectivity because of its relations with political 
decision-makers. The dissemination of misleading information has become a daily 
practice, especially in the light of existing conflicts between Fatah and Hamas in which 
politicians became engaged in political deception. In addition, it has become difficult to 
distinguish between misleading and accurate information, and consequently people have 
lost their confidence in the media. 
 
At this time of increasing sources of knowledge and information, public opinion has 
become more vulnerable to manipulation and misleading information, especially in 
times of crisis and wars. The reason, of course, is the failure of media to implement its 
expected role as a fourth estate. In the Palestinian context, Hamas practises 
manipulation through its media tools where Al-Aqsa TV has a double role: it is both a 
political opposition and a governmental channel. It serves as a tool of manipulation in 
which it critiques opposition parties and at the same time functions as a mouthpiece for 
the government. This has led it to lose its credibility, objectivity and legitimacy among 
some segments of the Palestinian community. On the other hand, Fatah controls the 
Palestinian Authority institutions and tries to employ its entire media institution against 
Hamas. Palestine TV plays the role of protector of the PA, and functions as a 
mouthpiece. It does not criticize any of the government elites. This has led it to lose its 
credibility among some segments of the Palestinian society. In the absence of a 
genuinely pluralistic media that reflects different thoughts and the diverse spectrum of 
Palestinian society, as well as the absence of a platform for discussions and dialogue, 
public opinion remains vulnerable. 
 
7.8 Freedom of information as a human right in the Palestinian context 
In Palestine, the importance of adopting laws that guarantee the right to access 
information must be seen in the context of supporting a strong push towards the 
democratic process. This could be achieved through empowering national public 
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opinion to practise democracy; in other words, to provide information in order to 
engage the public in decision-making. 
 
The right to access information is considered a source of conflict between media 
practitioners and local authorities in Palestine, in which the latter creates pretexts to 
restrict this right. Consequently, Palestinians, especially journalists, are constantly 
seeking a legal environment to protect their right to access information. Palestinians' 
access to information enhances their involvement in the democratic process. 
 
Media pluralism offers an opportunity for Palestinians to access alternative sources of 
information. These sources should be protected by law and should not be exclusive to 
the government or any other party. However, Palestinians have the right to question 
those in power. They can exercise this right through elections. Hence, accessing 
information is very important as a primary source through which citizens can play a part 
in political life and take decisions regarding their representatives. 
 
Although the Palestinian Basic Law stressed freedom of opinion and expression and 
freedom of the press, it did not mention directly the right to access information. 
However, the Palestinian press law has many articles relating to the right to access 
information. Articles 2 and 4 affirmed the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
and the freedom to access, disseminate and circulate information and comment on 
it. But this philosophy is inconsistent with other articles, which restrict channels for 
obtaining information. In addition, there is a vagueness in terms and phrases employed 
in many articles.  
 
For example, paragraph C of Article 4 affirms the right for journalists to ‘search for 
information, news and statistics that are of concern to citizens from various sources and 
to analyse, disseminate and comment within the limits of the law’. In the same context, 
Article 6 states that officials should facilitate the task of journalists and researchers by 
advising them of anticipated programmes and projects. It is clear that these provisions 
as currently drafted do not guarantee the right of access to information essential for 




There is no doubt that the Palestinian Authority intentionally included unclear terms in 
articles related to freedom of information. It is difficult for journalists to obtain 
information and even when they do, they have to be very careful when they publish. In 
addition, there is a lack of clarity regarding this law which therefore prevents journalists 
from performing their duties. Indeed, they could be prosecuted or punished based on the 
elite’s interpretations of the legislation, especially in the light of the lack of 
independence of the judiciary and separation of powers. 
 
A human rights activist analyzed the situation of the two governments and how they use 
information for their own interests. He said, ‘The public have the right to know. Both 
governments hid the facts. They only disclose information that could serve their 
interests. Hamas government disclose the information that could harm Fatah and the 
Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, Fatah try to disclose information that could 
inflame the public against Hamas government’ (Shaqoura, 2010). 
 
Paragraph 4 in Article 4 grants journalists the right to protect confidential sources of 
information unless ordered otherwise by a court. Circumstances in which a court could 
take action include investigations involving a threat to national security, endeavouring 
to prevent crime being committed or to promote the interests of justice. While this 
paragraph indicates the right to protect confidential sources of 
information, it restricts it with ambiguous provisions of law under the pretext 
of prejudice to state security, prevention of crime or promotion of the interests of 
justice. These restrictions put journalists and media institutions under the penalty 
of law. 
 
These articles are followed by a set of prohibitions contained in Article 37 which 
prohibit publication of the following:  
 
• Any confidential information about police and public security forces or 
weapons, their location, movements, and exercises; 




• Articles that harm national unity, incite crimes, promote hatred and discord, and 
encourage disharmony and sectarianism between community members; 
• Proceedings of private meetings of the National Council and the Authority 
Ministers Council.  
 
From this, it is clear that the Palestinian Authority did not respect the law, especially the 
right of freedom of access to information. For the Fatah faction, it remained in power 
and took control of the Legislative Council for about ten years. It is suffering from an 
internal democratic crisis that has resulted in established leaders taking control of senior 
positions within the organization. They did not give leadership opportunities to the 
younger generation. Hamas faction took over power and controlled the Gaza Strip, 
which prevented both free access to information and freedom of expression. The 
immaturity of democratic thought within the two governments has led to practices such 
as the targeting of journalists, withholding of sources of information, assaults on media 
institutions and the detention of citizens because of their views and political affiliations.  
 
It is reasonable to impose restrictions on confidential information which relates to 
national security. But these restrictions must be within a rigid framework and 
only exercised when there is danger and real threat. Imposing restrictions on 
the dissemination of confidential information that related to meetings of the National 
Council and the Authority Ministers Council is contrary to international laws and does 
not allow the public to know what is going on. 
 
Despite the existence of a clear law which regulates media work, Palestinian journalists 
suffer from the absence of a law that constitutes a legal reference point. This legal 
vacuum leads to many violations from the executive authority which practises violations 
against media institutions and journalists without any justification or legal basis. 
 
7.9 Media and liberation 
Liberation movements became aware of the role of the media in influencing the 
individual’s political knowledge. Therefore they attached great importance to the mass 
media and took advantage of news programmes to disseminate their political ideologies. 
Governments became aware of the liberation movements' intentions. Thus, they 
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regulated the media law that restricts their work in an attempt to control 
information. But the new technology has made it very difficult for those regimes to 
control information and to impose censorship over media channels. However, media 
activists who employed modern technology such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook and other 
publishing tools have made it easy to circumvent censorship and the 
blockade. Undoubtedly, such new technologies became tools of liberation and freedom 
from authoritarian suppression.  
 
In the Palestinian context, the Palestinian leadership has realized that the media are one 
of the most effective weapons it can employ to achieve its goals. It was used as a tool to 
defend counterfeiting and the forgery of facts by the Israeli media. Needless to say, 
since its occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Israeli government has ensured 
strong support for its media propaganda aimed at destroying the Palestinian identity. It 
was therefore the duty of the Palestinian leadership to highlight the Palestinian cause 
and enlighten world public opinion in support of their cause.  
 
After the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Palestinian factions 
started to issue leaflets and statements that highlight their achievements at the national 
level in refuting the allegations of the occupiers. The Palestinian media have been the 
concern of the Palestinian revolution since its inception. In parallel with their interest in 
military actions, Palestinian factions have paid special attention to the media to explain 
their goals widely and lead the process of liberation. Indeed, they knew very well it was 
essential to focus on the Palestinian people and inflame their feelings against the Israeli 
occupation. In the absence of a balance of power between the Israeli occupation and the 
Palestinian resistance, the best option was a popular uprising. It is important to note that 
the internal press faced many difficulties, such as prosecution and the confiscation of 
equipment as well as the detention of journalists. 
 
The role of the resistance press in liberation struggles cannot be ignored. Such a press 
had flourished during the Israeli occupation. It gained a strong position among 
Palestinians. It had an impact on public awareness, and mobilized them to fight and to 
spread the experience of resistance. Thus, it promoted the struggle for national 
liberation in order to return to the homeland and establish an independent and 
democratic Palestinian state. In order to achieve national goals, the Palestinian 
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resistance had to be committed to principles and values to succeed and deliver its 
message, and therefore to activate the role of the media. 
 
In the diaspora, factions used to issue newspapers and magazines and established a 
radio station in order to connect with Palestinians inside and outside Palestine. Such 
mass media was the most important tool in providing the latest information and news of 
military operations that took place against the Israeli occupation. Such information was 
used to inspire people to look forward to freedom. It is important to note that the 
Palestinian media played an important role in building public pressure on the 
international political community to take action to liberate the Palestinian people from 
occupation. It also made the Palestinian cause the focus of the international community. 
 
Needless to say, representatives of non-Palestinian news organizations had suffered 
difficulties when journalists were subjected to chases and assassination. Educators in 
the Palestinian factions wrote against the Israeli occupation policy and played an 
important role in inflaming the people and igniting the popular uprising. Their essays, 
poems and drawings expressed Palestinian suffering under the occupation. At that time, 
Israeli had focused on the assassination of Palestinian journalists and intellectuals 
because of their distinctive role in publicizing the Palestinians' suffering. They 
assassinated the Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanaan, participated in the assassination of 
the artists Naji Al-Ali and Majed Abu Sharar, and other Palestinian writers. 
 
A Palestinian journalist expressed his view about the Palestinian journalists' role in 
liberating Palestine. He said, ‘Palestinian journalists played an important role in 
liberating the Palestinians from the Israeli occupation. They succeeded to show how 
much such occupation dominating about five million Palestinians' lives. They raised the 
Palestinian cause to the international community. They pressurised on international 
policy and made it clear that the Palestinian people deserve an independent state’ 
(Sabah, 2010). 
 
Radio has received special attention, as an important medium that can reach a large 
number of people. The Palestinian resistance, notably the PLO, had established a radio 
station in May 1968 to play a role in the liberation process. Its tasks were to support the 
Palestinian liberation movement in its struggle against Israeli occupation, to connect 
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with Palestinians inside and outside, to announce statements and updates from the 
Palestinian leadership, to clarify the strategy of struggle against the occupation, and to 
refute occupation plans to destroy the Palestinian cause.  
 
The Israeli government followed with concern the growth of internal and external 
Palestinian media. They realized that it was impossible to end this by the assassination 
of Palestinian writers. Consequently, Israeli political and military bodies began planning 
a major operation to eliminate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The strike was in 
early June 1982: a large-scale military process aimed at an area which included southern 
Lebanon up to Beirut, which was a stronghold of the Palestinian press. As a result, 
Palestinians were scattered in different countries and their media suffered suppression.  
 
The national press played a positive role in all stages of the Palestinian people's 
struggle. It expressed their hopes and worked to strengthen their movement for national 
liberation, and participated in the process of nation-building. Palestinians considered the 
press as a tool to guide and mobilize and to serve the values and fundamental principles 
that they enshrined during their long struggle. The national press must therefore remain 
a strategic weapon that encourages the fight for liberation, and a protective barrier that 
protects rights and freedoms. 
 
With the signing of the Oslo agreement, the Palestinian Authority entered a new phase 
which was represented by the establishment of Palestine TV. This has been identified as 
a turning point in the history of Palestinian media. As stated before, agreements 
between the PA and Israel prevent any incitements against each other. Therefore, as the 
television station is controlled by the PA, it is not allowed to broadcast any content that 
could inflame the public against Israel. Consequently, the Palestinian media have lost its 
role as a resistance tool for liberation and became a tool for a certain class of 
beneficiaries from the authority's regime.  
  
When Hamas started Al-Aqsa TV, expectations were very high as it was not related to 
the Palestinian Authority regime. The station's stated goals were to raise public 
awareness of the occupation's plan, to reveal its crimes against the Palestinian 
people, and to lead public freedom towards liberating the whole Palestinian land 
(Abumuhsen, 2010). Indeed, the station has shown Palestinian suffering and played an 
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important role in highlighting crimes committed by the Israeli occupation. It covered 
very closely the 2009 Israeli war in the Gaza Strip.  
 
There could be three trends for media priorities at this stage of the struggle for 
liberation. The first trend focuses on the use of the Palestinian media to accomplish the 
main objective of Palestinian resistance, the liberation of the land from Israeli 
occupation. At this stage, the main tasks of the mass media are to establish politically 
and ideologically integrated unity, to promote initiatives that encourage unification of 
the different political factions, and to mobilize international support for the liberation of 
Palestine from the Israeli occupation.  
 
The second trend focuses on the main challenges that face the media at this stage of the 
struggle for liberation. These challenges are represented in its contribution to the 
achievement of social justice. Yet the media are considered to be an integral part of the 
struggle and therefore should focus on economic, social, political and cultural problems. 
The media at this stage focuses to develop individuals within society in order to prepare 
them to lead the country.  
 
The third trend focuses on the primary task of the media at this stage of the struggle for 
national liberation. These tasks are linked to the strengthening of democratic practices 
by promotion of the three main functions of information, forum, and critique. The 
media at this stage encourages freedom of expression, provides credible information, 
allows more criticism, and functions as a watchdog. But at this stage, especially with the 




In this chapter, I have discussed different issues related to media and democracy in 
Palestine as a conflict zone. These issues affect the Palestinian media in its everyday 
practices. Despite several media institutions having been severely affected by the two 
governments and by Israeli occupation policies, they are still able to carry out some of 
their daily activities. The lack of freedom of expression, the obstruction of information, 
and the existence of daily harassments by the two governments' security forces have 
become the major barrier in any move towards democracy. Although the Palestinian 
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press law affirms freedom of expression, it contains vague terms which are subjected to 
different interpretations. Ambiguous terms and sentences contained in the press law 
were intended to enable censorship of media and journalists. The prominent role of the 
executive forces of the two governments and the vagueness of the Palestinian press law 
has had a significant impact on the right of freedom of expression. However, violations 
against freedom of expression, self-censorship, restrictions on Palestinian press freedom 
and the detention of journalists have all been part of a clear decline in Palestinian media 
performance.  
 
Peace agreements with Israel have affected the Palestinian media's ability to work 
towards political liberation. In addition, such agreements have limited Palestinians' 
freedom of expression. At the same level, Israeli blockade policies have deprived 
Palestinian journalists of opportunities to develop their journalistic skills and have 
affected media coverage of violations. In essence, freedom of expression has not been 
respected as a principle that ensures citizen’s freedom and which protects their interests 
in order to move towards democracy. Indeed, the media's experience over recent years 
has established deep doubts about the likelihood of any move towards democracy.  
 
The data from fieldwork showed that the two television channels are providing a 
platform for their own members and supporters of their policies. Interviews with 
political analysts revealed that such participation that does not include different public 
sectors and this contributes to a deepening of political differences which then leads to 
state destruction rather than state building. Moreover, the two governments' control over 
media channels has resulted in public mistrust in the information that is broadcast. 
However, the presence of the two opposing television channels has in some ways acted 
for the public interest, as each channel functioned as a fourth estate for its opponent. 
But, at the same time it has become clear that the two television channels play the dual 
role of being government channels, which defend their owners' strategies, and political 







Conclusion: Democratic communication and partisan media 
 
The main aim of the thesis was to investigate the question of how far, in the perceptions 
of Palestinians, the two television channels – Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV – were 
contributing to the development of a democratic political state through participative 
communication processes. Both quantitative (survey-based) and qualitative (focus 
group/interview) methods were used. Although, as stated in Chapter 4, the views are not 
claimed to be representative of all Palestinians, a carefully structured range of groups 
was selected to reflect the stratification of both areas of Gaza Strip. The fieldwork 
gathered the perceptions of different sectors of Palestinian society and media workers 
about their access to the television channels, their views on media reliability, freedom of 
expression, the watchdog role of television, their opinions on the status of democracy 
and human rights, and other issues related to media functions and democracy in 
Palestine.  
 
The key findings from the survey questionnaire were that, in the view of many 
respondents, the two television channels, Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV, were 
controlled by the two political parties - Fatah and Hamas respectively - and that the 
programmes broadcast on these, such as talk-shows, served to further the political 
agendas of the two groups so that the channels in effect functioned as a mouthpiece for 
the two parties. Respondents also felt that freedom of expression was not a priority for 
either channel, so that independent television channels was essential to help create a 
democratic culture. However, some participants believed that the rise of Al-Aqsa 
television has provided an aspect of freedom for the Palestinians in that they now had a 
counter propaganda channel to the Palestine TV. 
 
The findings illustrated how far the two television channels were acting only in a 
limited way as a public sphere, as they tended to only provide their own members with a 
platform and avoided those who critiqued their policies. The findings demonstrated that 
the status of democracy and human rights in Palestine was extremely low and indicated 
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that it would be very difficult to conduct free and fair elections under such 
circumstances. The survey results highlighted that the two television channels were not 
able to function as a fourth estate: i.e. that they were not providing credible information 
or promoting democracy by encouraging tolerance among Palestinians, nor were they 
protecting human rights and freedom of expression.  
 
However, participants did believe that the establishment of the Hamas-supported Al-
Aqsa television channel had prompted a change in the Palestinian arena. On the one 
hand, it contributes to promoting the democratization process by functioning as a fourth 
estate monitoring the opposing Fatah government, disseminating information in the 
Hamas interest not otherwise provided and providing a platform for Hamas members 
and others who support its policies. But, on the other hand, it contributes to the 
instability of Palestine by only providing a partisan view. In the same way, Palestine 
Television as a governmental channel functions as a fourth estate monitoring Hamas 
governance, broadcasting information of interest to Fatah and providing a platform for 
Fatah members and others who support their views. It was clear that both television 
channels have entered into a cycle of action and reaction in which media disputes are 
the major feature in recent years.  
 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is possible that this adversarial situation 
itself could be a partial solution to the provision of democratic communication. Despite 
the fact that independent media are essential at the stage of state building, partisan 
media could be part of the solution for democracy. Since the media have three functions 
in democracy – forum, information provider and monitor, each party urges its television 
channel to play these three functions for its own interests. 
 
In this investigation of the two television channels and their function in relation to 
supporting and developing democratic communication, it was necessary to examine the 
characteristics of the opposing factions and their role in Palestinian politics. Exploring 
these internal conflicts has reinforced the need to investigate the elements that hinder 
the implementation of democracy. An analysis of the dynamics of power inherent in 
occupied and transitional societies is an essential pre-requisite for understanding media 
functions in this context. In examining the strategies adopted by the two factions in 
shaping the emerging public sphere, the thesis argues that the two political factions are 
197 
 
trying to manipulate the public and conceal information that affects their power. As a 
result, the political parties have polarized the emerging public sphere. Giving examples 
from the internal political sphere, the Palestinian political and media structures, the 
research has demonstrated how much these spaces have been occupied by undemocratic 
practices. The survey results provided evidence of how far the two factions control the 
media and how this has compromised the media’s function to promote democratic 
communication and the democratic process. It shows how internal division and Israeli 
occupation have disrupted these attempts to establish a democratic sphere in Palestine. 
 
These findings were reinforced by the output from the focus groups, providing an 
insight into the problems caused by political divisions and the effect on the state-
building project. Discussions with participants in focus groups revealed their aspirations 
for an end to political divisions and for a democratic space where human rights are 
respected. The factions’ control of the two television channels, together with the 
censorship of other media channels, has resulted in the deterioration of performance by 
the Palestinian media. The results also revealed the difficulty of practising journalism in 
the Palestinian Territories and showed how media institutions and journalists suffered 
from censorship and other state harassment when covering human rights violations. The 
conflict between journalists and the two governments over access to information has 
compromised the role of the media in providing the basis for democratic 
communication and participation in the political process.  
 
The findings from both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups and 
interview) research show that the two television channels are not enabling the 
development of democracy in Palestine. The interviews supported the survey findings 
that that the two television channels’ policies are affected by the conflict between the 
two factions. Members of the ‘Independent’ focus groups were the most vigorous critics 
of the two television channels, stating that any criticism of those in power in the two 
factions was absent in their programmes. 
 
The key findings from both qualitative and quantitative research have pointed to the 
most important factor, which is the partisan nature of Palestinian society. Unstructured 
interviews in cafes – a popular space that functions as a public sphere - reveal the inner 
feelings of ordinary Palestinians, who are keen to discuss the political situation. They 
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tend to take a partisan position, whether for or against what is happening in the 
Palestinian arena. Some favour Hamas strategy in ruling Gaza, others favour Fatah 
strategy in ruling the West Bank and yet others criticize both governments. There is 
some convergence of opinion in the research in that all groups criticize both 
governments’ actions against journalists and media institutions and all agree that the 
Israeli occupation is negatively impacting on the performance of the media in the 
Palestinian Territories.  
 
The findings from the interviews with journalists, political analysts, human rights 
activists, and academics revealed the problematic position of the media as an area of 
practice in Palestine. Political divisions and the lack of security arising from the Israeli 
occupation have made it difficult for journalists to practise professionally or effectively 
as media workers. Journalists suffer both from government censorship and self-
censorship in that most journalists are afraid to talk. In addition, the Israeli occupation 
and its operations are preventing journalists working freely, for example covering 
violations committed against Palestinians. Another impact on their performance is the 
Israeli blockade that prevents them participating in international conferences and 
training and has caused a shortage of press equipment. However, despite being targeted 
by the Israeli occupation forces, Palestinian journalists have succeeded in 
communicating Israeli violations to the international community. 
 
The fieldwork interactions with Palestinian people, academics, journalists, human rights 
activists and other media practitioners in Gaza have enabled insights into how media 
can function during a transitional period, where there is no democratic state. It is clear 
that much of the literature concerns media functions in democratic Western societies but 
it is important to consider examples from the Arab world, where authoritarian 
governments control the media for their own interests. In this context, the need for 
rethinking an Arab media culture is extremely important (Sabry, 2009) 
 
During the research, it became clear that many journalists and participants in focus 
groups were not fully aware of the nature of democracy and how media functions in 
democratic countries. This indicated a lack of knowledge among some sectors of the 
Palestinian society that need to be informed about their rights. Indeed, the prospects for 
democracy in Palestine were still seen as vague. Freedom and independence for the 
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media is very much dependent on the willingness of the political parties to form a united 
government.  
 
There was a view in the focus groups that maintaining a national broadcaster during the 
period of political instability could ensure the national interest was upheld. However, if 
national television is run by one political party, there was no guarantee it would not be 
used for its partisan interests. Thus the solution might be to form a national committee 
to supervise national television policy in order to maintain the national interest. 
Interviews with journalists indicated that so far national television has failed to tackle 
internal issues and meet people’s demands and not managed to communicate with the 
international community. Instead it was the perception that Palestine Television had 
been used as a tool for political manipulation and to mislead the public. In addition, 
because of its partiality, it was not upholding proper journalistic ethics, which meant it 
had no credibility and therefore could not function as a fourth estate.  
 
On the other hand, the journalists interviewed were frustrated with the way that the Al-
Aqsa television channel was tackling internal issues. They confirmed that the channel 
had a strong influence, which Hamas was using to oppose Fatah and inflame public 
opinion against the Palestinian Authority. Using the channel as a party mouthpiece in 
this way has led to the loss of its credibility. The media discourse being used during this 
phase of political tension is one of inciting conflict leading to violence and deepening 
internal divisions and which ignores professional journalism ethics. Such an adversarial 
discourse is affecting negatively the project of state building and progress towards 
democracy. 
 
Interviews with human rights activists showed how human rights organizations are very 
aware of the two governments’ actions against journalists. They also claimed that the 
two factions used their television channels to target human rights activists. There have 
also been attacks on independent media outlets. It is clear from the findings that a 
review of Palestinian Press Law is also very much needed. The government should 
ensure that the free flow of information to support democracy is safeguarded by the law. 
Legislation should be enacted in order to encourage media pluralism and prevent 
concentration of media ownership by the government. Furthermore, the government 
should encourage media diversity in order to safeguard the public interest. Democracy 
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and state-building can only be achieved if the two political parties Fatah and Hamas end 
the internal division and stop using their television channels as propaganda tools.  
 
The lack of freedom of expression and access to information has prevented the 
establishment of a democratic space essential to create a coherent political system and 
on which to base a democratic society that respects human rights. The view of those 
interviewed was that the two governments needed to hold elections in order to end the 
Palestinian division. They were convinced that public participation in the political 
process was very crucial at this stage of state-building. 
 
The success of the Palestinian state depends on political unity and an effective media 
system that is able to perform the three functions of forum, critique and information. In 
moving towards democracy, the government should provide the climate in which an 
independent and pluralistic media can emerge and develop. The government should 
guarantee freedom of expression and free access to information. Special efforts should 
be made to support independent media and journalists to work freely and without 
government interference. It is crucial to maintain non-partisan reporting and high 
professional standards of journalism ethics when covering events, especially in times of 
conflict.  
 
However, in the transition to this desired state, it could be argued that the Palestinian 
media experience has shown that partisan media may be able to fulfil a role in 
contributing to the democratization of Palestine. The two television channels do provide 
limited functions of democratic communication to their own factions, so between them 
they may benefit Palestinian society. The Palestinian Authority treats Al-Aqsa 
television channel as opposition media, considering it to be irresponsible, by causing 
discontent and disunity among Palestinians. In addition, they believe that the criticism it 
makes of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah threatens political stability. On the other 
hand, Al Aqsa’s supporters believe that the existence of the television channel is their 
only guarantee of freedom and democracy (Zaqout, 2009; Abuhashish, 2010). They 
think that it would be impossible to have democracy without such an opposition media 
channel, which is able to fulfil the functions of providing a platform for critics of the 
Palestinian Authority, acting as a watchdog and providing the public with the necessary 




Partisan media as opposition media can practise a freedom of expression which is 
important for democratic communication. Despite the fragile political situation in the 
Palestinian Territories, Al-Aqsa television does act as a watchdog, monitoring the 
Palestinian Authority. Al-Aqsa television, as a partisan media channel, has played a 
crucial role in exposing the Palestinian Authority in relation to violations against human 
rights and freedoms in Palestine. Moreover, Palestine Television as a governmental 
institution is restricting the flow of information to the public, and, therefore, Al-Aqsa 
television has played the role of an alternative source of information. Palestinian 
Authority control over the West Bank, censorship and the hierarchical organisation of 
the Palestine Television channel has prevented journalists from tackling sensitive issues. 
However, Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip has provided Al-Aqsa television channel 
with the space to criticise the Palestinian Authority and monitor those in power in the 
West Bank. 
 
Since the Palestinian Authority is controlled by Fatah, and Fatah elites control Palestine 
Television as a governmental channel, this also is a partisan media channel. Fatah elites 
use the channel to respond to Hamas actions. They tend to show Hamas as the party 
which has betrayed the Palestinian cause by seeking power to further their own 
ideological interests, while Hamas depict Fatah and the Palestinian Authority as selling 
out to Israel.  
 
The other smaller political parties have also tried to establish their own media to 
provide an alternative source of information but the two governments are now trying to 
exert control over these channels via censorship. However, when the national television 
channel fails to provide the platform for diverse opinions, fails to provide information 
for the public and fails to act as a watchdog to protect public interests, then opposition 
media could be a partial solution.  
 
There is no doubt that national and partisan media could get stuck in a cycle of action 
and reaction, which would lead the public to mistrust both. However, this opposition 
means that the two channels act as watchdogs of each other, that between them 
sufficient information is made accessible and that the platforms provided by the two 
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channels are sufficient for the public to express their views against each government act 
overall in the general public interest.  
 
As the Palestinian public sphere has been controlled by the Palestinian political parties, 
independent media have not been able to find a way to reach the public and contribute 
to democratic communication. As discussed in Chapter 2, independent media are 
characterised by the World Bank as having free access to information and free to report 
the information they receive without ‘undue fear’. Media in Palestine are either 
controlled directly by the two governments or indirectly via censorship. The law has 
also proved unable to safeguard their independence or the safety of journalists. The key 
factors required for independent media to flourish are not present, as in many 
transitional and post-conflict countries, leaving it vulnerable to power elites.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in situations such as Palestine, where there is strong 
political control and little democracy, international NGOs have played an important role 
in promoting independent media and professional journalism by providing resources 
and training courses to build capacity and skills. The role of the internet is also 
important as an alternative space or public sphere as a source of independent 
information. Projects supporting media development such as those of UNESCO or the 
SIDA collaboration with Birzeit University have a particular importance in the 
Palestinian territories, which lack the basic tools to sustain a robust public sphere. There 
is little doubt that the aim of such projects is to provide the Palestinian journalists with 
the ability to support media channels as a force to promote dialogue and democracy. 
 
The research showed that nearly all the groups surveyed thought that independent 
television channels would help to create democracy. This indicates that Gazans are 
aware of the role of independent media in establishing the conditions for democracy by 
providing information and acting as a forum for public debates. However, independent 
media depend on a democratic constitution which provides guarantees of freedom of 
expression and the right to access information. In the Palestinian case, an independent 
media are much needed in order to promote democracy and build a Palestinian state. As 
Shahin (2010) states, if the two channels were independent, it would benefit Palestinian 
communal interest, not just the factions’ interest. In addition, it would play a role in 
reconciliation and reduce Palestinian divisions.  
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That Palestinian media are dominated by political issues is a legacy of the birth of the 
Palestinian problem, and as a result other issues have been neglected. It is crucial at this 
transition stage to state-building to focus on other social and economic issues such as 
education, health, etc. Allowing Palestinians to express themselves in issues related to 
their daily life would deepen democracy and create a public space for discussion among 
different political players. 
 
In May 2011 Hamas and Fatah finally reconciled their major differences and signed an 
agreement to form a united government. It will be interesting to see how this will 
impact on these two television channels and whether Palestine Television could become 























Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire 
 
Gaza Strip, 15-01-2010 
Communication and Media Research Institute     
The University of Westminster 
Researcher: Bahjat Abuzanouna 
 
Please answer by placing the sign X in the appropriate box 
 
1- Gender:   Male   Female  Age                     Political 
affiliation 
 
2- How long do you watch television daily? 
  
Less than one hour   From one to two hours       More than three 
hours 
 
3- Do you watch Palestine TV channel?         
 
Yes    No 
 
4- Do you watch Al-Aqsa TV channel?        
 
Yes    No  
 
5- Which television station fulfils your requirements?   
 
        Palestine TV           Al-Aqsa   None  
 
6- In your opinion, which television station has greater reliability? 
  
        Palestine TV           Al-Aqsa   None  
 
7- How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights in 
Palestine? 
 
     Good    Bad   Very bad   
 
8- Do you think it is possible to conduct democratic elections in the current situation? 
 
  Yes   No   
 
9- Do you think television can contribute to facilitating a dialogue among different 
political parties in Palestine?  
   



























10- Do you think the editorial policy of the two television stations - Palestine and Al-
Aqsa - is affected by the conflict between Fatah and Hamas? 
 
      Yes    No 
11- Do you think the social debates conducted in the two channels could enhance the 
democratic culture and contribute to the creation of a pluralistic society? 
 
      Yes    No   Sometimes 
 
12- Do you think Israeli occupation affects the performance of television in Palestine? 
 
      Yes    No 
  
13- Do you think television could contribute to the process of state-building? 
 
      Yes    No 
 
14- Do you think Palestine television channel is politically biased? 
 
       Yes     No 
 
15- Do you think Al-Aqsa TV channel is politically biased? 
 
      Yes     No 
 
16- Are freedom of expression and opinion being implemented by the two television 
channels?      
      Yes    No 
 
17- Do you think that the creation of an independent media would be an important 
factor in establishing democracy in Palestine?             
 
        Yes    No 
 
18- In your view which television station allows people’s participation and promotes 
controversial opinions? 
 
         Palestine TV          Al-Aqsa    None 
 
19- Do you think Hamas government in the Gaza Strip imposes censorship? 
 
        Yes    No 
 
20- Do you think the Palestinian Authority (PA) imposes censorship? 
 
       Yes    No 
 
21- Do you think the two TV channels Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa television function as 
a mouthpiece respectively for Fatah and Hamas?           




























22- Do you think Palestine and Al-Aqsa TV, function as a fourth estate? 
 
       Yes    No 
 
23- Do you think Palestine TV and Al-Aqsa TV can afford to criticise those in power?  
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